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1. Introduction 
 
The  field  of  management  accounting  has  become  more  strategic  (Bromwich  
and Bhimani, 1989, 1994; Bhimani and Bromwich, 2010; Otley, 2001). This 
development has been enhanced by the fact that many traditional management 
accounting systems, such as performance measurement systems and cost 
accounting systems, have been transformed into new applications that allow 
for the inclusion of strategically critical information that can also take a non-
financial form (Bhimani and Bromwich, 2010; Otley, 2001; see e.g. Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992, 1996; Shank, 1996; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). In tandem 
with these developments, management accountants have started to take a more 
strategic role in organisations. Instead of being traditional ‘bean counters’, they 
now play a more business-orientated value-adding role. (Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Granlund and Taipaleenmäki, 2005; Järvenpää, 2007; Vaivio and 
Kokko, 2006; for recent practitioner reports see e.g. IBM, 2010; McKinsey, 
2009)  
 The strategic role of management accounting is in practice mobilised 
through management practices that integrate management accounting more 
firmly with the core of strategic decision-making and control.1 This dissertation 
focuses on four management practices that lie on the interface between 
strategy and management accounting.2 Some of these management practices 
lie on the boundaries of traditional conceptions of management accounting.3   
                                                  
1 The term ‘strategic  role  of  management accounting’  refers  in this  dissertation to the 
role management accounting has in supporting strategy formation and 
implementation; i.e. in enhancing strategic decision-making and the attainment of an 
organisation’s strategic objectives. The term ‘practice’ refers here, on the other hand, to 
the shared routines of behaviour, including traditions, norms and procedures of 
thinking, acting and using ‘things’ (this last in a broad sense, including for example the 
use  of  management  accounting  systems).  Such  practices  can  be  informal  or  formal.  
They can also be organisation-specific, or extra-organisational in which case they 
derive from larger social fields. (Whittington, 2006) 
2 The term ‘strategy’ refers in this dissertation to a pattern of important decisions, 
implemented over time and affecting the long-term direction and scope of the 
organisation (based on Thomson and Baden-Füller, 2010, p. 22). These decisions may 
result from a deliberate calculation and analysis or they may emerge more informally 
as part of managerial work (see e.g. Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Whittington, 2006). 
3 This dissertation adopts a broad definition of management accounting. It responds to 
Otley’s (1994, 1999, 2001) repeated calls for extending the boundaries of management 
accounting in order to “put the management back to management accounting”, and to 
make management accounting research more relevant to managers in contemporary 
organisations. The term ‘management accounting’ refers in this dissertation to 
processes and systems that managers use for managing and controlling organisational 
performance. These processes and systems relate, for example, to target-setting, 
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The first essay of this dissertation focuses on the practices used in making 
strategic investment decisions (SIDs).4 SIDs represent a management 
accounting practice in which management accountants have traditionally had a 
significant role in strategic decision-making (see e.g. Bromwich and Bhimani, 
1994; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998). SID literature has documented 
significant differences in practice – both in regard to the choice of capital 
budgeting techniques (see e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Carr and 
Tomkins,  1996,  1998;  Sandahl  and  Sjögren,  2003;  Verbeeten,  2006)  and  in  
regard to broader tendencies to emphasise strategic versus financial analysis in 
decision-making (see e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Sandahl and Sjögren, 
2003). The SID literature has, however, paid little attention to which 
contextual variables, apart from the country context, could be associated with 
these differences (Chen, 2008; Verbeeten, 2006). Essay 1 seeks to shed light on 
the contextual nature of these differences. It develops a new corporate typology 
that aims specifically at explaining differences in SID making practices. It also 
explores this typology’s potential for explaining differences in practice.  
The second essay of this dissertation addresses the role of management 
control systems (MCSs) in shaping strategy formation. Early MCS research 
tended to view their role as being constrained to the enhancement of strategy 
implementation (Otley, 1994). Contemporary literature on MCSs widely 
acknowledges that they are not only important for strategy implementation, 
but also for strategy formation (see e.g. Chapman, 2005; Langfield-Smith, 
1997; Simons, 1990). MCS literature has tended to describe the role of MCSs in 
shaping strategy formation as one of triggering strategic debate and 
organisational learning (see e.g. Bruining et al., 2004; Simons, 1990, 1991, 
1995b; Tuomela,  2005; Vaivio,  2004).  Essay 2 seeks to shed new light on the 
role of MCSs in shaping strategy formation by examining the use of knowledge-
integrating corporate-level MCSs.5  
                                                                                                                                    
decision-making, measurement, control and rewarding. These processes and systems 
may or may not be based on financial information. (Otley, 1999; 2001; see also Ferreira 
and Otley (2010) for a recent discussion about the nature of performance management 
systems) 
4 The definition of SID will be clarified in Section 2. That section will also discuss the 
definitions of the other three management practices addressed in this dissertation: 
MCS, SPMS and values-based control.  
5 Knowledge integration and organisational learning are, inevitably, interrelated 
concepts (see e.g. Bell et al., 2002; Crossan et al., 1999; Huber, 1991, Thomas et al., 
2001). The effective use of knowledge is often considered to constitute a key element of 
the organisational learning process (Crossan et al., 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; 
Huber, 1991). Knowledge integration and organisational learning differ, however, in 
their  scope  and  time  orientation.  Organisational  learning  has  a  broader  scope  and  a  
longer time orientation. It is generally viewed as a rather open-ended process, which 
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The third essay of this dissertation focuses on strategic performance 
measurement  systems  (SPMS),  which  have  become  an  integral  part  of  
contemporary corporate practice (see e.g. Kald and Nilsson, 2000; Malmi, 
2001; Rigby, 2001; Silk, 1998, Speckbacher et al., 2003). Essay 3 examines how 
substantial dynamism can be built into SPMSs and how such dynamic SPMSs 
can be used for strategic alignment. Essay 3 is motivated by the practical 
significance of building dynamism into SPMSs (see e.g. Bititci et al., 2000; 
Eccles, 1991) and the shortage of prior empirical evidence showing how 
companies seek to achieve this in practice (see e.g. Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 
2003; Neely, 2005; Waggoner et al., 1999). 
Finally, the fourth essay of this dissertation focuses on the concept of values-
based control - a concept which has remained ambiguous despite wide 
acknowledgement by the contemporary MCS literature that such systems 
constitute  an  essential  part  of  a  broader  control  package  (e.g.  Malmi  and  
Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Mundy, 2010; Simons, 
1995a;  Widener,  2007).  Essay  4  seeks  to  specify  the  key  approaches  through 
which values-based control is mobilised and to illustrate how these approaches 
can be applied in practice.  
 The primary objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the SID, SPMS, 
MCS and values-based control literatures by addressing the research gaps 
specified in the study. While making more focused contributions to these 
literatures, this dissertation also makes general observations about the 
strategic role of management accounting in contemporary organisations. These 
general observations will be addressed in the concluding section of Part I.   
 This dissertation is strongly motivated by the objective of developing 
theoretical insights that are useful for accounting practice (see Baldvisndottir 
et al., 2010; Malmi and Granlund, 2009; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006; 
Otley, 2001). In line with this objective, it examines management accounting 
practices in their natural settings (see e.g. Cooper and Morgan, 2008; Ferreira 
and Merchant, 1992; Kaplan, 1986; Kasanen et al., 1993; Malmi and Granlund, 
                                                                                                                                    
aims at fairly abstract outcomes such as the enhancement of an organisation’s long-
term performance (Garvin, 1993; Senge, 1990; Thomas et al., 2001), strategic renewal 
(Crossan and Berdrow, 2003), adaptation (Edmonson and Moingeon, 1998), and, 
ultimately, survival (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Knowledge integration, on the other 
hand, has a narrower scope and more concrete objectives. It aims at integrating 
dispersed, specialised knowledge in organisational routines, procedures, processes, 
structures, documents or other repositories (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Teece, 2000). The focus is more on the effective application of existing 
knowledge, rather than on the acquisition or creation of new knowledge that would 
enhance  strategic  renewal  and  adaptation  over  time  (Grant,  1996a,  1996b).  The  
concept of ‘knowledge’ will be addressed in Subsection 2.2.2. 
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2009; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006; Otley, 2001). All four essays 
included in this dissertation adopt a case study approach. Depending on the 
particular theoretical objectives of the essays, their more specific case study 
designs range from a hypotheses testing-oriented multiple case study design, to 
an  inductive,  theory  discovery-oriented  single  case  study  design  (see  e.g.  
Keating, 1995; Scapens, 1990).  
 This dissertation comprises two parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
dissertation. It starts by defining the key concepts of the study, by presenting 
an  overview  of  relevant  work  within  the  SID,  MCS,  SPMS  and  values-based  
control literatures, and by highlighting the particular research gaps in these 
literatures that are addressed by this dissertation. The subsequent third section 
specifies  the  research  objectives  of  the  four  essays.  It  also  describes  the  key  
theoretical underpinnings of each essay. The fourth section clarifies the 
methodological position of the study. It also discusses the research approach in 
regard to the method, data sources and data analysis and deals with reliability 
and validity issues. The fifth section presents summaries of the four essays and 
their contribution. The sixth and final section concludes Part I by discussing 
this dissertation’s broader implications. Finally, Part II includes the four 
original papers. 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
2.1. Strategic investment decisions (SIDs) 
 
2.1.1. Definition of SID  
 
The capital budgeting literature has not always distinguished more strategic 
types of investment (e.g. Arnold and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Klammer and Wa1ker, 1984; Pike, 1983). A substantial body of research, 
however, attests to the importance of this distinction, arguing that the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding SIDs may present particular 
challenges to management (Alkaraan and Northcott,  2006; Butler et  al.  1993; 
Marsh et al., 1988; Oldcorn and Parker, 1996; Phelan, 1997; Van Cauwenbergh 
et al., 1996). 
 Most available definitions of SID highlight its influence on long-term 
corporate performance (Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Carr and Tomkins, 
1996; Van Cauwenbergh et al., 1996). For example, Van Cauwenbergh et al. 
(1996, pp. 169) define SID simply as “a decision on an investment which has a 
significant potential for improving corporate performance”.  Carr  and  
Tomkins  (1996)  agree  on  SID’s  performance  implications  and  add  that  SIDs  
also tend to have broad organisation-wide ramifications. Alkaraan and 
Northcott (2006) add, on the other hand, that substantial size is also a defining 
characteristic of an SID.6  
 The definition of SID adopted in this study combines elements of previous 
definitions: it defines SID as a decision on a substantial investment that has 
broad organisation-wide ramifications and a significant effect on an 
organisation’s long-term performance.  
 
2.1.2. Research on SIDs 
 
Much of the literature on SID making practices has focused on examining the 
general use of capital budgeting techniques such as DCF (e.g. Alkaraan and 
Northcott, 2006; Arnold and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Farragher et al., 1999; 
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Pike, 1996). Most research in the field has focused 
                                                  
6Alkaraan and Northcott (2006) also note that SIDs involve high levels of risk and 
produce hard-to-quantify outcomes. This specification is excluded from the definition 
of SID applied in this study. Whether an investment can be regarded as ‘strategic’ is not 
considered to be directly linked to the level of risk involved, nor to the extent to which 
potential investment outcomes are quantifiable. 
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on particular country contexts, addressing the use of techniques for example in 
the U.S. (e.g. Farragher et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Klammer et al., 
1991), the U.K. (e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Arnold and Hatzopoulos, 
2000;  Pike,  1996),  Japan (e.g.  Carr,  2005;  Carr  and Tomkins,  1998;  Jones  et  
al., 1993; Kim and Song, 1990; Shields et al., 1991; Yoshikawa et al., 1989), 
Continental Europe (e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 1996; 1998; Carr et al., 1994) and 
Nordic  countries  (Honko  and  Virtanen,  1975;  Keloharju  and  Puttonen,  1995;  
Liljeblom and Vaihekoski, 2004; Sandahl and Sjögren, 2003; Virtanen, 1984). 
Another, more limited research stream has examined SID making practices 
from a field study perspective. This research stream has sought to shed light on 
the way in which capital budgeting techniques are used in companies. (See e.g. 
Butler et al., 1991; Carr, 2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Carr et al., 1994; 
Jones et al., 1993) A large part of this type of research is cross-national and it 
also seeks to provide evidence of potential cross-country differences in SID 
making practices. (See e.g. Carr, 2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Jones et 
al, 1993) 
 Research findings suggest that there are considerable differences in SID 
making practices among companies. These differences relate not only to the 
choice of capital budgeting techniques, but also to the way in which these 
techniques are used to inform decision making. (See e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 
1996, 1998; Sandahl and Sjögren, 2003) Available evidence indicates that some 
of these differences can be attributable to the country context. It suggests that 
the  use  of  DCF  techniques  is  more  extensive  and  influential  among  Anglo-
Saxon companies (e.g. Arnold and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Pike, 1996; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001) as compared to Japanese, Continental European and Nordic 
companies, which may also base their decisions on less sophisticated 
techniques such as payback period. (Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Keloharju 
and Puttonen, 1995; Liljeblom and Vaihekoski, 2004; Sandahl and Sjögren, 
2003; Shields et al., 1991; Yoshikawa et al., 1989) The research evidence also 
suggests that Japanese and German companies tend to pay more attention to 
strategic considerations than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. U.K. companies, 
in particular, have been found to tend to overlook strategic considerations and 
to focus strongly on financial analyses. (Carr, 2005; Carr and Harris, 2002; 
Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Jones et al., 1993)  
 Available evidence indicates that there are also differences in the SID 
making practices among companies in the same country context (see e.g. 
Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Sandahl and Sjögren, 2002; Verbeeten, 2006). 
For  example,  Sandahl  and  Sjögren’s  (2003)  Swedish  study  indicates  
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considerable differences among companies both in regard to the use of capital 
budgeting techniques and the tendency to emphasise strategic versus financial 
considerations in analysis.  
 In  addition  to  the  association  with  country  context,  SID  literature  has  
hitherto provided only limited evidence of a link between contextual variables 
and these differences, (Chen, 2008; Slagmulder et al., 1995; Verbeeten, 2006). 
Available contextual evidence relates to the use of capital-budgeting 
techniques,  suggesting  that  the  use  of  sophisticated  techniques  is  more  
common among large companies (Farragher et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Pike, 1996), among companies that operate in predictable as opposed to 
unpredictable business environments (Chen, 1995; Ho and Pike, 1998), among 
highly leveraged companies (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Klammer et al., 1991), 
and among companies that face financial uncertainty (Verbeeten, 2006).7 On 
the other hand, the question of which contextual factors may be associated with 
differences in the ways in which capital-budgeting techniques are put to use 
when  making  decisions  on  strategic  investments  has  remained  largely  
unexplored (Slagmulder et al., 1995).  
 
2.1.3. Research gap in the SID literature addressed in this study  
 
The first essay of this dissertation, “Strategic investment decision making 
practices: A contextual approach”, responds to repeated calls for more 
contextually based research designed to explain differences in SID making 
practices (Haka, 1987; Ho and Pike,  1998; Slagmulder et  al.,  1995; Verbeeten, 
2006). It introduces a new corporate typology that has been developed 
specifically to explain differences in SID making practices. It also presents 
some exploratory evidence of this typology’s potential for explaining 
differences in practice.  
 
 
2.2. Management control systems (MCSs) 
 
2.2.1. Definition of MCS 
 
                                                  
7 We draw on Haka et  al.  (1985) to use the term ‘sophisticated techniques’  to  refer  to 
capital budgeting techniques such as Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) that consider the risk-adjusted discounted net cash flows expected from a 
project. 
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The definition of MCS has evolved considerably over the years. Much of the 
early research on MCSs was influenced by Anthony’s (1965, pp. 17) classic 
definition of management control as “the process by which managers assure 
that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organisation’s goals” (see Otley, 1994; Otley and Berry, 
1980). Anthony’s classic definition has subsequently come under considerable 
criticism. It has been criticised for providing only a partial view of management 
control by deliberately excluding the challenges of defining organisational 
goals and of ensuring that needed actions are taken in practice (Langfield-
Smith,  1997;  Otley  1994;  1999;  Otley  and  Berry,  1980).  It  has  also  been  
criticised for excluding the role of MCSs in strategy formation (Simons, 1990) 
and for failing to account of the possible emergence and evolvement of 
strategies in the course of business (Specklé, 2001).  
Despite this criticism, many of the more recent definitions of MCS similarly 
emphasise the role of MCS in assuring the achievement of an organisation’s 
goals (e.g. Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Flamholtz et al., 
1985; Otley and Berry, 1994). Many MCS definitions also highlight the role of 
MCS  in  influencing  human  behaviour  (e.g.  Abernethy  and  Chua,  1996;  
Flamholtz et al., 1985; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Marginson, 2002, Merchant 
and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  Otley,  1987).  Another  widely  acknowledged  role  of  
MCS is that of informing decision-making (Chapman, 1997; Merchant and 
Otley, 2007; Widener, 2007; cf. Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
 This study draws on the recent definition of MCS put forward by Malmi and 
Brown (2008) as it provides one of the most elaborate conceptualisations of 
MCS available to date.  It  is  consistent with the widely shared view that MCSs 
work through their influence on organisational members’ behaviour (see e.g. 
Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Merchant and Van der 
Stede,  2007;  Otley,  1987).  It  also  suggests  that  MCSs  work  not  only  by  
influencing the behaviour of organisational members, but also by influencing 
their decisions. Further, it echoes many MCS definitions in emphasising a 
linkage  between  MCSs  and  organisational  objectives  (see  e.g.  Anthony,  1965,  
Bisbe  and  Otley,  2004;  Flamholtz  et  al.,  1985).  It  diverges  from  many  other  
definitions,  however,  in  that  it  explicitly  acknowledges  that  objectives  can  
change before they are achieved. Rather than suggesting that MCSs help to 
ensure the attainment of an organisation’s objectives, their definition 
maintains that MCSs seek to ensure that employees’ behaviours and decisions 
are consistent with the organisation’s objectives. Finally, their definition is 
consistent  with  the  widely  shared  understanding  that  MCSs  include  not  only  
19 
 
accounting-based  systems,  but  also  many  other  types  of  controls  such  as  
administrative and values-based controls (see e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Emmanuel 
et al., 1990; Fisher, 1998; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Langfield-Smith, 1997; 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Otley, 1980; Simons, 1995a).  
 The definition of MCS applied in this paper diverges from the original 
definition of Malmi and Brown (2008) in that it does not attempt to exclude 
mere decision-support systems from the concept of MCS. This is because such 
a distinction may often be artificial and difficult to establish in practice 
Although some systems may at first seem to be mere decision-support systems 
in  that  their  influence  on  subordinate  behaviour  and  goal  congruence  is  not  
monitored (see Malmi and Brown, 2008), these systems may be in place in 
order to shape the understandings of organisational members and to influence 
their decisions and behaviour. Finally, the definition applied in this study also 
acknowledges that some existing control devices may not be actively and 
intentionally used for control purposes. As a consequence, only those devices 
that managers actively and intentionally use to influence the behaviours and/or 
decisions  of  organisational  members  are  regarded  as  MCSs  in  this  study.  
Consequently, the term MCS refers in this study to any systems that managers 
actively and intentionally use to ensure that the behaviours and/or decisions 
of organisational members are consistent with the organisation’s objectives. 
  
2.2.2. Research on MCSs 
 
MCSs are one of the most extensively studied areas of management accounting 
research (Chapman et al., 2007; Luft and Shields, 2003).8 Hence, my purpose 
here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature. Instead, it is to 
address three specific streams in MCS literature that are relevant to this 
dissertation. These include the examination of interconnections between MCSs 
in a control package; the examination of the strategy formation shaping role of 
MCSs; and the examination of the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs.  
                                                  
8 The  field  of  MCS  research  is  also  very  diverse.  This  diversity  relates  to  research  
methods, research questions, variables, measures, definitions, theories, research sites 
and organisational levels in which MCSs are studied (Stringer, 2007). Comprehensive 
reviews  of  the  MCS  literature  have  been  presented,  for  example  by  Baxter  and  Chua  
(2003), Berry et al. (2009), Chenhall (2003, 2005, 2007), Covalevski et al. (1996), 
Ferreira and Merchant (1992), Fisher (1995), Harrison and McKinnon (1999), 
Langfield-Smith  (1997,  2007),  Macintosh  (1994),  Merchant  and  Otley  (2007)  and  
Stringer (2007). 
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2.2.2.1 Interconnections between MCSs in a control package 
Early research on MCSs tended to focus on accounting-based controls such as 
budgets and costing systems (Otley, 1994, 1999; Puxty, 1989). Much of this 
research adopted a contingency approach which is based on the premise that 
there is no universally appropriate MCS that would apply to all organisations in 
all circumstances (Dent, 1990; Otley, 1980). The results of the contingency-
based research have been fragmented and less than definitive (Chenhall, 2003, 
2007; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995). One reason for this is that variation in the 
dimensions of variables has inhibited coherent accumulation of findings 
(Chenhall,  2003).  Another reason is that the tendency to focus on only a few 
contingency and MCS variables has resulted in very fragmented findings 
(Fisher, 1995).  
 Not surprisingly, there have been repeated calls for a more comprehensive 
examination of control packages - whereby accounting-based controls would be 
studied in combination with other types of MCSs (e.g. Abernethy and Chua, 
1996; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; Fisher, 1995, 
1998; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980, 1994; 1999; 
2001). What in actuality constitutes a ‘control package’ has, however, remained 
ambiguous  (Malmi  and  Brown,  2008).  Most  scholars  agree  that  a  control  
package comprises a combination of accounting-based and other controls 
(Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Emmanuel et al., 1990; Fisher, 1998; Flamholtz et 
al,  1985;  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  Simons,  1995a).  The  central  role  of  
cybernetic control systems is also emphasised by many researchers (Fisher, 
1998;  Flamholtz,  1983;  Flamholtz  et  al.,  1985;  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  
Simons, 1995a). Many scholars also agree that organisational structure should 
be  included  as  one  of  the  control  package  variables  (Otley,  1980;  Otley  and  
Berry,  1980;  Fisher,  1998;  Flamholtz  et  al.,  1985;  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  
Sandelin, 2008). Academics  appear  to  disagree  on  the  extent  to  which  MCSs  
need to be integrated for their combination to be referred to as a ‘control 
package’. For example, Abernethy and Chua (1996) argue that control systems 
operate as a package when they are internally consistent. Emmanuel et al. 
(1990),  Otley  (1999)  and  Malmi  and  Brown  (2008)  are  more  pragmatic.  For  
them the term ‘control package’ implies that different elements of the package 
may be introduced by different people and/or at different points in time. Their 
view of the nature of a control package is hence less integrated. 
 The accumulation of available evidence on the interconnections between 
MCSs  in  a  control  package  has  only  begun  (see  e.g.  Chenhall  and  Langfield-
Smith,  1998;  Chenhall  and  Morris,  1995;  Mundy,  2010;  Sandelin,  2008;  
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Widener,  2007).  It  indicates  that  MCSs  are  interdependent  and  that  this  
interdependence  is  often  complementary  in  nature  (Bruining  et  al.,  2004;  
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Macintosh and Daft, 1987; Milgrom and 
Roberts,  1995;  Sandelin,  2008;  Widener,  2007;  Widener  et  al.,  2008).  It  
suggests that managers may in practice choose to use one MCS as the primary 
mode of control, which shapes the design and use of other, complementary, 
MCSs (Sandelin, 2008). Research findings also indicate that the 
interdependence  can  be  substitutional  in  nature.  For  example,  a  strong  
emphasis on informal controls may substitute for the need to apply formal 
accounting-based controls. (See e.g. Collier, 2005; Marginson, 1999) Finally, 
there is also first, tentative evidence that MCSs may represent configurational 
equifinality  -  meaning  that  an  equally  good  final  state  could  be  achieved  
through several control package configurations in the face of similar 
contingencies (Huikku, 2007; Sandelin, 2008). It is the internal consistency of 
the configuration that seems essential here (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Norris 
and O’Dwyer, 2004; Sandelin, 2008).  
Despite these advancements, the literature on control packages remains 
significantly undeveloped. For example, available evidence on how MCSs are 
configured as packages, how the elements in a control package relate to each 
other, and which outcomes control packages and interrelationships between 
MCSs in a control package produce remains limited. (Malmi and Brown, 2008)  
This study does not seek to contribute directly to the literature on control 
packages. Some of the essays do, however, examine several control package 
elements. This provides a basis for making general observations about the 
interconnections between control package constituents. These observations 
will be addressed in the concluding section of Part I. 
2.2.2.2. The role of MCSs in shaping strategy formation  
Robert Simons’ (1990, 1991, 1995a) research has been instrumental in 
broadening our understanding of the relationship between strategy and MCSs. 
His  field  studies  in  large  U.S.  companies  suggested  that  MCSs  are  not  only  
important for strategy implementation, but also for strategy formation. His 
findings indicated that top managers trigger strategic debate and foster 
organisational learning about strategic uncertainties by using some MCSs in a 
more interactive way.9 Simons (1990) integrated his findings into a process 
                                                  
9 Simons (1990, 1991, p. 49-50) referred to this type of MCS as an interactive control 
system (ICS). It tended to reflect four conditions: i) information generated by the MCS 
is an important and recurring agenda addressed by the highest levels of management, 
ii) the process demands frequent and regular attention from operating managers at all 
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model of the relationship between business strategy and MCSs. It proposes a 
two-way relationship between strategy and MCSs. While strategy influences 
MCSs by determining key strategic uncertainties and by influencing top 
managers in their choice of MCSs for interactive use, the use of such interactive 
control systems (ICSs) does, on the other hand, direct and foster organisational 
learning. This influences business strategy formation by triggering new 
strategic initiatives. 
Simons’ (1990) conceptualisation of the role of MCSs in shaping strategy 
formation is strongly influenced by the notion that strategies emerge through a 
process of incremental learning (see e.g. Mintzberg, 1994; Quinn, 1980). 
Shaping  strategy  by  guiding  strategic  debate  and  incremental  learning  is,  
however, likely to be slow and ambiguous (Ansoff, 1991; Goold, 1996; Pascale, 
1984).  The  use  of  organisation-wide  ICSs  may  also  be  costly.  It  may  lead  to  
positive performance outcomes only in situations in which the organisation is 
going through a major strategic redirection. (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; 
Kober et al., 2007) Corporate-level managers may have an incentive to develop 
more  immediate  ways  of  shaping  business  strategy  formation  (Goold  and  
Campbell, 1987; Goold et al., 1994; Grant, 2003). Their ability to call business 
strategies  into  question  is,  however,  likely  to  be  hindered  by  the  fact  that  
strategic knowledge, for example of technology and markets, is scattered 
throughout the organisation (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996b; Teece, 
2000; Tsoukas, 1996).10 Thus, corporate-level managers may have an incentive 
to develop processes and systems that facilitate the integration and sharing of 
strategically critical knowledge (see e.g. Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 
                                                                                                                                    
levels of the organisation, iii) data are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face 
meetings  of  superiors,  subordinates  and  peers,  and  iv)  the  process  relies  on  the  
continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions, and action plans. 
Bisbe et al. (2007) have subsequently provided further specification to the construct of 
ICS. 
10 The term ‘knowledge’ refers in this dissertation to a fluid mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is 
applied in the minds of knowers (Davenport and Prusak, 1998, p.5). This definition 
acknowledges that data, information and knowledge are related but not 
interchangeable concepts that are often conceptualised as representing a hierarchy of 
meaning, depth and relevance to action (e.g. Ackoff, 1989; Buckley and Carter, 2004; 
Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Rowley, 2007). The term ‘data’ refers to unprocessed 
discrete facts and figures, which bear little relevance or purpose by themselves. The 
term ´’information’ refers to interpreted and structured data. (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998;  Elearn,  2007;  Zeleny,  2005)  It  does  not  exhibit  the  personal,  subjective  and  
experience-based qualities that characterise ‘knowledge’ (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka et al., 2001). Finally, the term ‘knowledge integration’ 
refers here to a combination of complementary knowledge which may be value-adding 
and result in the production of new knowledge (Buckley and Carter , 2004). 
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1996a, 1996b, Kogut and Zander, 1992). This may enable corporate-level 
managers  not  only  to  ensure  that  they  are  in  a  better  position  to  review  
business level strategic plans themselves, but also that business level managers 
possess more complete knowledge when making strategic decisions.11 How 
formal organisational means may be used to enhance knowledge integration 
and sharing has, however, remained a somewhat obscure phenomenon 
(Buckley and Carter, 2004; Foss et al., 2010; Foss and Pedersen, 2004), 
because  the  knowledge  management  literature  has  tended  to  focus  on  
cognitional issues, knowledge flows and informal aspects of the organisation 
(Foss, 2007; Foss and Pedersen, 2004). 
2.2.2.3. The role of MCSs in enhancing knowledge integration 
Recent advancements in the MCS literature suggest that MCSs may possess 
knowledge management properties (Grandori, 1997; Roberts, 2006; Turner 
and Makhija, 2006), serving also as instruments for knowledge integration 
(Ditillo, 2004). Available evidence suggests that the design of knowledge-
integrating MCSs is context-specific, being influenced by the codifiability and 
complexity  of  the  knowledge  which  is  to  be  integrated  (Ditillo,  2004).  The  
evidence  indicates  that  when  knowledge  is  characterised  by  cognitional  
complexity and a low level of codifiability – which is likely to be the case when 
strategically critical knowledge is being integrated for strategy formation 
purposes – formal management accounting systems may not provide adequate 
means for knowledge integration. In such situations effective knowledge 
integration  is  more  likely  to  become  mobilised  through  verbal  face-to-face  
interaction, which facilitates the transformation of private, largely uncodifiable 
knowledge into shared knowledge which can be expressed in more explicit 
terms. (Ditillo, 2004; Grant, 1996b; Nonaka, 1991, 1994)  
Prior evidence of the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs has focused on the 
project team level, where verbal, face-to-face communication can occur 
naturally, as part of the regular interaction between project participants 
(Ditillo, 2004). At higher organisational levels such face-to-face interaction 
may, however, not occur without intervention by managers. Formal processes 
and platforms can be needed to enable specialists from different locations, 
functions and cultures to interact and thereby integrate their specialised 
knowledge (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996b; Kulkki and Kosonen, 
                                                  
11 The notion of ‘completeness’ refers to the degree to which the critical knowledge for 
decision-making is entirely sufficient and available for the decision maker’s use 
(Turner and Makhija, 2006).  
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2001). How MCSs may serve as levers for knowledge integration at higher 
organisational levels, including business and corporate levels, remains unclear. 
  
2.2.3. Research gap in the MCS literature addressed in this study 
 
The second essay of this dissertation, ‘Shaping strategy formation with 
knowledge-integrating corporate-level management control systems’ seeks to 
provide new insight into the roles MCSs play in shaping strategy formation. 
Prior research has tended to conceptualise the strategy formation shaping role 
of MCSs as that of triggering strategic debate and organisational learning (see 
e.g. Bruining et al., 2004; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995b; Tuomela, 2005). This 
study examines the knowledge-integrating, strategy formation shaping role of 
MCSs. The examination focuses on corporate-level MCSs.12 
 
 
2.3. Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMSs) 
 
2.3.1. Definition of SPMS 
 
Research on strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) has rarely 
provided any explicit definitions for SPMS. Much of the research has focused 
on the concept of Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996a, 
1996b; 2001) without seeking to specify the defining characteristics of the BSC 
-  or  those  of  SPMSs  in  general  (see  e.g.  Ahn,  2001;  Butler  et  al.,  1997;  Davis  
and Albright, 2004; Kasurinen, 2002; Malina and Selto, 2001; Papalexandris 
et  al.,  2004;  cf.  Speckbacher  et  al.,  2003;  see  Neely  (2005)  for  a  review  of  
SPMS literature).  
 Chenhall (2005), Tuomela (2005) and Gimbert et al. (2010) are among the 
few who have  sought  to  specify  the  concept  of  SPMS.  They  all  agree  that  the  
inclusion of financial and non-financial strategically aligned measures is a 
defining characteristic of SPMS. Chenhall (2005) and Gimbert et al. (2010) 
also place emphasis on the integrative features of SPMS, highlighting that 
                                                  
12 The  term  ‘corporate-level  MCS’  refers  to  MCSs  that  address  issues  common  to  the  
whole organisation – such as corporate-level strategic issues – and that are used 
principally at a corporate rather than business level. Organisation-wide systems such 
as budget planning systems are thus not considered corporate-level MCS in this study. 
Further, we use the term ‘corporate-level managers’ to refer to those parties who are in 
the position to exert control over business managers. Such parties include the CEO, the 
Board members and, depending on the company in question, managers responsible for 
key corporate functions such as finance & control and strategic planning.  
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SPMS enable translating strategy into a coherent set of performance measures. 
Gimbert et al. (2010) also pay attention to several specific features, such as the 
provision of a sequence of goals/metrics/targets/action plans for each 
performance measurement perspective and the presence of explicit causal 
linkage relationships between goals and or/between performance measures. 
Tuomela’s (2005) definition of SPMS is more general. It also includes PMSs 
where the set of measures is less coherent and integrative.  
 This study adopts a broad definition of SPMS. It draws on Tuomela (2005) 
to acknowledge that many strategically oriented performance measurement 
systems (PMSs) are less integrative and coherent than suggested by Chenhall 
(2005)  and  Gimbert  et  al.  (2010)  (see  e.g.  Malmi,  2001;  Speckbacher  et  al.,  
2003). It also acknowledges that SPMSs may be oriented towards measuring 
performance at an individual level (Tuomela, 2005). The definition adopted in 
this  study  also  draws  on  the  extensive  review  of  PMS  literature  by  Franco-
Santos  et  al  (2007),  which  identifies  ‘performance  measurement’  and  
‘supporting infrastructure’ as the necessary features of PMSs.  
 The term SPMS refers in this study to formal performance measurement 
systems used to measure strategic outcomes and/or strategic actions. The 
term ‘formal’ refers here to the existence of supporting infrastructure. On the 
other hand, the notion ‘measure strategic outcomes and/or strategic actions’ 
emphasises that SPMSs measure performance on dimensions of strategic 
importance. 
  
2.3.2. Research on SPMSs 
 
Research on SPMSs has evolved progressively over the years (Franco and 
Bourne, 2003). Initially, research interest in SPMSs stemmed in the early 
1990s from dissatisfaction with traditional, financially oriented PMSs, which 
were criticised for promoting short-termism in organisations (Eccles, 1991; 
Goold and Quinn, 1990; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; McNair et al., 1990). Much 
of the early research on SPMSs focused on presenting frameworks and models 
for enabling a better strategic alignment of performance measures (Franco and 
Bourne, 2003; see e.g. Dixon et al., 1990; Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Kaplan 
and Norton, 1992; Kanji, 1998; Lynch and Cross, 1991; McNair et al., 1990; 
Neely et al., 2002). Over time, the research focus shifted from the design of 
SPMSs to the processes and challenges related to their implementation (Franco 
and  Bourne,  2003;  see  e.g.  Ahn,  2001;  Bukh  and  Malmi,  2005;  Kasurinen,  
2002; Malina and Selto, 2004; Nørreklit, 2000; Papalexandris et al., 2004; 
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Vaivio,  1999a).  More  recently,  scholars  have  started  to  pay  attention  to  the  
ways in which SPMSs are used to manage organisations. Attention is also paid 
to how managers seek to extract value from the data they collect. (Franco and 
Bourne, 2003; see e.g. Banker et al., 2000; Davis and Albright, 2004; Dossi 
and  Patelli,  2010;  Gimbert  et  al.,  2010;  Ittner  et  al.,  1997;  Lipe  and  Salterio,  
2002; Malmi, 2001; Melnyk et al., 2010; Micheli and Manzoni, 2010; Vaivio, 
2004; Wiersma, 2009) 
 The  literature  on  SPMSs  has  tended  to  portray  them  as  effective  
mechanisms for strategic alignment. It has been argued that SPMSs enable the 
translation of strategy into a coherent set of financial and non-financial 
measures  that  may  be  cascaded  throughout  the  organisation.  (see  e.g.  
Chenhall, 2005; Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001; 
Papalexandris et al., 2004).  
 SPMS researchers have, however, cautioned against a potential 
organisational rigidity introduced by SPMSs, and underlined a need to build 
dynamism into them (see e.g.  Eccles,  1991; Bititci  et  al,  2000; Kennerley and 
Neely, 2002, 2003; Neely et al., 2000). Most writers on dynamic SPMSs have 
argued that the overall development of an SPMS should include a periodic 
review process enabling managers to ensure that measures remain relevant in 
the light of external and internal development (Wisner and Fawcett, 1991; 
Medori and Steeple, 2000). Specific audit tools that provide detailed guidance 
for the review have also been proposed (Bititci et al., 2000; Dixon et al., 1990; 
Neely et al., 1997).   
 Much of the research on dynamic SPMSs has, however, tended to be 
conceptual in nature (see e.g. Neely, 1999; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003). 
Those studies providing empirical evidence have tended to focus on 
manufacturing companies, examining how the evolution of SPMSs may be 
managed over time (see e.g. Bititci et al., 2000; Bourne et al., 2000). Much less 
attention has been paid to the ways through which substantial dynamism can 
be built into SPMSs in order make frequent modifications to the measures 
possible. Nevertheless, capability of this kind is likely to be vital in turbulent 
industries where companies must be able to alter strategies and business 
models  rapidly  (Doz  and  Kosonen,  2007,  2008).  As  a  consequence,  an  
examination  of  the  ways  through  which  companies  seek  to  build  substantial  
dynamism into their SPMSs has been highlighted as one of the key areas for 
future research on SPMSs (see e.g. Kennerley and Neely, 2003; Neely, 2005; 
Waggoner et al., 1999). 
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2.3.3. Research gap in the SPMS literature addressed in this study  
 
The third paper of this dissertation, “Dynamic strategic performance 
measurement systems: Balancing empowerment and alignment”, responds to 
the  calls  for  an  empirical  examination  of  dynamic  SPMSs  (Kennerley  and  
Neely,  2003;  Neely,  2005;  Waggoner  et  al.,  1999).  It  seeks  to  present  
empirically grounded theoretical insights about how substantial dynamism can 
be  built  into  SPMSs  and  how  such  dynamic  SPMSs  can  be  used  for  strategic  
alignment.13 
 
 
2.4. Values-based control 
 
2.4.1. Definition of values-based control 
 
This dissertation uses a generic term ‘values-based control’14 to  refer  to  any 
attempts by managers to utilise organisational values as a means of 
influencing the behaviour of organisational members.  The  choice  to  adopt  
such  a  generic  definition  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  values-
based control remains ambiguous. MCS researchers have addressed values-
based control through a variety of concepts including clan control (Ouchi, 1979, 
1980; see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995, 1997), cultural control (e.g. Merchant and 
Van  der  Stede,  2007;  Sandelin,  2008),  belief  system  (Simons,  1995a,  1995b;  
see  e.g.  Marginson,  2002;  Mundy,  2010;  Widener,  2007)  and  value-based  
control (Malmi and Brown, 2008) without providing much specification about 
                                                  
13 The term ‘dynamic SPMS’ refers to those SPMSs that enable frequent modifications 
to the measures and targets; i.e. SPMSs that allow the modification of measures and 
targets  at  intervals  that  are  considerably  shorter  than  an  annual  planning  cycle.  
Similarly, the term substantial dynamism refers to the capability to modify measures 
and  targets  at  such  short  intervals.  To  avoid  tautology,  the  terms  flexible,  adaptable  
and fluid SPMS are also used in this dissertation for these dynamic SPMSs. 
14 The term ‘values-based control’ applied in this paper is similar to the term ‘value-
based control’ recently put forward by Malmi and Brown (2008). I have used the first 
term because it better enables me to distinguish the control approach discussed in this 
dissertation from the term ‘value-based management’ that is commonly used within 
management accounting literature to refer to a management approach that emphasizes 
the maximisation of shareholder value creation (See e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 2001; 
Malmi and Ikäheimo, 2003). Within the general management literature the terms 
‘value-based management’ (see e.g. Brytting and Trollestad, 2000) and ‘values-based 
management” (see e.g. Andersson, 1997) and ‘values-driven management” (see e.g. 
Driscoll and Hoffman, 1999) have all been used to refer to a management approach 
whereby organisational values are mobilised to influence the mind-sets and/or 
behaviour of organisational members. 
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the defining characteristics of these concepts or their linkages with other 
related concepts. 
 This broad definition acknowledges that organisational members can be 
motivated to engage in values-related behaviour through different 
mechanisms. Some organisational members may engage in values-related 
behaviour based on their intrinsic motivation to do so (see e.g. Meglino and 
Ravlin,  1998;  Ouchi,  1979).  Some  other  organisational  members  may,  on  the  
other hand, engage in such behaviour based on their perceptions of the benefits 
available from it (Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). It 
also acknowledges that values-based control may not always take a purely 
socio-ideological form whereby managers seek to influence the behaviour of 
organisational members by influencing their mind-sets. It can also take a more 
technocratic form, and seek to exert more direct influence on their behaviour 
(see e.g. Doz and Kosonen, 2008; Lenzioni, 2002).15  
 
2.4.2. Research on values-based control 
 
The  notion  that  managers  utilise  organisational  values  to  influence  the  
behaviour of organisational members is well established in MCS (e.g. 
Langfield-Smith, 1995; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007, Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995a) and organisational behaviour literatures 
(e.g.  Harris  and Ogbonna,  2011;  Meglino  and Ravlin,  1998;  Wiener,  1982).  A  
control approach of this kind – discussed as values-based control in this 
dissertation – is often contrasted with formal, bureaucratic forms of control 
(e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Norris and O’Dwyer, 2004; 
Ouchi, 1979).16 Early contributions on values-based control tend to position 
values-based control as an alternative control approach, suitable for complex 
and uncertain situations in which formal, bureaucratic forms of control may 
not enable effective control (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Jaeger, 1983; Ouchi, 1979). 
More recent contributions have tended to refrain from such mutually exclusive 
positions, highlighting the complementary nature of values-based and other 
controls. Contemporary literature on MCSs widely acknowledges that values-
                                                  
15 I draw on Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) to distinguish between ‘socio-ideological 
control’ that seeks to influence the behaviour of organisational members by influencing 
their mind-sets and ‘technocratic control’ that seeks to exert direct influence on their 
behaviour.  
16 The term ‘bureaucratic control’ refers here to a control approach that is based on the 
definition of formal rules and procedures, mechanisms for monitoring compliance, and 
explicit standardised systems of reward and sanction to ensure conformity (based on 
Ferner, 2000).   
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based control systems constitute an essential part of a control package (e.g. 
Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Mundy, 2010; 
Simons, 1995a; Widener, 2007). They exert a powerful influence on other 
MCSs (Mundy, 2010; Sandelin, 2008; Widener, 2007) and act as complements 
(Bruining  et  al.,  2004;  Mundy,  2010;  Simons,  1995a;  Widener,  2007)  or  
substitutes for other MCSs in the control package (Sandelin, 2008). 
 Despite the widespread recognition of the significance of values-based 
control, the concept of values-based control remains ambiguous. MCS 
researchers have addressed values-based control through a variety of concepts 
including clan control (Ouchi, 1979, 1980; see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995, 
1997),  cultural  control  (e.g.  Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  Sandelin,  
2008), belief system (Simons, 1995a, 1995b; see e.g. Marginson, 2002; Mundy, 
2010; Widener, 2007) and value-based control (Malmi and Brown, 2008). 
Although these concepts share the assumption that managers can seek to 
utilise organisational values as a means of influencing organisational members’ 
behaviour, these concepts only partially overlap. They are based on different 
interpretations of the key mechanisms and approaches through which this 
influence is mobilised. Hitherto, MCS literature has made little progress in 
specifying  the  concept  of  values-based  control  or  in  identifying  linkages  
between the applied values-based control concepts. MCS literature has also 
been relatively silent about the potential limitations of influencing the 
behaviour of organisational members through values-based control 
approaches. 
 
2.4.3. Research  gap  in  the  values-based  control  literature  addressed  in  
this study 
 
The fourth essay of this dissertation, ‘Elaborating on the concept of values-
based control’ seeks to contribute to the MCS and values-based control 
literatures  by  elaborating  on  the  concept  of  values-based  control  -  a  concept  
which has remained ambiguous despite the fact that MCS researchers widely 
acknowledge that such systems constitute an essential part of a control package 
(see e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Mundy, 
2010;  Simons,  1995a;  Widener,  2007).  The  essay  seeks  to  specify  the  key  
approaches through which values-based control is mobilised and to illustrate 
empirically how these approaches can be applied in practice.  
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3. Research objectives 
 
 
This section summarises the research objectives of the dissertation. The 
primary objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the SID, SPMS, MCS 
and values-based control literatures by addressing the research gaps that were 
specified in the previous section. While making more focused contributions to 
these literatures, this dissertation will also provide a basis for making general 
observations about the strategic role of management accounting in 
contemporary organisations. These general observations will be addressed in 
the concluding section of Part I.   
 The research objectives of each of the four essays constituting this 
dissertation will be summarised in the following. The key theoretical 
underpinnings of each essay will also be addressed. Here the term ‘theoretical 
underpinnings’  is  used  to  refer  to  the  key  literature  streams  and  theoretical  
concepts that form the basis for the theoretical discussion in each paper. Table 
1 summarizes the research objectives and theoretical underpinnings of the 
essays.  
 Essay 1 seeks  to  advance  our  knowledge  of  the  contextual  nature  of  SID 
making practices. The paper develops a contextual framework for explaining 
differences in SID making practices, and explores this framework’s potential 
for explaining differences in practice. Differences in practice are examined both 
in  regard  to  the  use  of  capital  budgeting  techniques,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  
companies overall approaches to SIDs – encompassing tendencies to 
emphasise strategic versus financial analysis in the decision-making.  
Since SID literature has provided only limited empirical evidence on the 
contextual  factors  that  may  be  associated  with  differences  in  SID  making  
practices  (Slagmulder  et  al.,  1995;  Verbeeten,  2006),  the  paper  draws  on  the  
broader  strategic  management  (e.g.  Eisenhardt  and  Sull,  2001;  Miles  and  
Snow,  1978;  Mintzberg,  1994;  Porter,  1980)  and  strategic  management  
accounting (SMA) literatures (e.g. Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Govindarajan 
and Gupta, 1985; Guilding, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Simons, 
1987) to derive contextual variables that are assumed to be associated with 
differences in SID making practices. Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) four-state 
cost management model is used as a starting point for developing the 
framework, since it provides one the most developed approaches for explaining 
differences in SMA practice available to date. 
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Essay 2 seeks to provide new insight into the roles MCSs play in shaping 
strategy formation by examining the use of knowledge-integrating corporate-
level MCSs. Given limited prior knowledge of the knowledge-integrating, 
strategy formation shaping role of corporate-level MCSs, the paper adopts a 
rather explorative, open-ended research design (Keating, 1995; Otley and 
Berry, 1994). The paper is, however, informed by prior theoretical concepts; in 
particular Simons’ (1990) process model of the relationship between strategy 
and  MCSs,  and  the  concept  of  ICS  (Simons,  1990,  1991,  1995b;  Bisbe  et  al.,  
2007).  The  paper  also  draws  on  the  emerging  literature  on  the  knowledge-
integrating  role  of  MCSs  and  on  the  broader  literature  on  knowledge  
management (e.g. Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Grant, 1996a; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Teece, 2000). The research findings of the 
paper are also related to a recent discussion within the strategic management 
literature which suggests a reconciliation between the ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ 
schools  of  strategy  formation  (e.g.  Brews  and  Hunt,  1999;  Brown  and  
Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998: Grant, 2003; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000). 
 Essay 3 seeks to contribute to the literature on SPMSs thorough an 
empirical examination of dynamic SPMSs. The paper examines how substantial 
dynamism can be built into them and how such dynamic SPMSs can be used 
for strategic alignment. Diverging from much of the research on SPMSs, which 
has tended to focus on systems such as the Balanced Scorecard – which 
measure performance at an organisational level – Essay 3 responds to recent 
calls for a broad examination of SPMSs, and extends the examination to 
include systems that measure contribution to strategic performance at an 
individual level (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 2007; Franco and Bourne, 
2003; Marr and Schiuma, 2003).  
Given the limited available evidence of how substantial dynamism can be 
built into SPMSs (see e.g. Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003; Neely, 2005; 
Waggoner et al., 1999), Essay 3 adopts an inductive approach, and draws on 
very limited a priori theoretical  discussion  (see  e.g.  Siggelkow,  2007).  The  
empirically grounded theoretical insights of the paper are, on the other hand, 
linked to the pertinent management accounting and strategic management 
literatures; in particular those related to the general design and use of SPMSs 
(e.g. Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001; Neely, 1999, 
2005; Simons, 2000), the development and use of dynamic SPMSs (e.g. Bititci 
et al., 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003; Medori and Steeple, 2000; 
Neely et al., 1997), subjectivity in PMSs (e.g. Gibbs et al., 2004; Manzoni, 
2002; Moers,  2005; Prendergast and Topel,  1996; Simons, 2005),  and finally,  
32 
 
the practices of strategic planning and decision-making (Grant, 2003; Miller et 
al., 2008; Ocasio and Joseph, 2008; Woiceshyn, 2009).   
 Finally, Essay  4 seeks to contribute to MCS and values-based control 
literatures by elaborating on the concept of values-based control. It seeks to 
specify the key approaches through which values-based control is mobilised 
and to illustrate how these approaches can be applied in practice. The paper 
reviews literature on values-based control by placing particular emphasis on 
the key values-based control concepts applied within MCS literature. These 
include the concepts of  clan control  (Ouchi,  1979, 1980),  cultural  control  (e.g.  
Harris and Ogbonna, 2010; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Sandelin, 
2008),  belief  system (Simons,  1995a,  1995b)  and value-based  control  (Malmi  
and  Brown,  2008).  The  paper  also  draws  on  the  literatures  on  human  values  
(e.g. Meglino, 1997; Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ravlin, 1995; Rokeach, 1978), 
and corporate  culture  (e.g.  Pettigrew,  1979;  Pratt  and Beaulieu,  1992;  Schein,  
1985;  Sørensen,  2002;  Wiener,  1988)  in  order  to  address  the  nature  of  
individual and organisational values. 
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Essay 1  
Research objective  To develop a contextual framework for explaining differences in SID making 
practices. 
 To explore this framework’s potential for explaining differences in practice. 
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
 SID literature (e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 
1998; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Van Cauwenbergh et al., 1996) 
 Strategic management literature (e.g. Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Miles and 
Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1994; Porter, 1980) 
 SMA literature (e.g. Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; 
Guilding, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Simons, 1987) 
 the four-state cost management model (Oldman and Tomkins, 1999) 
Essay 2  
Research objective  To provide new insight into the roles MCSs play in shaping strategy formation 
by examining the use of knowledge-integrating corporate-level MCSs.  
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
 a process model of the relationship between strategy and MCSs (Simons, 1990) 
 the concept of ICS (Bisbe et al., 2007; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995a) 
 literature on the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs (e.g. Ditillo, 2004) 
 literature on knowledge management (e.g. Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Grant, 
1996a; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Teece, 2000)  
 literature on strategy formation (e.g. Brews and Hunt, 1999; Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998: Grant, 2003; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000) 
Essay 3  
Research objective 
 
 To present empirically grounded theoretical insights about how substantial 
dynamism can be built into SPMSs and how such dynamic SPMSs can be used 
for strategic alignment.  
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
 generic literature on SPMSs (e.g. Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996, 2001; Neely, 1999, 2005; Simons, 2000) 
 literature on dynamic SPMSs (e.g. Bititci et al, 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 
2002, 2003; Medori and Steeple, 2000; Neely et al., 1997) 
 literature  on subjectivity  in  PMSs (e.g.  Gibbs  et  al.,  2004,  Ittner  et  al.,  2003;  
Manzoni, 2002; Moers, 2005; Prendergast and Topel, 1996; Simons, 2005) 
 literature on strategic planning and decision-making (Grant, 2003; Miller et 
al., 2008; Ocasio and Joseph, 2008; Woiceshyn, 2009) 
Essay 4  
Research 
objective 
 
 To elaborate on the concept of values-based control by specifying the key 
approaches through which values-based control is mobilised and by illustrating 
how these approaches can be applied in practice.  
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
 literature on values-based control (e.g., Harris and Ogbonna, 2010; Langfield-
Smith,  1995;  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  
Ouchi, 1979, Simons, 1995a, Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993)  
 literature on human values (e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Rokeach, 1978) 
 literature on corporate culture (e.g. Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1985) 
Table 1. Research objectives and theoretical underpinnings of the four essays 
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4. Research approach 
 
 
4.1. Methodology17 
 
This study locates within the positivistic research tradition18, which is based on 
the ontological position that reality is objective and external to the subject (see 
e.g. Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).19 Diverging from the ontological position of 
‘naive realism’, which assumes that reality is real and apprehendable, this 
study adopts the ontology of ‘critical realism’, which acknowledges that reality 
is  real,  but  only  imperfectly  and  probabilistically  apprehendable.  As  a  
consequence, the epistemological position of this study can be classified as 
‘post-positivism’, which diverges from ‘positivism’ in that it does not consider 
findings absolute truth – rather it takes a more sceptical stance and assumes 
that findings are only ‘probably true’. (Lincoln and Gupta, 2000)  
 The methodological orientation of this study can also be classified as 
functionalism. In alignment with the objectives of the functionalist paradigm, 
this study seeks to provide essentially rational explanations and to produce 
theoretical insights of practical relevance. In line with the functionalist 
paradigm, this study assumes that the social world is composed of relatively 
concrete  empirical  artefacts  and  relationships  which  can  be  sufficiently well 
identified, studied, and measured through approaches derived from the natural 
                                                  
17The term ‘methodology’ refers to the epistemological foundation of research (Bryman, 
1984; Llwellyn, 1992), which determines the general approach to the study of research 
topics (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Silverman, 1993).  
18 Positivist epistemology seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social world 
by searching for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements. 
According to positivism, the growth of knowledge is essentially a cumulative process in 
which new insights are added to the existing stock of knowledge and false hypotheses 
eliminated. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 5) 
19 ‘Alternative’ management accounting traditions - such as the interpretive and critical 
tradition - reject this realist ontology and assume reality as emergent, subjectively 
created,  and  objectified  through  human  interaction  (see  e.g.  Ahrens  and  Chapman,  
2006; Chua,  1986;  Humphrey and Scapens,  1996).  The recent methodological  debate 
within the management accounting community suggests, however, that earlier claims 
of the incommensurability of paradigms may not hold. Interpretive research, in 
particular, has been suggested to ‘straddle between paradigms’- i.e. to combine 
‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’ in order to produce research findings of theoretical 
significance. (Ahrens, 2008; Kaakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008a, 2008b; Lukka, 2010; 
Modell, 2010; Vaivio and Sirén, 2010) 
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sciences.20 (See  Burrell  and  Morgan,  1979,  pp.  25-28,  for  a  discussion  on  
functionalism) 
 
4.2. Method21 
 
This  study  applies  the  case  study  research  method.22 Although some scholars 
consider the case study method more suitable to the interpretive paradigm (see 
e.g. Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Scapens, 1990), 
most management accounting scholars agree that the case study method can 
also be applied within positivistic methodology (see e.g. Ahrens and Chapman, 
2006; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Otley and Berry, 1994; Scapens, 1990). 
Within the interpretative tradition, the case study method is often used to 
demonstrate the complexity of accounting in organisations. Within the 
positivist tradition its purpose is often to contribute to theory development 
(Otley and Berry, 1994): case studies are often seen as a necessary precursor 
for more elaborate testing of large sample hypotheses (Humphrey and Scapens, 
1996). Case studies can be used to develop hypotheses, construct models, and 
in some instances even provide limited empirical tests (Scapens, 1990).  
 What characterises a case study has been the subject of some scholarly 
debate.  According  to  Kaplan  (1986),  case  studies  are  characterised  by  an  
intense examination of a single entity. For him, a cross-examination of several 
entities  would,  on  the  other  hand,  be  characteristic  of  a  field  study.  Kaplan’s  
characterisation of the case study method on the basis of sample size has 
subsequently been criticised (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). Most management 
accounting scholars seem to agree today that the case study method can also be 
applied to cross-examination of several entities. Some positivist-orientated 
scholars even argue that such an approach - referred to as a multiple-case 
study design - would be preferable in order to strengthen the external validity 
of findings (see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
2003). In this study, the term ‘case study’ is defined in accordance with Cooper 
and Morgan’s (2008) recent definition as an in-depth and contextually 
                                                  
20 In  contrast,  the  interpretive  paradigm  is  concerned  with  understanding  the  
fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979, p. 28). 
21 The  term  ‘method’  refers  to  the  technique  for  doing  research  within  the  chosen  
research methodology (Bryman, 1984; Llwellyn, 1992). 
22 Although the case study is sometimes referred to as a research methodology, several 
management accounting scholars have noted that it is essentially a research method, 
which  can  be  applied  within  several  research  methodologies  (see  e.g.  Ahrens  and  
Chapman, 2006; Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Llwellyn, 1992; Otley and Berry, 1994;  
Scapens, 1990).  
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informed examination of specific organisations or events that explicitly 
addresses theory. 
 Management accounting and management scholars have attempted to 
categorise case studies in several ways. Several scholars have categorised case 
studies according to their research design. For example, Eisenhardt (1989) 
categorises case studies as single and multiple case studies, Yin (2003) as 
single,  multiple,  holistic and embedded case studies,  and Cooper and Morgan 
(2008) as extreme or deviant, maximum variation, critical and paradigmatic. 
On the other hand, another group of scholars have categorised case studies 
according to their purpose. For example, Scapens (1990) categorises case 
studies as descriptive, illustrative, experimental, exploratory and explanatory; 
Ferreira and Merchant (1992) as descriptive, theory building and hypotheses 
testing; and Otley and Berry (1994) as exploratory, critical and illustrative. 
Siggelkow (2007) adds that case studies can be used to motivate a research 
question, refine existing theory, or to illustrate a conceptual argument put 
forward.  
 Perhaps  the  most  elaborate  categorisation  of  case  studies  has  been  that  
proposed by Keating (1995), which classifies case studies according to their 
intended contribution to theory. Theory discovery case studies seek to map 
novel, dynamic and/or complex phenomena which have been ignored or 
inadequately  explained  by  existing  theories.  Since  such  case  studies  do  not  
have well-defined theories to guide them, they have an emergent, open-ended 
character.  The  major  strength  of  theory  discovery  cases  is  their  capacity  to  
surprise;  they  may  result  in  novel,  even  unexpected  findings  of  theoretical  
importance. Theory discovery case studies rarely result in fully specified 
theories. Typically, they contribute to theory development by producing 
theoretical  insights  that  serve  as  theoretical  building  blocks  for  further  
investigations. Theory refinement case studies, on the other hand, seek to 
either illustrate a theory’s capacity to illuminate a phenomenon in new or 
better ways, or specify the theory by adding greater precision to theoretical 
constructs or propositions. Since theory refinement case studies have a more 
definitive theoretical starting point, they are typically more focused in their 
research design. In order to ascertain the capacity to produce new theoretical 
insights, theory refinement case studies must, however, remain open to the 
discovery of constructs that supplement or replace prior theoretical constructs. 
Finally, theory refutation case studies seek to falsify or otherwise refute a well-
specified theory. Their research design is tightly focused on a priori defined 
theoretical constructs.  
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 The four essays constituting this dissertation can be classified as applying 
the case study method in somewhat different ways; depending on the 
particular theoretical objectives of the essays (see Table 2). Essay  1 has 
characteristics of both a hypotheses testing and an explorative case study (see 
e.g.  Ferreira  and  Merchant,  1992;  Otley  and  Berry,  1994).  It  resembles  a  
hypotheses testing case study in that it develops a systematic contextual 
framework for explaining differences in SID making practices, and it examines, 
on  a  general  level,  whether  a  company’s  SID orientation  can  be  explained  by  
this framework. Essay 1 also has characteristics of an explorative case study in 
that  the  actual  differences  in  the  SID-making  practices  across  the  four  
contextual categories constituting the framework are explored by analysing 
qualitative interview data. Rather than suggesting a priori what these 
differences may be (except on a general level suggesting that a tendency to 
emphasise strategic versus financial considerations is likely to increase as we 
move from the most financially orientated restructurer category towards the 
most strategically orientated market creator category),  these  differences  are  
allowed to emerge through the data analysis. Our choice to combine 
hypotheses testing and explorative case study approach is justified by the 
limited empirical evidence of the contextual nature of SID making practices 
(see  e.g.  Haka,  1987;  Verbeeten,  2006).  While  the  broader  strategic  
management and SMA literatures enable us to suggest four general contextual 
situations that can be assumed to influence SID making practices, they do not 
enable  us  to  specify,  in  detail,  what  these  differences  could  be.  As  a  
consequence, an open-ended, emergent approach is needed to explore the 
more specific nature of these differences.  
 Essay 1 adopts a multiple-case study design and draws on an exploratory 
set of 14 matched field case studies from the U.K., U.S. and Japan. It provides 
coverage of vehicle components and telecommunications sectors. The case 
selection resembles maximum variation replication logic (Cooper and Morgan, 
2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003), as the set of case studies represents 
differences in two dimensions (industry, country of origin), which have been 
found to be associated with differences in SID making practices (see e.g. Carr, 
2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1998; Cheung, 1993; Haka, 1987). This selection logic 
is also assumed to result in a variation in the contextual positioning of case 
companies across the four contextual categories constituting the contextual 
framework  -  thus  allowing  the  exploration  of  whether  the  contextual  
framework has the capacity to explain differences in SID-making practices. All 
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case  companies  are  large,  multinational  companies  (MNC),  operating  in  
several countries, and among the global or regional leaders in their industries. 
 Essay  2, Essay  3 and Essay 4 all have characteristics of a theory 
discovery case in that they have an emergent, open-ended character. Essay 2 
and Essay 4 can also be classified as theory refinement case studies since they 
result in a further specification of prior theoretical concepts. (See Keating, 
1995) Essay 3 and Essay 4 draw on a case study in a large global organisation, 
which provides a particularly revelatory case for studying the phenomena in 
question.  Essay  2  also  draws  on  this  case  study,  but  it  also  utilises  data  from 
another case study, conducted in a global organisation with theoretically 
divergent characteristics. The research design of these three essays is discussed 
in more detail in the following. 
Essay  2 has  characteristics  of  both  the  theory  refinement  and  the  theory  
discovery  case  study  approach  (Keating,  1995).  It  resembles  a  theory  
refinement case study design in that it is informed by prior theoretical concepts  
- in particular the concept of interactive control system (ICS) (Simons, 1990, 
1991,  1995a;  Bisbe  et  al.,  2007)  and  the  process  model  of  the  relationship  
between strategy and MCSs (Simons, 1990) - and in that it results in a further 
specification of these concepts. The paper is, however, more explorative and 
broadly scoped than a typical theory refinement study. The above-mentioned 
theoretical concepts serve mainly as theoretical frames of reference that guide 
the  empirical  analysis  (Ahrens  and  Dent,  2006).  The  empirical  analysis  is  
empirically sensitive and allows for the emergence of new theoretical insights 
(see Ahrens and Dent, 1998, Vaivio, 2008).  
 The  case  selection  logic  follows  Eisenhardt  and  Graebner’s  (2007)  
theoretical  sampling approach, which uses ‘polar type’  cases.  According to the 
polar type approach, case organisations are chosen on the basis of theoretical 
characteristics that are presumably associated with differences in the observed 
phenomenon. As available evidence indicates that the way MCSs are used to 
shape strategy formation may be influenced by the business environment and 
the strategic orientation of the company (Chenhall, 2003; Simons, 1987; 1990), 
two case organisations with contrasting characteristics on these two 
dimensions were selected. The case company ‘Saturn’ competes largely through 
product innovation and marketing. The company is widely acknowledged for 
its innovation capability, and it also invests heavily in brand building. Saturn 
operates in a very dynamic business environment characterised, for example, 
by short product cycles. The case company ‘Titan’ builds its competitive 
advantage largely on cost advantages driven from i.e. setting up production in 
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low-cost  locations.  Titan  operates  in  a  relatively  stable,  mature  business  
environment. Both companies are large multi-business companies, and among 
the global leaders in their respective industries.  
Essay 3 is a typical example of a theory discovery case. Given the limited 
available evidence of the subject matter (how substantial dynamism can be 
built into SPMS, and how such dynamic SPMS can be used for strategic 
alignment), the paper adopts an inductive, open-ended research approach 
(Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Keating, 1995; Vaivio, 2008). The empirical 
examination focuses on a single organisational setting in order to enable an in-
depth analysis of the phenomenon studied (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). The case 
organisation provides a particularly revelatory case for studying the 
phenomenon  in  question  (see  Yin,  2003):  as  a  successful  global  leader  in  a  
turbulent industry, it is conceivable that the case organisation has adopted 
novel management practices in regard to building and using dynamic SPMS.23 
The case selection logic also follows the advice by Kaplan (1986), Cooper and 
Morgan (2008) and Malmi and Granlund (2009) in that it enables an 
examination of management accounting practices in the context of a successful 
organisation. 
 Similarly to Essay 2, Essay  4 also has characteristics of both a theory 
refinement and a theory discovery case: although it results in a further 
specification of prior theoretical concepts, it is considerably more explorative 
than  atypical  theory  refinement  study.  This  facilitates  the  drawing  of  novel  
theoretical insights from the empirical analysis (Keating, 1995). The way the 
case study is in actuality used in Essay 4 could also be categorised as 
illustrative. Rather than showing how the case study facilitated the emergence 
of  new  theoretical  insights,  it  is  used  here  to  illustrate  and  highlight  the  
conceptual argument put forward in the paper (see Siggelkow, 2007). Similarly 
to Essay 3, the case study can be classified as particularly revelatory 
(Siggelkow, 2007): it examines values-based control practices in an 
organisation with a strong administrative heritage in values-based control. 
Finally, it provides an empirical platform for examining the phenomenon in 
question in the context of a successful organisation (see Cooper and Morgan 
2008; Kaplan, 1986; and Malmi and Granlund, 2009). Table 2 summarises the 
research design of the four essays. 
  
                                                  
23 The term ‘turbulent industry’ refers here to industries characterised by rapid and 
unpredictable change, short product life-cycles and temporary advantages (see Cooper, 
1996; Grant, 2003). 
40 
 
 
  
 Case Study 
Type 
Case Study 
Design 
Case Selection 
Logic 
Selected Cases 
     
Essay 1 Hypotheses 
testing  
(general 
working 
hypothesis)/ 
Explorative 
(specific SID 
making 
practices) 
Multiple-case 
study 
Maximum 
variation 
replication logic 
(Industry/ 
country of origin) 
14 case studies of 
U.K., U.S. and 
Japanese MNCs 
operating in the 
vehicle component 
(10) and 
telecommunicatio
ns (4) sectors 
Essay 2 Theory  
discovery/ 
refinement 
Two-case 
case study 
Polar cases 
(in terms of 
industry/ 
business 
strategy) 
Two large MNCs 
representing 
divergent strategic 
orientations and 
business 
environments  
Essay 3 Theory  
discovery 
 
Single 
case study 
Revelatory case/ 
successful 
organisation 
A global leader in  
a turbulent 
industry 
Essay 4 Theory  
discovery/ 
theory 
refinement/ 
illustrative case 
Single  
case study 
Revelatory  
case/ 
successful 
organisation 
A large global 
MNC with a strong 
administrative 
heritage in values-
based control 
 
Table 2. Research design of the four essays 
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4.3. Data sources and analysis 
 
The particular data sources and data analysis approaches applied in the four 
essays are addressed in the following. A more elaborate discussion about the 
data sources and analysis are presented in the original papers included in Part 
II of this dissertation.  
 Essay 1 draws on interview data from an international study on SID 
making practices conducted by one of the authors between 1994 and 1997. 
Although  over  a  decade  old,  the  data  remain  appropriate  for  an  initial  
assessment of the corporate typologies developed in the paper: These 
typologies are expected to be enduring in nature, similar to those of Miles and 
Snow (1978) which have been used in research for over thirty years. In three of 
the companies (one from each country), further data, gathered in 2001-2003, 
were also available and were used to confirm the longitudinal durability of the 
typologies. The case data principally comprise theme interviews with senior 
executives  who  had  been  personally  involved  with  SIDs.  In  7  out  of  the  14  
cases, interviews were conducted with several company representatives. The 
interviews averaged approximately 2.5 hours and all were taped and 
transcribed. 
 Data analysis involved several phases. To enable positioning of the 
companies  in  the  context  of  the  proposed  explanatory  framework,  the  
companies investigated were first scored for all contextual variables on a scale 
between 1 and 9. This involved reviewing the qualitative interview data and 
searching  for  quotations  that  would  provide  an  indication  of,  for  example,  a  
prospector-type  strategic  configuration.  All  of  the  interview  transcripts  were  
then reviewed to identify potential differences in SID making practices. The 
transcripts were first examined for any potential differences in the use of 
capital budgeting techniques, hurdle rates, and other specifics related to the 
use of financial techniques.24 Thereafter, the transcripts were reviewed and 
analysed again. This time an attempt was made to identify emergent themes 
that would characterise the overall SID approaches of the four corporate types. 
                                                  
24 In addition to analysing differences across the four contextually based categories, a 
systematic cross-check was made for differences against every composite contextual 
variable on a one-by-one basis. These analyses addressed the counter-hypothesis of 
whether our framework does have further explanatory power than that possessed by 
any individual variable. Checks were also made for differences in the SID practices of 
Anglo-Saxon and Japanese companies. This analysis addressed the other counter-
hypothesis that country-context, rather than contextual category, might afford a more 
convincing explanation of the differences observed. Since our analyses included only 14 
cases, these analyses were inevitably very tentative, but nonetheless provided some 
indication of the individual variable and country influences. 
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Finally, the transcripts of the three follow-up interviews were analysed and 
compared with initial interview transcripts to assess any changes in SID 
practices subsequent to the initial interviews.  
 Essay 3 and Essay 4 draw on the same data set – gathered during an in-
depth case study in a successful, large global organisation. Theme interviews 
with corporate, business area and business unit level managers serve as the 
principal source of evidence. The corporate-level managers who were 
interviewed represented key corporate functions such as corporate strategy, 
finance & control and HR, while the business area and business unit managers 
represented key business areas and horizontal organisations. Altogether, 22 
interviews with an average length of over 70 minutes were conducted. 
Interview data were complemented with relevant internal documents such as 
planning process descriptions, performance appraisal schemes, operational 
mode specifications and documents relating to the use of performance 
measures. A variety of public documents, for example, analyst presentations, 
press releases and press articles, were also drawn upon. The case data were 
gathered during a period of three years between May 2006 and June 2009. 
 The data analysis proceeded in parallel with data gathering, enabling the 
researcher to pose more specific questions and to probe deeper into initial 
ideas as the project and the data collection progressed (Vaivio, 2008). The data 
analysis involved searching for emerging themes of significance, reorganising 
data  according  to  themes,  and  using  these  themes  as  input  for  further  
interviews (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). An on-going research relationship with 
the case company provided the researcher with the opportunity to test initial 
theoretical understandings with key informants during the data gathering and 
analysis phase. The overall analysis was also verified by multiple key 
informants at the case company. 
 Essay 2 draws partially on the same data set as Essay 3 and Essay 4. In 
addition  to  the  case  data  applied  in  Essay  3  and  Essay  4,  it  also  draws  on  
another, more limited case study in a global organisation with theoretically 
divergent characteristics. Again, theme interviews with corporate and business-
level managers serve as the principal source of evidence - this time gathered 
from two case organisations referred to as ‘Titan’ and ‘Saturn’ in the paper. 
Altogether, 32 interviews lasting from 30 to 150 minutes were conducted. 
Similarly to Essay 3 and Essay 4, salient internal and public documents, such 
as planning process descriptions, documents related to the performance 
measures used at corporate and business levels as well as broker presentations, 
were  also  drawn  upon.  The  case  data  were  gathered  during  a  period  of  over  
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four years from May 2006 to September 2010. The procedures for data analysis 
were  very  similar  to  those  applied  within  the  Essay  3  and  Essay  4,  with  the  
exception that they also included making cross-case analysis between the two 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
 
 
Number 
of Cases 
Interviewees Number of 
interviews 
Other data sources 
     
Essay 1 14 cases25 Senior 
executives, who 
had been 
personally 
involved with 
SIDs 
23 theme 
interviews 
 
Public documents, 
Thompson database  
Essay 2 2 cases Corporate, 
business area 
and business 
unit level 
managers 
32 theme 
interviews  
 
Internal and public 
documents,  
informal discussions 
with key informants 
Essay 3 1 case Corporate, 
business area 
and business 
unit level 
managers 
22 theme 
interviews 
Internal and public 
documents,  
informal discussions 
with key informants 
Essay 4 1 case Corporate, 
business area 
and business 
unit level 
managers 
22 theme 
interviews 
Internal and public 
documents,  
informal discussions 
with key informants 
 
Table 3. Data sources of the four essays 
 
                                                  
25 Although some management accounting authors would argue that this type of 
research design, in which only limited time is spent on each research site, could not be 
referred to as a case study approach (Spicer, 1992; Vaivio, 2008), this research design 
portrays the characteristics of multiple-case study design specified by Lillis and Mundy 
(2005). According to Lillis and Mundy (ibid.) multiple case-studies differ from cross-
sectional field studies in their tendency to focus on a unit of analysis that constitutes a 
case, while in cross-sectional field studies the unit of analysis is defined more flexibly 
as an observable occurrence of the phenomenon under study. In multiple-case studies 
the  number  of  cases  examined  is  generally  small  in  order  to  avoid  significantly  
compromising the depth of analysis, while cross-sectional field studies generally 
involve a  large number of  units  of  study.  (Lillis  and Mundy,  2005) Essay 1  also uses 
several data sources (interviews, public documents, Thompson database), which is 
typical of a case study design (Yin, 2003).  
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4.4. Reliability and validity 
 
The extent to which the concepts of reliability and validity apply to qualitative 
management  accounting  research  has  been  the  subject  of  some  scholarly  
debate (see e.g. Abernethy et al., 1999; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Atkinson 
and Shaffir, 1998; McKinnon, 1988; Lukka and Modell, 2010; Vaivio, 2008).26 
Interpretatively orientated management accounting scholars have, rightly, 
argued that the notions of validity and reliability that reflect positivist stances 
of objective reality are unsuitable for qualitative field studies which assume 
that social reality is emergent, subjectively created and objectified through 
human interaction (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Chua, 1986). More positivist-
oriented management accounting scholars have, on the other hand, noted that 
the issues of reliability and validity cannot be avoided or compromised in 
either the conduct or reporting of case studies (Abernethy et al., 1999; Atkinson 
and Shaffir, 1998; McKinnon, 1988). According to their view, the concepts of 
validity and reliability can be described at a broader level in respect of their 
applicability to research generally. Broadly defined, reliability is concerned 
with the question of whether the researcher is collecting data on which she/he 
can rely. Validity, on the other hand, is concerned with the question of whether 
the researcher is studying the phenomenon she or he purports to be studying. 
(McKinnon,  1988)  Validity  can  be  further  divided  into  construct  validity  
(whether the research is really measuring what it intends to measure), internal 
validity (establishing a causal relationship whereby certain conditions are 
shown  to  lead  to  other  conditions)  and  external  validity  (establishing  the  
domain in which a study’s findings can be generalised to wider populations, 
settings or times) (Abernethy et al., 1999; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Yin, 
2003).  
 Management accounting and management scholars have suggested several 
strategies and tactics for increasing the reliability and validity of qualitative 
management accounting research. These include spending substantial length 
of  time  in  the  field  (McKinnon,  1988,  Vaivio,  2008),  triangulation  between  
different empirical materials (McKinnon, 1988; Scapens, 1990; Vaivio, 2008), 
using numerous and highly knowledgeable informants that view the 
                                                  
26 The term ‘qualitative management accounting research’ is used here to refer to 
management accounting studies that use qualitative data as the principal source of 
evidence.  The term ‘qualitative research’  is  thus used to refer  to the type of  evidence 
(see e.g. Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Vaivio, 2008; Yin, 2003), rather than the type of 
research design, reflecting a particular type of methodological stance (see e.g. Ahrens 
and Chapman, 2006; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
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phenomenon from different perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), 
trust building and non-biasing social behaviour by the researcher in the field 
(McKinnon, 1988; Vaivio, 2008), making notes and asking probing questions 
(McKinnon, 1988), interaction between theory and evidence; overlap between 
data analysis and data gathering (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006; Vaivio, 2008), referencing empirical material to allow readers 
to judge the validity of the case description (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Lukka and 
Kasanen, 1995), feeding back evidence to the subjects (Scapens, 1990), and 
being careful not to overgeneralise the findings (Vaivio, 2008). 
 In this research, several procedures were taken to increase the validity and 
reliability of the findings. Essay 3 and Essay 4 benefited from all of the above-
mentioned procedures for increasing the validity and reliability of findings. 22 
theme interviews over a period of three years provided the researcher with 
substantial time in the field. The interviewees represented several key 
corporate functions (finance and control, HR, strategy) and several layers of 
management  and  represented,  thus,  a  group  of  highly  knowledgeable  
informants that could view the phenomenon from different perspectives 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Interview data were complemented with 
several other data sources (McKinnon, 1988; Scapens, 1990, Vaivio, 2008), and 
data analysis proceeded in parallel with data gathering, enabling the researcher 
to  probe  deeper  into  initial  ideas  as  the  project  and  the  data  collection  
progressed (Ahrens and Dent,  1998; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; McKinnon, 
1988,  Vaivio,  2008).  While  in  the  field,  the  researcher  was  aware  of  the  
background of each interviewee and addressed topics relevant to that person, 
was careful not to lead the discussion along preconceived paths and not to 
express her opinions during the interviews (Vaivio, 2008). The overall analysis 
was also verified by key informants at the case company (Scapens, 1990). 
When  reporting  the  findings,  rather  heavy  referencing  was  made  to  the  
empirical  material,  enabling  the  readers  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  field  
evidence (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). Finally, care was taken not to 
overgeneralise the findings: both studies commented, for example, on the 
situations in which the management practices found may not be pertinent 
(Vaivio, 2008).27 The procedures for strengthening the reliability and validity 
were  almost  identical  in  Essay  2  except  that  the  first  case  study  at  the  case  
company Titan involved a limited number of interviews (7) and a considerably 
shorter period of time in the field. As this initial investigation yielded 
                                                  
27 When  generalising  the  findings  of  all  of  the  essays,  ‘theoretical‘  rather  than  
‘statistical’ generalisation was applied (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lukka and Kasanen, 1995; 
Scapens, 1990; Spicer, 1992; Yin, 2003). 
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interesting preliminary findings, we examined the phenomenon further, and in 
more organisational depth, in a contrasting contextual setting at the case 
company Saturn. The second case study at Saturn was conducted over a period 
of  four  years  and  involved  25  interviews  with  managers  from  several  
management layers. 
 The procedures for increasing the validity and reliability of findings were 
slightly different for Essay 1, which was based on a multiple case study of 14 
companies. As the data were gathered from 14 companies, the field time spent 
in each case company was inevitably rather short (see e.g. Vaivio, 2008). Since 
each interview focused on a major SID incident, an average interview time of 
2.5 hours facilitated discussion in considerable depth on the SID-making 
practices related to the SID in question. Other empirical materials, such as 
annual reports and books and articles related to the case companies were also 
used to complement the data gathered in the theme interviews (McKinnon, 
1988). Specific procedures to increase the validity of the findings were also 
conducted.  First,  the  scoring  was  based  on  a  phased  procedure  in  which  the  
scores were first assessed by two researchers working independently through 
all transcripts. After joint analysis and comparison, the two researchers agreed 
on  their  final  scores  (See  McKinnon,  1988,  pp.  49-50).  Second,  to  provide  
further  evidence  of  the  validity  and  reliability  of  the  scoring,  we  asked  for  
independent reviews from experienced academics in the field from two 
different universities, working independently of each other. This independent 
analysis did not result in any material differences in the scores or changes in 
the categorisation of companies. 
  
47 
 
5. Summaries of the essays and their 
contribution 
 
 
5.1. SID making practices: A contextual approach 
 
The first essay of this dissertation seeks to shed light on the contextual nature 
of SID making practices. SID literature has documented significant differences 
in practice – both in regard to the choice of particular capital budgeting 
techniques (see e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 
1998;  Sandahl  and  Sjögren,  2003;  Verbeeten,  2006)  and  in  regard  to  the  
broader tendencies to emphasise strategic versus financial analysis in the 
decision-making (see e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Sandahl and Sjögren, 
2003). The SID literature has, however, paid very little attention to which 
contextual variables, besides the country context, could be associated with 
these differences (Chen, 2008; Verbeeten, 2006). As a consequence, several 
scholars have called for more contextually based research studies designed to 
explain differences in SID making practices (Haka, 1987; Ho and Pike, 1998; 
Slagmulder et al., 1995; Verbeeten, 2006).  
Essay  1  develops  a  new  contextual  framework  for  explaining  differences  in  
SID making practices. The framework developed encompasses important, but 
neglected contingencies that are derived from the broader strategic 
management and strategic management accounting (SMA) literatures. These 
contingencies are integrated to construct a general contextual framework that 
explains  SID  making  practices  in  terms  of  a  company’s  ‘market orientation’ 
and its ‘performance in relation to shareholder expectations’. The framework 
developed gives rise to a fourfold categorisation of companies comprising 
market creators, value creators, refocusers and restructurers. This 
framework’s potential for explaining differences in SID making practices is 
subsequently explored through an exploratory set of 14 matched field case 
studies  from  the  U.K.,  U.S.  and  Japan,  providing  coverage  of  the  vehicle  
components and telecommunications sectors.  
 Essay 1 contributes to the SID literature by proposing a new corporate 
typology that is developed specifically to explain differences in SID making 
practices. Given limited prior focus on contextual SID making practices 
(Slagmulder et al., 1995; Verbeeten, 2006), no such SID-specific typology has 
been presented before. The evidence presented in the paper suggests, however, 
that general SMA typologies, such as Miles and Snow’s (1978) prospector-
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defender-analyser-reactor-typology (see e.g. Cadez and Guilding, Guilding, 
1999; Simons, 1987),  would provide a less comprehensive explanation for the 
differences in SID making practices. Although tentative and descriptive at this 
stage, the new typology developed in the paper provides a theoretical 
categorisation against which further research on contextual differences in SID 
making practices can be examined. Over time, the findings of such 
examinations could accumulate and provide a more thorough understanding of 
contextual SID making practices.  
 Essay 1 also adds to the SID literature by presenting qualitative field-based 
evidence of how decisions on strategic investments are in actuality made in 
organisations. The evidence reveals substantial differences in practice: these 
differences are not revealed simply in regard to the choice of capital budgeting 
techniques, but are also particularly apparent in the way the techniques are 
used, and in how they influence decision-making on strategic investments. The 
differences found in practice vary in accordance with the contextual framework 
proposed in the paper. Correspondingly, market creators exhibit the most 
strategically orientated approach to SIDs. Financial analyses have a more 
supportive role and they are likely to be over-ridden or even manipulated by 
decision-makers. At the other extreme, restructurers emphasise financial 
considerations and are more rigid and conservative when handling targets and 
non-quantifiables. Value creators and refocusers demonstrate a more balanced 
emphasis  on  both  strategic  and  financial  considerations,  but  exhibit  other  
marked differences in their overall SID approaches. 
 
 
5.2. Shaping strategy formation with knowledge-integrating 
corporate-level management control systems 
 
The second essay of this dissertation seeks to provide new insight into the roles 
MCS play in shaping strategy formation. Prior MCS research has tended to 
conceptualise the strategy formation shaping role of MCS as that of triggering 
strategic debate and organisational learning (see e.g. Bruining et al., 2004; 
Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995b; Tuomela, 2005). Essay 2 examines the knowledge-
integrating, strategy formation shaping role of corporate-level MCSs. The 
empirical examination of the paper draws on an exploratory case study in two 
global multi-business companies which represent different business strategies 
and environmental contexts. 
 Essay 2 contributes to the literature on MCSs by empirically demonstrating 
that their role in shaping strategy formation may be more multifaceted than 
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what is  suggested by prior MCS literature.  Essay 2 suggests that MCSs do not 
influence strategy formation solely through triggering strategic debate and 
organisational learning (Simons, 1990). They can also have a more immediate 
influence  over  strategy  formation:  they  can  facilitate  the  integration  of  
strategically critical knowledge and contribute to business managers 
possessing more complete knowledge when they formulate their business 
strategies. This represents a non-invasive, enabling approach to exerting 
influence over business strategy formation. It seeks to mobilise business 
managers’ knowledge, and it enables them to deal more effectively with their 
inevitable  contingencies.  (see  Ahrens  and  Chapman,  2004;  Wouters  and  
Wilderom, 2008). The approach presented in the paper shares characteristics 
with recent advancements in the strategic management literature, which 
suggest reconciliation between the ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ schools of strategy 
formation by indicating that strategy formation may be guided with only 
limited structure (Brews and Hunt, 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998; 
Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Grant, 2001; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Ocasio and 
Joseph, 2005, 2008). It corresponds particularly closely to Grant’s (2003) 
concept of ‘planned emergence’ according to which business managers exhibit 
substantial autonomy and flexibility in strategy making, but corporate 
management seeks to shape the strategy making by providing the structure and 
context for the planning. Similarly to the ‘planned emergence’ approach, the 
approach presented in the paper also involves providing channels and forums 
for communication and knowledge sharing. How the approach presented in the 
paper differs from the approach illustrated by Grant is that a strong emphasis 
is placed on integrating knowledge in an explicit and readily digestible form. 
This facilitates that the knowledge sharing is not limited to those participating 
in the process, but can be shared more extensively throughout the organisation 
(Grant, 1996b; Teece, 2000).  
 Essay 2 also adds to the MCS literature by providing further specification to 
the concept of ICS: it presents a comparison of the purpose and properties of 
learning-oriented business-level ICSs (Bisbe et al., 2007; Simons, 1990, 1991, 
1995a) and knowledge integration-oriented corporate-level ICSs. The paper 
also  integrates  its  key  findings  to  propose  an  extension  to  Simons’  (1990)  
influential process model of the relationship between business strategy and 
MCSs by adding a corporate-level perspective to it. 
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5.3. Dynamic SPMS: Balancing empowerment and alignment 
 
The  third  paper  of  this  dissertation  seeks  to  contribute  to  the  literature  on  
SPMSs thorough presenting empirically grounded theoretical insights about 
dynamic SPMSs. The paper examines how substantial dynamism can be built 
into SPMSs, and how such dynamic SPMSs can be used for strategic alignment. 
The paper is motivated by the practical significance of building dynamism into 
SPMSs28, and the shortage of prior empirical evidence showing how companies 
seek  to  achieve  this  in  practice  (see  e.g.  Kennerley  and  Neely,  2002,  2003;  
Neely,  2005;  Waggoner  et  al.,  1999).  The  paper  draws  on  an  inductive,  in-
depth case study of a global leader operating in the dynamic 
telecommunications industry. 
 Essay 3 contributes to the SPMS literature by empirically demonstrating 
that building and using dynamic SPMSs may require companies to use a 
combination of management practices that differ considerably from those 
prevalent for more stable SPMSs. These differences relate to the number and 
type of performance measures, the number and type of alignment processes, 
and the level of subjectivity in the performance evaluation. Essay 3 also 
contributes to the SPMS literature by shedding light on individual level SPMSs. 
Prior SPMS literature has tended to focus on SPMSs, such as the BSC, which 
measures performance at an organisational level (see e.g. Franco and Bourne, 
2003;  Neely,  2005).  Essay  3  suggests  that  SPMS  measuring  contribution  to  
strategic performance at an individual level may be central for building 
dynamism into SPMSs. They allow for the incorporation of a variety of types of 
measures - including action-oriented targets that can be derived directly from 
strategic action plans - and facilitate placing primary responsibility for the 
measures at the level of an individual manager. This enhances the mobilisation 
of local knowledge in relation to the most significant and timely issues and 
facilitates the identification of more valid, reliable and understandable 
measures (Wouters and Wilderom, 2008). It also allows for that modifications 
                                                  
28 Empirical reports from different parts of the world indicate that SPMSs have become 
an integral part of contemporary corporate practice (see e.g. Kald and Nilsson, 2000; 
Rigby, 2001; Silk, 1998, Speckbacher et al., 2003). Although they may provide 
managers with potentially effective mechanisms for strategic alignment (see e.g. 
Epstein and Manzoni, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001), they may also introduce 
organisational rigidity and slow down an organisation’s ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances unless frequent modifications to the measures are feasible (Bititci et al., 
2000). Such a capability is likely to be particularly vital in turbulent industries where 
companies seek strategic agility – the capability to change strategies and business 
models rapidly (Doz and Kosonen, 2007). 
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to the measures and target setting can be made swiftly. This can provide a more 
effective means for building dynamism into SPMSs than formal audit tools and 
review processes suggested by prior research on dynamic SPMSs (see e.g. 
Bititci et al., 2000; Bourne et al., 2000; Medori and Steeple, 2000).  
Finally,  Essay  3  adds  to  the  literatures  on  SPMSs  and  PMSs  in  general  by  
suggesting that subjectivity may reintroduce itself into strategic evaluation. For 
over a decade, quantitative strategic measurements have been advanced as 
critical elements for successful strategic alignment (see e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 
1992, 1996, 2001; Simons, 2000).  Essay 3 suggests that subjectivity may be a 
central feature in a dynamic SPMS. It could be essential both to empower 
managers  more  effectively  to  take  primary  responsibility  for  measures  and to  
provide  them  with  sufficient  leverage  to  account  for  changes  in  the  external  
and internal contexts. 
 
   
5.4. Elaborating on the concept of values-based control 
 
The fourth paper of the dissertation seeks to elaborate on the concept of values-
based control – a control approach whereby managers seek to utilise 
organisational values as a means of influencing organisational members’ 
behaviour. The concept of values-based control has remained ambiguous 
despite wide acknowledgement by contemporary literature on MCSs that such 
systems constitute an essential part of a broader control package (e.g. Malmi 
and Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Mundy, 2010; Simons, 
1995a;  Widener,  2007).  This  ambiguity  results  from  the  fact  that  MCS  
researchers have addressed values-based control through a variety of partially 
overlapping concepts without seeking to provide much specification for the 
potential linkages between the concepts.  
 Essay 4 seeks to specify the key approaches through which values-based 
control is mobilised and to illustrate how these approaches can be applied in 
practice. It also sheds light on the challenges that surface when organisational 
members’ behaviour is influenced through these approaches, and highlights 
similarities and differences between the key values-based control concepts 
applied within MCS literature. The examination is based on two pillars: first, it 
relies  on  a  review  of  extant  literature.  Second,  it  draws  from  an  empirical  
examination of values-based control practices in a large, global organisation 
with a strong administrative heritage in values-based control.  
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Essay 4 contributes to the literatures on values-based control and MCSs in 
two ways. First, it contributes conceptually by proposing a new 
conceptualisation of values-based control. The proposed conceptualisation is 
broader than the traditional values-based control concepts - clan control 
(Ouchi,  1979),  cultural  control  (e.g.  Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  
Sandelin, 2008), belief system (Simons, 199a, 1995b) and value-based control 
(Malmi  and  Brown,  2008)  -  applied  within  the  MCS  literature.  This  new  
conceptualisation acknowledges that organisational members can engage in 
desirable values-related behaviour by not only relying on their intrinsic 
motivation (e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ouchi, 1979), but also by relying on 
their  perceptions  of  the  benefits  related  to  assuming  such  behaviour  (e.g.  
Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). It portrays values-
based control as comprising an array of complementary values-based control 
approaches - selection, acculturation, communication and incentivisation. 
These differ in the extent to which they seek to exert direct influence on 
organisational members’ behaviour.  
The new conceptualisation of values-based control put forward in the paper 
has implications for the research on values-based control.  First,  it  argues that 
the general conception to view values-based control as socio-ideological control 
that operates through influencing organisational members’ internal beliefs 
about what types of behaviour are desirable (e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995; Norris 
and O’Dwyer, 2004; Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995a)  may represent only a partial 
view of the nature of values-based control.  Second, it  suggests that a common 
juxtaposition between values-based control and formal, bureaucratic forms of 
control (see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Norris and O’Dwyer, 
2005; Ouchi, 1979) may not be justifiable. The MCS and values-based control 
literatures often portray values-based control as an informal and subtle control 
form, which operates largely outside formal control processes (see e.g. 
Langfield-Smith,  1997;  Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  Norris  and  
O’Dwyer, 2004; Ouchi, 1979; cf. Alvesson and Kärreman, 2004; Simons, 
1995a). The conceptualisation put forward in Essay 4 highlights that many of 
the processes through which values-based control is mobilised are in fact quite 
formal organisational processes. Finally, the conceptualisation put forward in 
the  paper  also  highlights  the  complementary  nature  of  values-based  control  
approaches. It contends that all the identified values-based control approaches 
have inherent limitations. It argues that an effective mobilisation of values-
based control can necessitate a complementary use of these approaches.  
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Further,  Essay  4  also  adds  to  the  literature  on  values-based  control  by  an  
empirical illustration of  how  values-based  control  can  be  mobilised  through  
the formal incentivisation of organisational members’ values-related 
behaviour.  Although  some  recent  studies  have  reported  observations  of  
attempts to incentivise desirable values-related behaviour (Doz and Kosonen, 
2007, p. 110; Lenzioni, 2002, Mundy, 2010), these studies have provided very 
little visibility into how such formal incentivisation can be implemented in 
practice. The evidence presented in the paper demonstrates that the formal 
evaluation and incentivisation of organisational members’ values-related 
behaviour is subjective and sensitive in character. It also illustrates that 
particular procedural features - such as an attempt to strengthen the 
transparency of the evaluation process - can be used to enhance organisational 
members’ approval for such evaluation.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation has been to contribute to SID, MCS, 
SPMS and values-based control literatures by addressing the research gaps 
specified  in  these  literatures.  Each  of  the  four  essays  included  in  this  
dissertation makes several contributions to their specific research areas, as 
specified in the previous section. The dissertation provides both more focused 
contributions to these literatures and also a basis for general observations 
about the strategic role of management accounting. These general observations 
will be addressed in the following.  
 All four essays included in this dissertation provide evidence that inclusion 
of qualitative and subjective elements in management accounting could 
strengthen its strategic role – i.e. help make it more relevant to strategic 
decision-making and control. The introduction of qualitative and subjective 
elements can, first of all, facilitate the inclusion of not easily quantifiable 
factors such as synergies in the analyses of strategic investments (Essay 1). It 
can also facilitate that subjective, experience-based managerial insights can be 
drawn upon when formulating strategies (Essay 2) or when making decisions 
on strategic investments (Essay 1). It can also contribute to making strategic 
performance measures more relevant, timely and understandable by enabling 
the inclusion of qualitatively defined strategic targets that can be derived 
directly from strategic action plans and by providing individual managers with 
sufficient leverage to account for changes in external and internal contexts in 
target setting and performance evaluation (Essay 3). Finally, inclusion of such 
elements can also facilitate extending the formal evaluation and incentivisation 
of organisational members’ behaviour to include strategically critical elements 
- such as organizational members’ tendency to exhibit desirable values-related 
behaviours - that would simply not be measurable through purely quantitative 
means (Essay 4). 
 Similar observations about the potential benefits related to inclusion of 
qualitative and subjective elements in management accounting have been 
presented by several prominent management accounting scholars. Manzoni 
(2002, 2008, 2010) and Simons (1995; p. 118-119) have noted that allowing for 
subjective, qualitative judgement in performance evaluation and reward can 
increase flexibility, stimulate entrepreneurship and organisational learning, 
and help motivate organisational members engage in desirable behaviours. 
Bhimani and Bromwich (2010; see also Bromwich and Bhimani, 1991) have, on 
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the  other  hand,  commented  that  a  strict  focus  on  quantitative  analysis  can  
restrict the strategic role of management accounting by forcing managers to 
leave significant but not easily quantifiable factors outside analysis and 
decision-making. Otley (1999) and Ferreira and Otley (2010) have similarly 
emphasised that inclusion of qualitative, more subjective elements in 
management accounting could enhance its strategic role.  
 Despite these commentaries, available evidence of the ways through which 
business managers seek to draw benefits from blending quantitative and 
qualitative, more subjective analysis remains insufficient (Bhimani and 
Bromwich,  2010).  The  academic  management  accounting  community  has  
tended to draw attention to the negative implications of subjectivity (Manzoni, 
2002,  2008,  2010).  Attention  has  been  paid,  for  example,  to  the  discretion,  
bias and favouritism caused by inclusion of subjective elements (see e.g. 
Prendergeist and Topel, 1993, 1996; Simons, 2000). The above-mentioned 
observations and the evidence presented in this dissertation suggest that the 
role of subjectivity may need to be re-evaluated. The academic management 
accounting community may need to pay more attention to the contextual 
situations in which allowance for subjective judgement can be beneficial to 
organisations. Further empirical studies are also needed to cast more light on 
the  ways  through  which  managers  seek  to  blend  quantitative  and  qualitative  
analysis across key management accounting practices, such as those related to 
investment decision-making and performance measurement and evaluation.  
 This dissertation also provides further empirical evidence of significant 
discrepancies between practical management accounting applications and 
those generally proposed by management accounting literature (see e.g. Arnold 
and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Carr and Tomkins, 1998; Malina and Selto, 2004; 
Malmi,  2001;  Malmi  and  Ikäheimo,  2003;  Manzoni,  2002;  Merchant,  1987;  
Simons, 2005). The differences found relate not only to the ways through 
which particular management accounting techniques such as discounted cash 
flow (DCF) techniques and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) are used (Essay 1, Essay 
3; for prior evidence of such discrepancies see e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 1998; 
Malina and Selto, 2004; Malmi, 2001), but also to some of the most central 
management accounting principles such as the ‘accountability’ and ‘objectivity’ 
principles (Essay 3, Essay 4; for earlier evidence of such discrepancies see e.g. 
Manzoni, 2002; Merchant, 1989). The fact that empirical management 
accounting studies repeatedly report significant discrepancies between 
practical management accounting applications and those proposed by the 
management accounting literature highlights the need for continuing such 
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empirical endeavours. Field-based studies are likely to be particularly effective 
in telling us more about the multiple, potentially unexpected ways through 
which management accounting techniques are applied in organisations (see 
e.g.  Ahrens  and  Chapman,  1998;  Kaplan,  1986;  Yin,  2003).  Over  time  such  
studies may accumulate evidence that enables specification of the of types of 
applications that are effective in particular contextual settings. Such 
investigations can also tell us more about the plurality of purposes for which 
management accounting techniques are utilised.29 (see also Malmi and 
Granlund,  2009)  Finally,  further  empirical  investigations  could  also  tell  us  
more about the contextual situations in which managers may be willing to relax 
some of the central management accounting principles, such as the 
‘accountability’ and ‘objectivity’ principle, in order to draw more benefits from 
the use of management accounting systems. This dissertation presents 
tentative evidence that a turbulent business environment may be one of the key 
contextual drivers forcing managers to allow for considerable subjectivity in 
the target setting and performance evaluation (Essay 3).  
Finally, the research evidence presented in this dissertation provides a basis 
for drawing tentative insights about the nature of complementaries between 
control package constituents (see e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; Sandelin, 2008 
for calls for such specifications). It suggests, firstly, that control package 
constituents can be complementary in regard to their time orientation. 
Managers  may  seek  to  utilise  some  parts  of  the  overall  control  package  as  a  
means  of  enhancing  continuity,  while  other  parts  can  be  used  to  build  
dynamism and a sense of urgency into operations. The evidence presented in 
Essay 3 suggests that these types of complementaries may occur, for example, 
between  overall  SPMS  constituents,  or  between  SPMSs  and  values-based  
controls.  Managers  may  seek  to  utilise  individual  level  SPMSs as  a  means  of  
building dynamism by facilitating - and to some extent enforcing - frequent 
modifications to the measures. Organisational level SPMSs may, on the other 
hand, be kept relatively stable in order to enhance continuity in operations. 
Values-based control systems may, on another hand, be used to build a sense of 
even stronger continuity in the operations. The recent study by Chakhovich 
(2010) has presented related evidence that socio-ideological and technocratic 
                                                  
29 This dissertation presents also new, tentative evidence of the purposes for which managers 
may seek to utilise a BSC. Prior studies have positioned BSC as a mechanism for enhancing 
strategy formation, strategy implementation and organisational learning (see e.g. Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996, 2001; Tuomela, 2005). The evidence presented in Essay 3 suggests that 
managers may also seek to utilise a BSC as a mechanism for building continuity into 
organisational life: when a BSC is used for this purpose, other parts of the overall SPMS can be 
used specifically to enhance strategy implementation.   
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controls trigger varying time models among practitioners. Her study suggests 
that a potential balance between socio-ideological and technocratic controls 
can be beneficial in combating myopia, which she defines as a disproportionate 
concern for business matters related to the past, present or future which does 
not contribute to the long-term success of the focal company. Her findings and 
the findings presented in this dissertation are among the first to point to the 
time orientation-related complementaries between control package 
constituents. Much further research is needed to shed more light on how 
managers  seek  to  apply  -  and  how  their  subordinates  make  sense  of  -  such  
potential complementaries.  
 Further, the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that control 
package constituents can also be complementary in that they seek to account 
for  the  inherent  weaknesses  in  other  control  package  constituents.  A  
combination of such complementary MCSs may enable managers to exert 
influence on a larger part of organisational members than what would be 
feasible through any single MCS alone. The evidence presented in Essay 4 
suggests that managers may, for example, seek to apply a combination of 
values-based control approaches in order to motivate desirable values-related 
behaviour among organisational members. This can enable managers to 
motivate desirable values-related behaviour both among those organisational 
members  who  are  likely  to  have  an  intrinsic  motivation  to  engage  in  such  
behaviours and among those who are better motivated through the formal 
incentivisation of desirable values-related behaviours. Finally, this dissertation 
provides further evidence for claims that control package constituents can be 
complementary in that they seek to mitigate dysfunctional consequences 
caused by other control package constituents (see e.g. Simons, 1995, 2000, 
2005). This study presents evidence to support the contention that managers 
may seek to utilise values-based control systems as a means of increasing 
cooperation between organisational members in a context in which there is a 
strong emphasis on linking individual rewards to performance measurement 
(Essay 3; for prior evidence see e.g. Simons, 2005).30  
A single doctoral dissertation can only seek to scratch the surface of some of 
the complexities of management accounting practice. This study has sought to 
shed light on four management practices that lie on the interface between 
strategy and management accounting. It provides further empirical evidence 
                                                  
30 Previous studies have indicated that linking individual rewards to performance measurement 
may result in dysfunctional consequences such as not prioritising the organisation’s primary 
goals, competition between individuals and manipulation of data (see e.g. Hopwood, 1972; 
Otley, 1987; Ridgway, 1956). 
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for discussion about the strategic role of management accounting (see e.g. 
Bromwich and Bhimani, 1989, 1994; Bhimani and Bromwich, 2010; Otley, 
2001). It argues that the strategic role of management accounting can be 
strengthened by allowing qualitative and subjective elements to enter into the 
realm of management accounting. It also draws attention to the multi-faceted - 
and at times unexpected - forms that management accounting takes in 
organisations. Much further research is needed to uncover the complexities 
and contextualities of management accounting practice. We can hope that such 
efforts may, over time, provide more profound understanding of management 
accounting practice – and a theoretical knowledge which we may refer to as the 
theory of management accounting (Malmi and Granlund, 2009).  
  
59 
 
References for Part I 
 
Abernethy, M.A., Brownell, P., 1999. The role of budgets in organizations 
facing strategic change: an exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 24, 189-2004. 
 
Abernethy, M.A., Chua, W.F., 1996. A field study of control system “redesign”: 
the impact of institutional processes on strategic choice. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 13, 569-606. 
 
Abernethy, M.A., Chua, W.F., Luckett, P.F. and Selto, F.H., 1999. Research in 
managerial accounting: learning from others’ experiences. Accounting and 
Finance, 39, 1-27. 
 
Ackoff, R.L., 1989. From data to wisdom. Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 
16, 3-9. 
 
Ahn, H., 2001. Applying the balanced scorecard concept: an experience report. 
Long Range Planning, 34, 441-461. 
 
Ahrens, T., 2008. Overcoming the subjective-objective divide in interpretive 
management accounting research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 
292-297. 
 
Ahrens, T., Chapman, C.S., 2004. Accounting for flexibility and efficiency: a 
field  study  of  management  control  systems  in  a  restaurant  chain.  
Contemporary Accounting Research, 21, 271-301. 
 
Ahrens,  T.,  Chapman,  C.S.,  2006.  Doing  qualitative  field  research  in  
management accounting: positioning data to contribute to theory. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 31, 819-841. 
 
Ahrens, T., Dent, J.F., 1998. Accounting and organizations: realizing the 
richness of field research. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 10, 1-
39. 
 
60 
 
Alkaraan, F., Northcott, D., 2006. Strategic capital investment decision-
making:  a  role  for  emergent  analysis  tools?  A  study  of  practice  in  large  UK  
manufacturing companies. British Accounting Review, 38, 149-173. 
 
Alkaraan, F., Northcott, D., 2007. Strategic investment decision making: the 
influence of pre-decision control mechanisms. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, 4, 133-150. 
 
Alvesson, M., Kärreman, D., 2004. Interfaces of control. Technocratic and 
socio-ideological control in a global management consultancy firm. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 423-444. 
 
Anderson, C., 1997. Values-based management. Academy of Management 
Executive, 11, 25-46. 
 
Ansoff, H.I., 1991. Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s ‘the design school: 
reconsidering the basic premises of strategic management. Strategic 
Management Journal, 12, 449-461. 
 
Anthony, R. N., 1965. Planning and Control Systems: Framework for Analysis. 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston.  
 
Arnold,  G.C.,  Hatzopoulos,  P.D.,  2000.  The  theory-practice  gap  in  capital  
budgeting: evidence from the United Kingdom. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 27, 603-626. 
 
Atkinson, A.A.,  Shaffir,  W.,  1998. Standards for field research in management 
accounting. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 10, 42-68. 
 
Baldvinsdottir, G., Mitchell, F., Nørreklit, H., 2010. Issues in the relationship 
between theory and practice in management accounting: editorial. 
Management Accounting Research, 21, 79-82. 
 
Banker, R.D., Potter, G.,  Srinivasan, D., 2000. An empirical investigation of an 
incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures. The 
Accounting Review, 75, 65-92. 
 
61 
 
Baxter, J., Chua, W.F., 2003. Alternative management accounting research – 
whence and whither. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 97-126.  
 
Bell,  S.J.,  Whitwell,  G.J.,  Lukas,  B.A.,  2002.  Schools  of  thought  in  
organizational learning. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30, 70-
86. 
 
Berry, A.J., Coad, A.F., Harris, E.P., Otley, D., Stringer, C., 2009. Emerging 
themes in management control: a review of recent literature. The British 
Accounting Review, 41, 2-20. 
 
Bhimani, A.,Bromwich, M., 2010. Management Accounting: retrospect and 
prospect. CIMA Publishing, Oxford.  
 
Bisbe, J., Batista-Foguet, J-M., Chenhall, R., 2007. Defining management 
accounting constructs: a methodological note on the risks of conceptual 
misspecification. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 789-820.  
 
Bisbe, J., Otley, D., 2004. The effects of the interactive use of management 
control systems on product innovation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
29, 709-737.  
 
Bititci, U.S., Mendibil, K., Nudurupati, S., Garengo, P.,Turner, T., 2006. 
Dynamics of performance measurement and organizational culture. 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 26, 1325-1350. 
 
Bourne, M., Mills, J., Wilcox, M., Neely, A., Platts, K., 2000. Designing, 
implementing and updating performance measurement systems. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management 20, 754-771. 
 
Brews,  P.J.,  Hunt,  M.  R.,  1999.  Learning  to  plan  and  planning  to  learn:  
resolving the planning school/learning school debate. Strategic Management 
Journal, 20, 889-913. 
 
Broadbent, J., Laughlin, R., 2009. Performance management systems: a 
conceptual model. Management Accounting Research, 20, 283-295. 
 
62 
 
Bromwich, M., Bhimani, A., 1989. Management Accounting: Evolution not 
Revolution. The Chartered Institute of Accountants, London.  
 
Bromwich, M: and Bhimani, A., 1991. Strategic investment appraisal. 
Management Accounting, 72, March, 45-48. 
 
Bromwich, M., Bhimani, A., 1994. Management Accounting: Pathways to 
Progress. The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, London.  
 
Brown, S.L., Eisenhardt, K.M., 1997. The art of continuous change: linking 
complexity theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting 
organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 1-34. 
 
Brown,  S.L.,  Eisenhardt,  K.M.,  1998.  Competing  on  the  Edge:  Strategy  as  
Structured Chaos. Harvard Business School Press, Boston.  
 
Bruns, W.J., Kaplan, R.S., 1987. Introduction: field studies in management 
accounting. In Bruns, W.J. and Kaplan, R.S. (eds.) Accounting and 
Management: Field Study Perspectives. Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston.  
 
Bryman,  A.,  1984.  The  debate  about  quantitative  and  qualitative  research:  a  
question of method or epistemology? The British Journal of Sociology, 35, 75-
91. 
 
Bruining, H., Bonnet, M., Wright, M., 2004. Management control systems and 
strategy change in buyouts. Management Accounting Research, 15, 155-177. 
 
Brytting,  T.,  Trollestad,  C.,  2000.  Managerial  thinking  on  value-based  
management. International Journal of Value-Based Management, 13,  
 
Bukh,  P.N.,  Malmi,  T.,  2005.  Re-examining  the  cause-and-effect  principle  of  
the Balanced Scorecard. In Jönsson, S. and Mouritsen, J. (eds.) Accounting in 
Scandinavia – The Northern Lights. Liber & Copenhagen Business School 
Press, Copenhagen. 
 
63 
 
Buckley,  P.,  Carter,  M.,  2004.  A  formal  analysis  of  knowledge  combination  in  
multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35, 371-
384. 
 
Burns, J., Balvinsdottir, G., 2005. An institutional perspective of accoutants’ 
new roles - the interplay of contradictions and praxis. European Accounting 
Review, 14, 725-757. 
 
Burrell, G., Morgan, G., 1979. Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. Heinemann, London. 
 
Butler, R., Davies, L., Pike, R., Sharp, J., 1991. Strategic investment decision-
making: complexities, politics and processes. Journal of Management Studies, 
28, 395-415. 
 
Butler, R., Davies, L., Pike, R., Sharp, J., 1993. Strategic Investment Decisions: 
Theory, Practice and Process. Routledge, London.  
 
Butler,  A.,  Letza,  S.R.,  Neale,  B.,  1997.  Linking  the  Balanced  Scorecard  to  
strategy. Long Range Planning, 30, 242-253. 
 
Cadez, S., Guilding, C., 2008. An exploratory investigation of an integrated 
contingency model of strategic management accounting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 33, 836-863. 
 
Caglio, A., Ditillo, A., 2008. A review and discussion of management control in 
inter-firm relationships: achievements and future directions. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 33, 865-898. 
 
Carr, C.H., 2005. Are German, Japanese and Anglo-Saxon strategic styles still 
divergent in the context of globalization? Journal of Management Studies, 42, 
1155-1188. 
 
Carr,  C.,  Harris,  S.,  2002.  The  impact  of  diverse  national  values  on  strategic  
investment decisions in the context of globalization. International Journal of 
Cross Cultural Management, 4, 77-99. 
 
64 
 
Carr, C., Tomkins, C., 1996. Strategic investment decisions: the importance of 
SCM.  A  comparative  analysis  of  51  case  studies  in  U.K.,  U.S.  and  German  
companies. Management Accounting Research, 7, 199-217. 
 
Carr,  C.,  Tomkins,  C.,  1998.  Context,  culture  and  the  role  of  the  finance  
function in strategic decisions. A comparative analysis of Britain, Germany, the 
U.S.A. and Japan. Management Accounting Research, 9, 213-239. 
 
Carr, C.H., Tomkins, C.R., Bayliss, B., 1994. Strategic Investment Decisions: A 
Comparison of UK and W. German Practices in the Motor Components 
Industry. ICAEW/Avebury, Aldershot. 
 
Chakhovich, T., 2010. Essays on Managerial Myopia and Subject Positions in 
Companies with Different Governance Structures. Aalto University School of 
Economics – Aalto Print, Helsinki. 
 
Chapman, C., 1997. Reflections on contingent view of accounting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 22, 189-205. 
 
Chapman, C.S., 2005. Controlling Strategy. In Chapman, C.S. (eds.), 
Controlling Strategy: Management, Accounting, and Performance 
Measurement. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Chapman, C., Hopwood, A.G., Shields, M.D., 2007. Handbook of Management 
Accounting Research, Vol 2. Elsevier, Boston. 
 
Chen,  S.,  1995.  An  empirical  examination  of  capital  budgeting  techniques:  
impact  of  investment  types  and  firm  characteristics.  The  Engineering  
Economist, 40, 145-170. 
 
Chen,  S.,  2008.  DCF  techniques  and  nonfinancial  measures  in  capital  
budgeting: a contingency approach analysis. Behavioral Research in 
Accounting, 20, 13-29. 
 
Chenhall, R.H., 2003. Management control systems design within its 
organizational context: findings from a contingency-based research and 
directions for the future. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 127-168. 
 
65 
 
Chenhall, R.H., 2005. Integrative strategic performance measurement systems, 
strategic alignment of manufacturing, learning and strategic outcomes: an 
exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30, 395-422. 
 
Chenhall, R.H., 2007. Theorizing Contingencies in Management Control 
Systems Research. in Management Accounting. In Chapman, C., Hopwood, A. 
G., Shields, M. D. (eds.) Handbook of Management Accounting Research, Vol 1. 
Elsevier, Boston, 163-205. 
 
Chenhall, R.H., Langfield-Smith, K., 1998. The relationship between strategic 
priorities, management techniques and management accounting: an empirical 
investigation using a systems approach. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 23, 243-264. 
 
Chenhall, R.H., Langfield-Smith, K., 2007. Multiple perspectives of 
performance measures. European Management Journal, 25, 266–282. 
 
Cheung, J.K., 1993. Managerial flexibility in capital investment decisions: 
insights from the real-options literature. Journal of Accounting Literature, 12, 
29. 
 
Chua, W.F., 1986. Radical developments in accounting thought. Accounting 
Review, 61, 601-632. 
  
Collier, P.M., 2005. Entrepreneurial control and the construction of a relevant 
accounting. Management Accounting Research, 16, 321-339. 
 
Cooper, R., 1996. Lean enterprises and the confrontation strategy. The 
Academy of Management Executive, 10, 28-39. 
 
Cooper,  D.  J.,  Morgan,  W.,  2008.  Case  study  research  in  accounting.  
Accounting Horizons, 22, 159-178. 
 
Covaleski, M.A., Dirsmith, M.W., Samuel, S., 1996. Managerial accounting 
research: the contributions of organizational and sociological theories. Journal 
of Management Accounting Research, 8, 1-35. 
 
66 
 
Crossan, M.M., Berdrow, I., 2003. Organizational learning and strategic 
renewal. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 1087-1105. 
 
Crossan, M.M., Lane, H.W., White, R.W., 1999. An organizational learning 
framework: from intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24, 
522-537. 
 
Davenport, T.H., Prusak, L., 1998. Working Knowledge: How Organizations 
Manage What They Know. Harvard Business School Press, New York.  
 
Davis, S., Albright, T., 2004. An investigation of the effect of Balanced 
Scorecard implementation on financial performance. Management Accounting 
Research, 15, 135-153. 
 
Dent, J., 1990. Strategy, organization and control: some possibilities for 
accounting research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15, 3-25. 
 
Ditillo, A., 2004. Dealing with uncertainty in knowledge-intensive firms: the 
role of management control systems as knowledge integration mechanisms. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29, 401-421. 
 
Dixon, J.R, Nanni, A. J., Vollmann, T.E., 1990. The New Performance 
Challenge: Measuring Operations for World-class Competition. Dow Jones-
Irwin, Homewood. 
 
Dossi,  A.,  Patelli,  L.,  2010.  You  learn  from  what  you  measure:  financial  and  
nonfinancial performance measures in multinational companies. Long Range 
Planning, 43, 498-526. 
 
Doz, Y.L., Kosonen, M., 2007. The new deal at the top. Harvard Business 
Review, 85, 98-104. 
 
Doz,  Y.L.,  Kosonen,  M.,  2008.  Fast  Strategy:  How Strategic  Ability  Will  Help  
You Stay Ahead of the Game. Wharton School Publishing, Harlow.  
 
Discoll, D.-M., Hoffman, W.M., 1999. Gaining the ethical edge: procedures for 
delivering values-driven management. Long Range Planning, 32, 179-189. 
 
67 
 
Eccles, R.G., 1991. The performance measurement manifesto. Harvard 
Business Review 69, 131-137. 
 
Edmonson, A., Moingeon, B., 1998. From organizational learning to the 
learning organization. Management Learning, 29, 5-20. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1985. Control: organizational and economic approaches. 
Management Science, 31, 134-149. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Building theories from case study evidence. Academy 
of Management Review, 14, 532-550. 
 
Eisenhardt,  K.M.,  Graebner,  M.E.,  2007.  Theory  building  from  cases:  
opportunities and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 25-32. 
 
Elearn,  2007.  Making  Sense  of  Data  and  Information:  Management  Extra.  
Elsevier, Pergamon Flexible Learning, Oxford. 
 
Emmanuel, C., Otley, D., Merchant, K., 1990. Accounting for Management 
Control, 2nd edition. Chapman and Hall, London.  
 
Epstein, M., Manzoni, J-F., 1998. Implementing Corporate Strategy: from 
Tableaux de Bord to Balanced Scorecards. European Management Journal, 16, 
190-203.  
 
Farragher, E. J., Kleiman, R.T., Sahu, A.P., 1999. Current capital investment 
practices. Engineering Economics, 44, 137-149. 
 
Fauré, B., Rouleau, L., 2011. The strategic competence of accountants and 
middle managers in budget making. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
36, 167-182. 
 
Ferner, A., 2000. The underpinnings of ‘bureaucratic’ control systems: HRM in 
European Multinationals. Journal of Management Studies, 37, 521-539. 
 
Ferreira, A., Merchant, K.A., 1992. Field research in management accounting 
and control: a review and evaluation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 5, 3-34. 
68 
 
 
Ferreira, A., Otley, D., 2009. The design and use of performance management 
systems: an extended framework for analysis. Management Accounting 
Research, 20, 263-282. 
 
Fisher, J.G., 1998. Contingency theory, management control systems and firm 
outcomes: past results and future directions. Behavioral Research in 
Accounting, 10, 47-63. 
 
Flamholtz, E.G., 1983. Accounting, budgeting and control systems in their 
organizational context: theoretical and empirical perspectives. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 8, 153-169. 
 
Flamholtz,  E.G.,  Das,  T.K.,  1985.  Toward  an  integrative  framework  for  
organizational control. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 35-50. 
 
Foss, N. J., 2007. The emerging knowledge governance approach: challenges 
and characteristics. Organization, 14, 29-52. 
 
Foss, N.J., Husted, K., Michailova, S., 2010. Governing knowledge-sharing in 
organizations: levels of analysis, governance mechanisms, and research 
directions. Journal of Management Studies, 47, 455-482. 
 
Foss, N.J., Pedersen, T., 2004. Organizing knowledge processes in the 
multinational corporation: an introduction. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 35, 340-349. 
 
Franco,  M.,  Bourne,  M.,  2003.  Factors  that  play  a  role  in  “managing  through 
measures”. Management Decision, 41, 698-710.  
 
Franco-Santos, M., Kennerley, M., Micheli, P., Martinez, V., Mason, S., Marr, 
B., Gray, D, Neely, A. 2007. Towards a definition of business performance 
measurement systems. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 27, 784-801.  
 
Garvin, D.A., 1993. Building a learning organization. Harvard Business Review, 
71, 78-91. 
 
69 
 
Gibbs, M., Merchant, K.A., Van der Stede, W.A., Vargus, M.E., 2004. 
Determinants and effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review 
79, 409-436.  
 
Gimbert,  X.,  Bisbe,  J.,  Mendoza,  X,  2010.  The  role  of  performance  
measurement systems in strategy formulation process. Long Range Planning, 
43, 477-497.  
 
Goold, M., 1996. Learning, planning, and strategy: extra time. California 
Management Review, 38, 100-102. 
 
Goold, M., Campbell, A., 1987. Strategies and Styles: The Role of the Centre in 
Managing Diversified Corporations. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Goold, M., Campbell, A., Alexander, M., 1994. Corporate level Strategy. John 
Wiley & Sons, New York. 
 
Goold, M., Campbell, A., Alexander, M., 1998. Corporate Strategy and 
Parenting Advantage. Long Range Planning, 31, 308-314. 
 
Goold,  M.,  Quinn,  J.J.,  1990.  The  paradox  of  strategic  controls.  Strategic  
Management Journal, 11, 43-57. 
 
Govindarajan, V. and Gupta, A.K., 1985. Linking control systems to business 
unit strategy: impact on performance. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
10, 51-66. 
 
Graam, G.J.M. and Nijssen, E.J., 2004. Performance effects of using the 
Balanced Scorecard: a note on the Dutch experience, Long Range Planning, 37, 
335-349. 
 
Graham,  J.R.  and  Harvey,  C.R.,  2001.  The  theory  and  practice  of  corporate  
finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 187-243. 
 
Grandori, A., 1997. An organizational assessment of interfirm coordination 
modes. Organization Studies, 18, 897-925. 
 
70 
 
Granlund, M., Lukka, K., 1998. Towards increasing business orientation: 
Finnish management accountants in a changing cultural context. Management 
Accounting Research, 9, 185-211.  
 
Granlund, M., Taipaleenmäki, J., 2005. Management control and 
controllership in new economy firms – a life cycle perspective. Management 
Accounting Research, 16, 21-57. 
 
Grant, R.G., 1996a. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal, 17, 109-122. 
 
Grant, R.G., 1996b. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: 
organizational capability as knowledge integration. Organization Science, 7, 
375-387. 
 
Grant, R.G., 2003. Strategic planning in a turbulent environment: evidence 
from the oil majors. Strategic Management Journal, 24, 491-517.  
 
Guilding, C., 1999. Competitor-focused accounting: an exploratory note. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 24, 583-595.  
 
Haka, S.F., 1987. Capital budgeting techniques and firm specific contingencies: 
a correlational analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12, 31-48. 
 
Haka, S. F., Gordon, L. A., Pinches, G.E., 1985. Sophisticated capital budgeting 
selection techniques and firm performance. The Accounting Review, 60, 651-
669. 
 
Harris, L.C., Obgonna, E., 2011. Antecedents and consequences of 
management-espoused organizational cultural control. Journal of Business 
Research, 64, 437-445. 
 
Harrison, G. L., McKinnon, J., 1999. Cross cultural research in management 
accounting systems design: a review of the current state. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 24, 483-506.   
 
71 
 
Ho, S. M., Pike, R. H., 1998. Organizational characteristics influencing the use 
of risk analysis in strategic capital investments. The Engineering Economist, 
43, 247-268. 
 
Honko, J., Virtanen, K., 1975. The investment process in Finnish industrial 
enterprises. A study of the capital investment planning and control process in 
the fifty largest Finnish industrial enterprises. Helsinki School of Economics, 
Series A-16. 
 
Hopwood,  A.,  1972.  An  empirical  study  of  the  role  of  accounting  data  in  
performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 10, 156-182. 
 
Huber, G.P., 1991. Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the 
literatures. Organization Science, 2, 88-115. 
 
Huikku, J., 2007. Explaining the non-adoption of post-completion auditing. 
European Accounting Review, 16, 363-398. 
 
Humphrey, C., Scapens, R.W.,1996. Theories and case studies of organizational 
accounting practices: limitation or liberation? Accounting, Auditing, & 
Accountability Journal, 9, 86-106. 
 
IBM, 2010. The New Value Integrator: Insights from the Global Chief Financial 
Officer Study.  
 
Ittner, C.D., Larcker, D.F., Rajan, M.V., 1997. The choice of performance 
measures in annual bonus contracts. Accounting Review, 72, 231-255. 
 
Ittner, C.D., Farcher, D.F., Meyer, M.W., 2003. Subjectivity and the weighting 
of performance measures: evidence from a Balanced Scorecard. The 
Accounting Review, 78, 725-758. 
 
Jaeger,  A.M.,  1983.  The  transfer  of  organizational  culture  overseas:  an  
approach to control in multinational corporation. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 14, 91-114. 
 
72 
 
Jaeger, A.M., Baliga, B.R., 1985. Control systems and strategic adaptation: 
lessons from the Japanese experience. Strategic Management Journal, 6, 115-
134. 
 
Jones, T. C., Currie, W.L., Dugdale, D., 1993. Accounting and technology in 
Britain and Japan: learning from field research. Management Accounting 
Research, 4, 109-137. 
 
Järvenpää, M., 2007. Making business partners: a case study on how 
management accounting culture was changed. European Accounting Review, 
16, 99-142. 
 
Kaakkuri-Knuuttila, M.-L., Lukka, K., Kuorikoski, J., 2008a. Straddling 
between paradigms: a naturalistic philosphical case study on interpretive 
research in management accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
33, 267-291. 
 
Kaakkuri-Knuuttila, M.-L., Lukka, K., Kuorikoski, J., 2008b. No premature 
closures of debates, please: a response to Ahrens. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 33, 298-301. 
 
Kanji,  G.,  1998.  Measurement  of  business  excellence.  Total  Quality  
Management, 13, 13-27. 
 
Kaplan, R.S., 1983. Measuring manufacturing performance: a new challenge 
for management accounting research. The Accounting Review, 58, 686-705. 
 
Kaplan, R.S., 1984. The evolution of management accounting. The Accounting 
Review, 59, 686-705. 
 
Kaplan, R.S., 1986. The role for empirical research in management accounting. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 111, 429-452. 
 
Kaplan, R., Norton, D.P., 1992. The Balanced Scorecard – measures that drive 
performance. Harvard Business Review, 70, 71-79. 
 
Kaplan, R., Norton, D.P., 1996. Using the Balanced Scorecard as a strategic 
management system. Harvard Business Review, 74, 75-85. 
73 
 
 
Kaplan, R., Norton, D.P., 2001. The Strategy-Focused Organization. Harvard 
Business School Publishing Corporation, Boston.  
 
Kasanen, E., Lukka, K.,Siitonen, 1993. The constructive approach in 
management accounting research. Journal of Management Accounting 
Research, 5, 243-264. 
 
Kasurinen, T., 2002.  Exploring management accounting change: the case of 
balanced scorecard implementation. Management Accounting Research, 13, 
323-343. 
 
Keating, P.J., 1995. A framework for classifying and evaluating the theoretical 
contributions of case research in management accounting. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 7, 66-86. 
 
Keloharju, M., Puttonen, V., 1995. Suomalaisyritysten investointilaskelmat ja 
suunnitteluhorisontti [The investment calculation methods and planning 
horizon of Finnish companies]. The Finnish Journal of Business Economics, 
44, 316-332. 
 
Kennerley,  M.,Neely,  A.,  2002.  A  framework  of  the  factors  affecting  the  
evolution of performance measurement systems. International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 22, 1222-1245.  
 
Kennerley, M., Neely, A., 2003. Measuring performance in a changing business 
environment. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 
23, 213-229.  
 
Kim, U.-W., Song, J., 1990. U.S., Korea & Japan: accounting practices in three 
countries. Management Accounting, 72, 26-30. 
 
Kirkhaug, R., 2009. The management of meaning – conditions for perception 
of  values  in  a  hierarchical  organization.  Journal  of  Business  Ethics,  87,  317-
324. 
 
74 
 
Klammer, T., Koch, B., Wilner, N., 1991. Capital budgeting practices – a survey 
of corporate use. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 3, Fall, 113-
130.  
 
Kober, R., Ng, J., Byron, J.P., 2007. The interrelationship between 
management control mechanisms and strategy. Management Accounting 
Research, 18, 425-452. 
 
Kogut, B., Zander, U., 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities 
and the replication of technology. Organization Studies, 3, 383-397. 
 
Langfield-Smith, K., 1995. Organizational culture and control. In A.J. Berry, J. 
Broadbent and D. Otley (Eds.) Management Control: Theories, Issues and 
Practices. Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
 
Langfield-Smith, K., 1997. Management control systems and strategy: a critical 
review. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22, 207-232. 
 
Langfield-Smith, K., 2005. What do we know about management control 
systems and strategy? In Chapman, C. S. (eds.), Controlling Strategy: 
Management, Accounting, and Performance measurement. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Langfield-Smith, K., 2007. A Review of Quantitative Research in Management 
Control Systems and Strategy. In Chapman, C., Hopwood, A. G., Shields, M. D. 
(eds.) Handbook of Management Accounting Research, Vol 2. Elsevier, Boston, 
753-783. 
 
Lencioni, P.M., 2002. Make your values mean something. Harvard Business 
Review, 80, 113-117. 
 
Liljeblom, E., Vaihekoski, M. 2004. Investment evaluation methods and 
required rate of return in Finnish publicly listed companies. The Finnish 
Journal of Business Economics, 53, 9-24. 
 
Lillis, A.M., Mundy, J., 2005. Cross-sectional field studies in management 
accounting research. – Closing the gaps between surveys and case studies. 
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 17, 119-141. 
75 
 
 
Lincoln, Y.S., Guba, E.G., 2000. Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, 
and emerging confluences. In Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S. Handbook of 
Qualitative Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks, 163-188. 
 
Lipe,  M.G.,  Salterio,  S.E.  2002.  A  note  on  the  judgmental  effects  of  the  
balanced scorecard’s information organization. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 27, 531-540. 
 
Llwellyn, S., 1992. The role of case study methods in management accounting 
and resarch: a comment. British Accounting Review, 24, 17-32. 
 
Llwellyn, S., 1996. Theories for theorists or theories for practice? Liberating 
academic accounting research. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, 9, 112-118. 
 
Lovas, B., Ghoshal, S., 2000. Strategy as guided evolution. Strategic 
Management Journal, 21, 875-896. 
 
Luft, J., Shields, M.D., 2003. Mapping management accounting: graphics and 
guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 28, 169-249.  
 
Lukka, K., 2010. The roles and effects of paradigms in accounting research. 
Management Accounting Research, 21, 110-115. 
 
Lukka, K. and Kasanen, E., 1995. The problem of generalizability: anecdotes 
and evidence in accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 8, 71-90. 
 
Lukka, K., Modell, S., 2010 Validation in interpretive management accounting 
research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35, 462-277. 
 
Lynch, R.L. and Cross, K.F., 1991. Measure up – The Essential Guide to 
Measuring Business Performance. Mandarin, London.  
 
Macintosh, N.B., 1994. Management Accounting and Control Systems: An 
Organizational and Behavioral Approach. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester.   
76 
 
 
Macintosh, N.B. and Daft, R.L., Management control systems and 
departmental interdependencies: an empirical study. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 12, 49-61. 
 
Malina, A., Selto, F.H., 2001. Communicating and controlling strategy: an 
empirical study of the effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 13, 47-90. 
 
Malina, A., Selto, F.H., 2004. Choice and change of measures in performance 
measurement models. Management Accounting Research, 15, 441-469. 
 
Malmi, T., 2001. Balanced scorecards in Finnish companies: a research note. 
Management Accounting Research, 12, 207-220.  
 
Malmi, T., Brown, D.A., 2008. Management control systems as a package – 
Opportunities, challenges and research directions. Management Accounting 
Research, 19, 287-300. 
 
Malmi, T., Granlund, M., 2009. In Search of Management Accounting Theory. 
European Accounting Review, 18, 597-620. 
 
Malmi,  T.,  Ikäheimo,  S.,  2003.  Value  based  management  practices  –  some  
evidence from the field. Management Accounting Research, 14, 235-254. 
 
Manzoni, J.-F., 2002. Management control: toward a new paradigm? In 
Epstein,  M.J.,   Manzoni,  J.-F.  (eds.)  Performance  Measurement  and  
Management Control: A Compendium of Research, Jai, Amsterdam, 15-46. 
 
Manzoni,  J.-F.,  2008.  On  the  folly  of  hoping  for  A,  simply  because  you  are  
trying  to  pay  for  A.  In  Epstein,  M.  J.,  Manzoni,  J.-F.  (eds.)  Performance  
Measurement and Management Control: Measuring and Rewarding 
Performance. Emerald Jai, Bingley, 19-41. 
 
Manzoni, J.-F., 2009 Motivation through incentives: a cross-disciplinary 
review  of  the  evidence.  In  Epstein,  J.  and  Manzoni,  J.-F.,  Davila,  T. (eds.) 
Performance Measurement and Management Control: Innovative Concepts 
and Practices. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 19-63.  
77 
 
 
McKinnon, J., 1988. Reliability and validity in field research: some strategies 
and tactics. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability, 1, 34-54. 
 
Marginson, D.E.W., 1999. Beyond the budgetary control system: towards a 
two-tiered process of management control. Management Accounting Research, 
10, 203-230. 
 
Marginson,  D.E.W.,  2002.  Management  control  systems  and  their  effects  on  
strategy formation at middle-management levels: evidence from a U.K. 
organization. Strategic Management Journal, 23, 1019-1031. 
 
Marr. B., Schiuma, G., 2003. Business performance measurement – past, 
present and future. Management Decision, 41, 680-687.  
 
Marsh, P., Barwise, P., Thomas, K., Wensley, R., 1988. Strategic investment 
decisions in large diversified companies. Centre for Business Strategy Report 
Series, London Business School.   
 
McKinsey, 2009. McKinsey Global Survey: How Finance departments are 
Changing.  
 
McNair, C.J., Lynch, R.L., Ross, K.F., 1990. Do financial and non-financial 
performance measures have to agree? Management Accounting, 72, 28-36. 
 
Medori,  D.,  Steeple,  D.,  2000.  A  framework  for  auditing  and  enhancing  
performance  measurement  systems.  International  Journal  of  Operations  &  
Production Management 20, 520-533.   
 
Meglino, B.M:, Ravlin, E.C., 1998. Individual values in organizations: concepts, 
controversies, and research. Journal of Management, 24, 351-389. 
 
Melnyck, S. A., Hanson, J.D., Calantone, R.J. 2010.  Hitting the target…but 
missing the point: resolving the paradox of strategic transition. Long Range 
Planning, 43, 555-574. 
 
Merchant, K.A., 1987. How and why firms disregard the controllability 
principle, in W.J. Bruns Jr. and R.S. Kaplan (eds.) Accounting and 
78 
 
Management: Field Study Perspectives, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, 316-338.  
 
Merchant, K.A., Otley, D.T., 2007. A review of the literature on control and 
accountability. In Chapman, C., Hopwood, A., Shields, M.D. (eds.) Handbook 
of Management Accounting Research, Vol 2. Elsevier, Boston, 785-803. 
 
Merchant,  K.A.,  Wan  der  Stede,  W.A.,  2006.  Field-based  research  in  
accounting: accomplishments and prospects. Behavioral Research in 
Accounting, 18, 117-134. 
 
Merchant, K.A., Van der Stede, W., 2007. Management Control Systems: 
Performance Measurement, Evaluation and Incentives, 2nd edition. Prentice 
Hall, Harlow. 
 
Micheli, P., Manzoni, J.-F., 2010. Strategic performance measurement: 
benefits, limitations and paradoxes. Long Range Planning, 43, 465-476. 
 
Miller,  S.,  Hickson,  S.D,  Wilson,  D.,  2008.  From  strategy  to  action:  
involvement and influence in top level decisions, Long Range Planning, 41, 
606-628. 
 
Miller, P. and O’Leary, T., 2005. Capital budgeting, coordination, and strategy: 
a field study of interfirm and intrafirm mechanisms. In Chapman, C. (eds.), 
Controlling Strategy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Millgrom,  P.,  Roberts,  J.,  1995.  Complementaries  and  fit:  strategy,  structure  
and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 19, 179-208. 
 
Mintzberg,  H.,  1994.  The  Rise  and Fall  of  Strategic  Planning.  The  Free  Press,  
New York.  
 
Mintzberg, H., Waters, J.A., 1985. Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. 
Strategic Management Journal, 6, 257-272. 
 
79 
 
Modell, S., 2010. Bridging the paradigm divide in management accounting 
research: the role of mixed methods approaches. Management Accounting 
Research, 21, 124-129. 
 
Moers, F., 2005.  Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of 
diversity and subjectivity. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30, 67-80. 
 
Mundy,  J.,  2010.  Creating  dynamic  tensions  through  a  balanced  use  of  
management control systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35, 499-
564. 
 
Neely, A., 1999. The performance measurement revolution: why now and what 
next? International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 19, 205-
228. 
 
Neely, A., 2005. The evolution of performance measurement research: 
developments  in  the  last  decade  and  a  research  agenda  for  the  next.  
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 25, 1264-1277.  
 
Neely, A., Adams, C., Kennerley, M., 2002. The Performance Prism: The 
Scorecard for Measuring and Managing Business Success. Financial Times 
Prentice Hall, Harlow. 
 
Neely, A., Bourne, M., Kennerley, M., 2000. Performance measurement system 
design: developing and testing a process-based approach. International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management 20, 1119-1145.  
 
Neely, A., Richards, H., Mills, J., Platts, K., Bourne, M., 1997. Designing 
performance measures: a structured approach. International Journal of 
Operations & Production management, 17, 1131-1152. 
 
Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Nilsson, F., Kald, M., 2002. Recent advances in performance management: the 
Nordic case. European Management Journal, 20, 235-245.  
 
80 
 
Nonaka, I., 1991. The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review, 
Nov-Dec, 96-104. 
 
Nonaka, I., 1994. A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation. 
Organization Science, 5, 14-37. 
 
Nonaka, I., Toyama, R., Konno, N., 2001. SECI, Ba and leadership: a unified 
model of dynamic knowledge creation. In: Nonaka, I., Teece, D. (Eds.), 
Managing Industrial Knowledge: Creation, transfer and utilization. Sage 
Publications, London. 
 
Nørreklit, H., 2000. The balance on the balanced scorecard – a critical analysis 
of some of its assumptions. Management Accounting Research, 11, 65-88. 
 
Norris, G., O’Dwyer, B., 2004. Motivating socially responsive decision making: 
the operation of management controls in a socially responsible organization. 
The British Accounting Review, 36, 173-196. 
 
Ocasio, W., Joseph, J., 2005. An attention-based theory of strategy 
formulation: linking micro- and macroperspectives in strategy processes. 
Advances in Strategic Management, 22, 39-61.  
 
Ocasio, W., Joseph, J., 2008. Rise and fall – or transformation? The evolution 
of strategic planning at the General Electric Company, 1940-2006. Long Range 
Planning, 41, 248-272.  
 
Ogbonna, E., Harris, L., 1998. Managing organizational culture: compliance or 
genuine change? British Journal of Management, 9, 273-288. 
 
Oldcorn, R., Parker, D., 1996. The Strategic Investment Decision: Evaluating 
Opportunities in Dynamic Markets. Pitman, London. 
 
Otley, D., 1980. The contingency theory of management accounting: 
achievement and prognosis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5, 413-
428. 
 
Otley, D., 1987. Accounting Control and Organizational Behaviour. Heinemann 
Professional Publishing, Oxford.  
81 
 
 
Otley, D., 1994. Management control in contemporary organizations: towards a 
wider framework. Management Accounting Research, 5, 289-299. 
 
Otley, D., 1999. Performance management: a framework for management 
control systems research. Management Accounting Research, 10, 363-382. 
 
Otley, D., 2001. Extending the boundaries of management accounting 
research: developing systems for performance management. British 
Accounting Review, 33, 243-261. 
 
Otley, D., Berry, A.J., 1980. Control, organisation and accounting. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 5, 231-244. 
 
Otley, D.T., Berry, A.J., 1994. Case study research in management accounting 
and control. Management Accounting Research, 5, 45-65. 
 
Ouchi, W.G., 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organizational 
control mechanisms. Management Science, 25, 833-848. 
 
Ouchi, W.G., 1980. Markets, bureaucracies and clans. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 25, 129-141. 
 
Papalexandris, A., Ioannou, G., Prastacos, G.P., 2004. Implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard in Greece: a software firm’s experience. Long Range 
Planning, 37, 351-366.  
 
Pascale, R.T., 1984. The Honda effect. California Management Review, 26, 47-
72. 
 
Pettigrew, A.M., 1979. On studying organizational cultures. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 24, 570-581. 
 
Phelan, S. E. 1997. Exposing the illusion of confidence in financial analysis. 
Management Decision, 35, 163-168. 
 
Pike,  R.H.,  1983.  A  review  of  recent  trends  in  formal  capital  budgeting  
processes. Accounting and Business Research, Summer, 201-208. 
82 
 
 
Pike, R.H., 1996. A longitudinal survey on capital budgeting practices. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 23, 79-92. 
 
Pratt, J., Beaulieu, P., 1992. Organizational culture in public accounting: size, 
technology, rank and functional area. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
17, 667-684. 
 
Prendergast, C., Topel, R,. 1993. Discretion and bias in performance 
evaluation, European Economic Review, 37, 355-365. 
 
Prendergast, C., Topel, R.H., 1996.  Favoritism in Organizations. The Journal 
of Political Economy, 104, 958-978. 
 
Puxty, A.G., 1989. The problem of a paradigm: a critique of prevailing 
orthodoxy in management control. In Chua, W.  F., Lowe, A. and Puxty, A. G. 
(eds.), Critical Perspectives in Management Control. Macmillan, London. 
 
Quinn, J.B., 1980. Strategic Change: Logical Incrementalism. Irwin, 
Homewood. 
 
Ravlin, E.C., 1995. Values. In N. Nicholson (Eds.) The Blackwell Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary of Organizational Behaviour. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.  
 
Ridgway, V.F., 1956. Dysfunctional consequences of performance 
measurement. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1, 240-247. 
 
Rigby,  D.,  2001.  Management  tools  and  techniques:  a  survey.  California  
Management Review 43, 139-160. 
 
Roberts, H., 2006. Making management accounting intelligible. In: Bhimani, 
A. (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Management Accounting. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.  
 
Rowley, J., 2007. The wisdom hierarchy: representations of the DIKW 
hierarchy. Journal of Information Science, 33, 164-180. 
 
83 
 
Sandahl,  G.,  Sjögren,  S.,  2003.  Capital  budgeting  methods  among  Sweden’s  
largest groups of companies. The state of the art and a comparison with earlier 
studies. International Journal of Production Economics, 84, 51-69. 
 
Sandelin, M., 2008. Operation of management control practices as a package – 
a case study on control  system variety in a growth firm context.  Management 
Accounting Research, 19, 324-343. 
 
Scapens, R.W., 1990. Researching management accounting practice: the role of 
case study methods. British Accounting Review, 22, 259-281. 
 
Schein, E.H., 1985. Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View. 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. 
 
Senge, P.M., 1990. The Fifth Discipline. Doubleday, New York.  
 
Shank, J.K., 1996. Analysing technology investments - from NPV to SCM. 
Management Accounting Research, 7, 185-197. 
 
Shank, J.K., Govindarajan, V., 1993. Strategic Cost Management: The New Tool 
for Competitive Advantage. The Free Press, New York.  
 
Shapiro, A.C., 2005. Capital Budgeting and Investment Analysis. Pearson 
Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River.   
 
Shields, M.D., Chow, C.W., Kato, Y.,Nakagawa, Y., 1991. Management 
accounting practices in the U.S. and Japan: comparative survey findings and 
research implications. Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 3, 61-77. 
 
Siggelkow, N., 2007. Persuasion with case studies, Academy of Management 
Journal 50, 20-24. 
 
Silk, S., 1998. Automating the Balanced Scorecard. Management Accounting, 
79, 38-42. 
 
Silverman, D., 1993. Interpreting qualitative data. Sage Publications, London.  
 
84 
 
Simons, R., 1990. The role of management control systems in creating 
competitive advantage: new perspectives. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 15, 127-143.  
 
Simons, R., 1991. Strategic orientation and top management attention to 
control systems. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 49-62. 
 
Simons, R., 1994. How top managers use control systems as levers of strategic 
renewal. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 169-189. 
 
Simons,  R.,  1995a.  Levers  of  Control:  How Managers  Use  Innovative  Control  
Systems to Drive Strategic Renewal. Harvard Business School Press, Boston.  
 
Simons,  R.,  1995b.  Control  in  an  age  of  empowerment:  how  can  managers  
promote innovation while avoiding unwelcome surprises? Harvard Business 
Review, 73, 80-88. 
 
Simons,  R.,  2000.  Performance  Measurement  &  Control  Systems  for  
Implementing Strategy. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River.  
 
Simons,  R.,  2005.  Levers  of  Organization  Design:  How  Managers  Use  
Accountability Systems for Greater Performance and Commitment. Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston. 
 
Skærbæk, P., Tryggestad, K., 2010. K. The role accounting devices in 
performing corporate strategy. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35, 108-
124. 
 
Slagmulder, R., Bruggeman, W., Van Wassenhove, L., 1995. An empirical study 
of capital budgeting practices for strategic investments in CIM technologies. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 40, 121-152. 
 
Sørensen,  J.B.,  2002.  The  strength  of  corporate  culture  and  the  reliability  of  
firm performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 70-91. 
 
Speckbacher,  G.,  Bischof,  J.,  Pfeiffer,  T.,  2003.  A  descriptive  analysis  on  the  
implementation of Balanced Scorecards in German-speaking countries. 
Management Accounting Research, 14, 361-387.  
85 
 
 
Spicer, B.H., 1992. The resurgence of cost and management accounting: a 
review of some recent developments in practice, theories and case research 
methods. Management Accounting Research, 3, 1-38. 
 
Stringer, C., 2007. Empirical performance management research: observations 
from AOS and MAR. Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, 4, 
92-114. 
 
Teece, D.J., 2000. Strategies for managing knowledge assets: the role of firm 
structure and industrial context. Long Range Planning, 33, 35-54. 
 
Thomas, J.B., Sussman, S.W., Henderson, J.C., 2001. Understanding “strategic 
learning”: linking organizational learning, knowledge management and 
sensemaking. Organization Science, 12, 331-345. 
 
Thomson, N., Baden-Fuller, C., 2010. Basic Strategy in Context: European Text 
and Cases. John Wiley & Sons Ltd, West Sussex.  
 
Tsoukas, H.,1996. The firm as a distributed knowledge system: a 
constructionist approach. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 11-25. 
 
Tuomela, T-S., 2005. The interplay of different levers of control: a case study of 
introducing a new performance measurement system. Management 
Accounting Research, 16, 293-320. 
 
Turner, K.L., Makhija, M.V., 2006. The role of organizational controls in 
managing knowledge. Academy of Management Review, 31, 197-217. 
 
Vaivio, J., 1999.  Examining “The Quantified Customer”. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 24, 689-715. 
 
Vaivio, J., 2004. Mobilizing local knowledge with ‘provocative’ non-financial 
measures. European Accounting Review, 13, 39-71. 
 
Vaivio, J., 2008. Qualitative management accounting research: rationale, 
pitfalls  and  potential.  Qualitative  Research  in  Accounting  &  Management,  5,  
64-86. 
86 
 
 
Vaivio, J., Kokko, T., 2006 Counting big: re-examining the concept of the bean 
counter controller. Finnish Journal of Business Economics, 49-74. 
 
Vaivio, J., Sirén, A., 2010. Insights into method triangulation and “paradigms” 
in interpretive management accounting research. Management Accounting 
Research, 21, 130-141. 
 
Van Cauwenbergh, A.V., Durinck, E., Martens, R., Laveren, E., Bogaert, I., 
1996. On the role and function of formal analysis in strategic investment 
decision processes: results form an empirical study in Belgium. Management 
Accounting Research, 7, 169-184. 
 
Verbeeten, F.H.M., 2006. Do organizations adopt sophisticated capital 
budgeting practices to deal with uncertainty in the investment decision? A 
research note. Management Accounting Research, 17, 106-120.  
 
Virtanen, K., 1984. Tulosyksikköorganisaation ohjaus. [Controlling Profit 
Centre Organisations]. Weilin + Göös, Espoo.  
 
Waggoner, D.B., Neely, A.D. and Kennerley, M.P., 1999. The forces that shape 
organisational performance measurement systems: an interdisciplinary review. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 60/61, 53-60. 
 
Welch, D.E., Welch, L.S., 2006. Commitment for hire? The viability of 
corporate culture as a MNC control mechanism. International Business 
Review, 15, 14-28. 
 
Whittington, R., 2006. Completing the practice turn in strategy research. 
Organization Studies, 27, 613-634. 
 
Widener, S.K., 2007. An empirical analysis of the levers of control framework. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32, 757-788. 
 
Widener, S.K., Schackell, M.B., Demers, E.A., 2008. The juxtaposition of social 
surveillance controls with traditional organizational design components. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 25, 606-638. 
 
87 
 
Wiener, Y., 1982. Commitment in organizations: a normative view. Academy of 
Management Review, 7, 418-428. 
 
Wiener,  Y.,  1988.  Forms  of  values  systems:  a  focus  on  organizational  
effectiveness and cultural change and maintenance. Academy of Management 
Review, 13, 534-545. 
 
Wiersma, E., 2009. For which purposes do managers use Balanced Scorecards? 
An empirical study. Management Accounting Research, 20, 239-251. 
 
Willmot, H., 1993. Strength is ignorance; slavery is freedom. Managing culture 
in modern organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 515-552. 
 
Wisner, J.D., Fawcett, S.E., 1991. Linking firm strategy to operating decisions 
through performance measurement. Production and Inventory Management 
Journal 32, 5-11. 
 
Woiceshyn, J., 2009. Lessons from “good minds”: how CEOs use intuition, 
analysis and guiding principles to make strategic decisions. Long Range 
Planning, 42, 298-319. 
 
Zeleny,  M.,  2005.  Human  Systems  Management:  Integrating  Knowledge,  
Management and Systems. World Scientific Publishing Company, River Edge. 
 
Zimmerman, J.L., 1997. Accounting for Decision Making and Control, 2nd 
edition. Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston.   
 
Zimmerman, J.L., 2001. Conjectures regarding empirical managerial 
accounting research. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32, 411-427.   
 
Yin, R.K., 2003. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd edition. SAGE 
Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
 
Yoshikawa, T., Innes J., Mitchell, F., 1989. Japanese management accounting: 
a comparative survey. Management Accounting, 67, 20-23. 
  
88 
 
 
 
 
 
  
89 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
ORIGINAL PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
Essay 1 
 
Carr, C., Kolehmainen, K. and Mitchell, F. 2010. Strategic investment decision 
making practices: A contextual approach. Management Accounting Research, 
Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 167-184. 
 
Essay 2 
 
Kolehmainen, K. and Malmi, T. Shaping strategy formation with knowledge-
integrating corporate-level management control systems. Unpublished working 
paper. 
  
Essay 3 
 
Kolehmainen, K., 2010. Dynamic strategic performance measurement systems: 
Balancing empowerment and alignment. Long Range Planning, Vol. 43, Issue 
4, pp. 527-554. 
 
 
Essay 4  
 
Kolehmainen, K. Elaborating on the concept of values-based control. 
Unpublished working paper. 
 
 
 
  
90 
 
  
91 
 
 
 
 
Strategic investment decision making 
practices: A contextual approach 
 
Chris Carr, Katja Kolehmainen and Falconer Mitchell 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a contextual approach to explaining differences in 
strategic investment decision (SID) making practices. First, a systematic 
contextual framework is developed from the existing research literature. Then 
this framework’s potential for explaining differences in SID making practices is 
explored through 14 case studies of U.K., US and Japanese companies from 
both stable and dynamic business sectors.  Our findings suggest substantial 
SID differences across our four contextual categories of market creators, value 
creators, refocusers and restructurers.  The differences relate to the emphasis 
on strategic versus financial considerations, the thoroughness and rigidity of 
financial analysis, the attitudes towards incorporating less easily quantifiable 
factors and the level of hurdle rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on strategic investment decision (SID) making practices31 has 
provided ample evidence of the general use of capital budgeting techniques, 
such  as  DCF  (e.g.  Alkaraan  and  Northcott,  2006;  Arnold  and  Hatzopoulos,  
2000; Farragher et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Pike, 1996). Indeed, 
most  research  in  the  field  has  aimed  at  presenting  an  overview  of  prevailing  
corporate practice with regard to which techniques are being used (e.g. Arnold 
and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Farragher et al., 1999; Pike, 1983; 1996; Sandahl and 
Sjögren, 2003). However, there is still a need to know more about how these 
techniques are being used (Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Butler et al., 1991) 
and how  these  practices may vary across various contextual settings (Haka, 
1987; Slagmulder et al., 1995; Verbeeten, 2006). Furthermore, sociologists 
would argue for yet deeper investigation of the organisational processes 
entailed (Miller and O’Leary, 2005, 2007).Field study evidence also further 
indicates that SIDs are not always primarily based on financial considerations 
and there may be considerable differences in the extent to which strategic 
versus financial considerations are emphasised in their evaluation (Butler et 
al., 1991; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Jones and Dugdale, 1994). Cross-
country research suggests that these differences may be associated with the 
national context (Carr and Harris, 2004; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Jones 
et al., 1993; Shields et al., 1991). Additionally, documented differences in the 
emphasis on strategic versus financial considerations among companies from 
the same country contexts suggest that these differences may be associated 
with other contextual variables, as well (e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006 cf. 
Butler  et  al.  1991;  Sandahl  and  Sjögren,  2003).  Hitherto,  SID  literature  has  
provided only scant evidence of which contextual variables, besides the country 
context, could be associated with these differences (Chen, 2008; Verbeeten, 
2006).  
 This paper aims to address this void by proposing a systematic contextual 
framework for explaining differences in SID making practices. The framework 
developed encompasses important, but neglected contingencies that are 
                                                  
31 The term strategic investment decision (SID) refers to a decision on a substantial 
investment  which  has  a  significant  effect  on  long-term  performance  and  the  
organisation as a whole (Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998)  
Capital  budgeting  literature  has  not  always  distinguished  more  strategic  types  of  
investment (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2001; King, 1975; Klammer, 1972; Klammer and 
Walker, 1984; Pike, 1983; Sihler, 1964); but a substantial body of research now attests 
to the importance of this distinction (Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Butler et al. 1993; 
Marsh et al., 1988; Oldcorn and Parker, 1996). 
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derived from the broader strategic management and strategic management 
accounting (SMA) literatures. These contingencies are integrated to construct a 
general contextual framework that explains SID making practices in terms of a 
company’s  ‘market orientation’ and  its  ‘performance in relation to 
shareholder expectations’.32 The framework developed gives rise to a fourfold 
categorisation of companies comprising market creators, value creators, 
refocusers and restructurers.  The  framework’s  potential  for  explaining  
differences in SID making practices is subsequently tested on an exploratory 
basis through 14 case studies of U.K., U.S. and Japanese companies operating 
in vehicle component (10) and telecommunications (4) sectors.  Potential 
differences in SID making practices are explored initially, in regard to the use 
of capital budgeting techniques, and then in regard to companies’ overall SID 
approaches.33    
 The results of the 14 case studies indicate substantial differences in SID 
approaches across the 4 contextual categories. These are evident from the 
extent to which decisions are made based on strategic versus financial 
considerations, the thoroughness and rigidity of financial analysis, and 
attitudes towards incorporating less easily quantifiable factors such as 
synergies into calculations.  An expected tendency for hurdle rates to rise as we 
move from the most strategically orientated market creator category towards 
the most financially orientated restructurer category is also clearly observed. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  An overview of 
research related to SID making practices is presented.  Then the explanatory 
contextual framework for SID making practices is constructed and followed by 
a description of the research method.  The research findings are presented, first 
in respect of potential contextual differences in the use of capital budgeting 
techniques, and second in respect of the companies’ overall approaches to 
SIDs.  The conclusion comprises a summary of the findings, a discussion of 
their broader implications, and a suggestion of areas for further research.  
 
 
2. Literature overview on SID making practices 
 
2.1. Capital budgeting techniques 
                                                  
32 The terms in italics will be explained in more detail when we build our framework in 
Section 3.3. 
33 The term approach refers to broader attitudes and orientations, and encompasses 
tendencies to emphasise strategic versus financial considerations in the evaluation. 
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The  corporate  use  of  capital  budgeting  techniques  has  been  examined  
extensively (e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Arnold and Hatzopoulos, 
2000; Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; Farragher et al., 1999; Graham and 
Harvey,  2001; Haka, 1987; King, 1975; Klammer and Walker,  1984; Klammer 
et al., 1991; Pike, 1983, 1988; 1996; Sandahl and Sjögren, 2003; Sangster, 1993; 
see Haka, 2007 for a review). Most research, in the field, has focused on the use 
of capital budgeting techniques in particular country contexts, addressing the 
use of techniques for example in the U.K. (e.g. Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; 
Arnold  and  Hatzopoulos,  2000;  Pike,  1996),  the  U.S.  (e.g.  Farragher,  1991;  
Graham and Harvey, 2001; Klammer et al., 1991), Continental Europe (e.g. 
Carr and Tomkins, 1996; 1998; Carr et al., 1994), and Japan (e.g. Carr, 2005; 
Carr and Tomkins, 1998; Jones et al., 1993; Kim and Song, 1990; Shields et al., 
1991; Yoshikawa et al., 1989). Research findings demonstrate cross-country 
differences in the use of capital budgeting techniques. For example, the use of 
DCF techniques is more extensive among Anglo-Saxon companies (e.g. Arnold 
and Hatzopoulos, 2000; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Pike, 1996). Japanese, 
Continental  European  and  Nordic  companies  may,  on  the  other  hand,  
sometimes rely more on less sophisticated techniques, such as the payback 
period when making decisions on SIDs (Carr and Tomkins, 1996, 1998; 
Sandahl and Sjögren, 2003; Shields et al., 1991; Yoshikawa et al., 1989).                                                                         
 A limited amount of research has been conducted on the potential 
association between the use of capital budgeting techniques and contextual 
variables,  other  than  the  country  context  (Chen,  1995,  2008;  Haka,  1987;  
Verbeeten, 2006). The relationship between corporate size and the use of 
techniques has been the most extensively covered topic.  There is consistent 
evidence that large companies are more likely to use sophisticated techniques, 
such as DCF (Farragher et al., 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Pike, 1996).34 
Available empirical evidence also suggests that the use of sophisticated 
techniques is more common among companies that operate in predictable as 
opposed to unpredictable business environments (Chen, 1995; Ho and Pike, 
1998),  among  highly  leveraged  companies  (Graham  and  Harvey,  2001;  
Klammer et al., 1991) and among companies that face financial uncertainty 
(Verbeeten,  2006).  Companies  facing  a  challenging  financial  situation  have  
also been found to set tighter financial targets (Van Cauwenbergh et al., 1996). 
                                                  
34 We draw on Haka et al. (1985) to use the term ‘sophisticated techniques’ to refer to 
capital  budgeting  techniques  such  as  Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  and  Internal  Rate  of  
Return (IRR) that  consider the risk-adjusted discounted net cash flows expected from 
a project. 
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2.2. Broader approaches to SIDs 
 
Field study based research on SID making practices indicates that there are 
cross-country differences also in the extent to which SIDs are based on 
strategic versus financial considerations. Research findings suggest that U.K. 
companies may have a tendency to overlook strategic considerations and focus 
strongly on financial analyses, while Japanese and German companies may 
downplay financial evaluation and emphasise strategic considerations. U.S. 
companies may, on the other hand, have a more balanced approach, paying 
attention to both strategic and financial considerations (e.g. Carr, 2005; Carr 
and  Tomkins,  1996,  1998;  Jones  et  al.,  1993).  Corresponding  evidence  of  
differences in the extent to which SIDs are based on strategic versus financial 
considerations have also been documented among companies in the same 
country.  For  example,  Sandahl  and  Sjögren  (2003)  found  that  some  large  
Swedish companies base their decisions solely on sophisticated financial 
analysis while many of the companies promoting the traditional payback 
period technique tend to emphasise strategic considerations. Research 
evidence from the U.K. points to variation in the financial and strategic 
emphasis, as well (Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006 cf. Butler et al., 1991).  
 These documented differences in the balance of strategic versus financial 
considerations within the same country context indicate that contextual 
variables other than the country context are important influences on practice.  
However, available empirical evidence indicating an association with other 
contextual variables is very limited. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
higher levels of integration in manufacturing investment do attract a greater 
strategic emphasis (Abdel-Kader and Dugdale, 1998; Meredith and Hill, 1987). 
  Consequently, researchers have advocated the need for more 
contextually based research studies designed to explain differences in SID 
making practices (Haka, 1987; Ho and Pike, 1998; Slagmulder et al., 1995; 
Verbeeten,  2006).   This  study  aims  to  address  this  gap  by  developing  an  
explanatory contextual framework for SID making practices. The development 
of this framework is outlined in the following section. 
 
 
3. Towards a contextual approach for SID making practices 
 
3.1.  Oldman  and  Tomkins’  contextual  framework:  the  contexts  of  market  
orientation and need for turnaround 
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The development  of  the  framework  takes  Oldman and Tomkins’  (1999)  four-
state Cost Management Model as a starting point as it provides one of the most 
developed approaches to explaining differences in SMA practice. Their 
framework focuses on a sub-set of SMA, i.e. strategic cost management (SCM) 
and proposes a theoretical framework that encompasses important contextual 
variables. Their study is also one of the few SMA studies that are supported by 
several substantial and detailed case studies.35 It provides evidence that 
companies’ SCM practice variation can be explained by a four-state Cost 
Management  Model  that  categorises  companies  into  four  categories  based  on  
the extent of their market orientation and their need for turnaround (Figure 
1).36Although they do not explicitly address SID making practices, they find 
differences in the type of investment favoured across their four contextual 
categories. This suggests that their framework may also have some relevance 
for explaining differences in SID making practices (Chen, 1995; Klammer et al., 
1991). 
 
Figure 1. Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) Four-State Cost Management Model 
                                                
35 Although some researchers on SMA exclude SIDs from the field of SMA (e.g. 
Guilding et al, 2000; Roslender, 1995), Bromwich and Bhimani (1994) and Tomkins 
and Carr (1996) position SIDs as a central field within SMA. The significance of SIDs is 
also reflected in that the MAR 1996 Special Issue on Strategic Management Accounting 
included several articles on SIDs (Carr and Tomkins, 1996; Cauwenbergh et al., 1996; 
Shank, 1996). 
36 For the purposes of further discussion related to the development of our own 
contextual framework, we have transposed Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) original axes 
here so that need for turnaround appears on the horizontal axis, and the market 
orientation on the vertical axis. 
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The strategic management, SMA and SID literatures give direct support for the 
pertinence of Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) market orientation and need for 
turnaround contextual variables for explaining differences in SID making 
practices. These literatures suggest that financial turnaround shifts companies 
towards a greater financial orientation (Bibeault, 1981; Carr et al. 1994; Slatter, 
1984), and that financial uncertainty and high leverage are associated with the 
use of more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques (Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Verbeeten, 2006). Companies facing a difficult financial situation are 
also likely to operate a more formal investment decision making process and 
will set tighter financial targets (Van Cauwenbergh et al., 1996).  In addition, 
substantial literature arguing for a distinction between market and financial 
orientations (Barwise et al., 1989) suggests that companies with a weak market 
orientation are likely to put more emphasis on financial considerations, while 
strongly market orientated companies will emphasise strategic considerations.  
 
3.2. Modifying Oldman and Tomkins’ contextual framework 
 
Although market orientation and need for turnaround are pertinent in 
explaining differences in SID making practices (see e.g.  Bibeault,  1981; Doyle,  
1992; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Verbeeten, 2006), the strategic management, 
SMA, and SID literatures suggest that Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) framework 
may need to be modified to explain adequately differences in SID making 
practices. These modifications are discussed below by focusing on the two axes 
of their framework (see Figure 1 above). 
 
Modifying the need for turnaround axis 
 
SIDs involve long-term decisions, while turnaround is likely to be an inherently 
transitory circumstance. Companies may not be willing to change their SID 
making practices frequently as this would destroy any consistency in their 
approach to these decisions. Companies may thus be more likely to adjust their 
SID making practices in response to a more long-lasting decline in 
performance.  For the analysis of SIDs, performance might, therefore, be better 
conceived in terms of some longer term, more multi-dimensional concept of 
performance. 
 This, in turn, requires recognition that goals and objectives will primarily 
reflect shareholder influence. However, it is possible that in some cases this 
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may be extended to encompass other stakeholders (Johnson et al.,  2008, pp. 
153-163) and so could modify the pure shareholder value pursuit implied by 
Rappaport (1996), particularly in stakeholder-driven societies such as Japan. 
Indeed, no theory exists to explain performance in absolute terms. In classical, 
formal strategic planning processes it is the gap between performance and 
shareholder goals and expectations which triggers any top-level strategic 
reviews or controls (Argenti, 1974). Empirical evidence suggests that SID 
practices reflect perceptions of shareholder or other stakeholder demands, 
which in turn vary widely across and even within different country contexts. 
Frequently, it is these somewhat subjective perceptions,  rather  than  
considerations of finance theory alone, which motivate any differences in 
practices, such as those relating to the tightness of financial targets. (Carr et al., 
1994)  
 We would expect weak-performing companies to be highly constrained by 
tough financial targets, as compared to strong-performers who may have more 
discretion to emphasise strategic considerations (Bibeault, 1981; Slatter, 1984; 
Van Cauwenbergh et al., 1996). Any perception of high shareholder demands 
would add further to such financial constraints.  
 
Modifying the market orientation axis 
 
Although market orientation is likely to be relevant for explaining differences 
in  the  extent  to  which  strategic  versus  financial  considerations  are  being  
emphasised (Barwise et al., 1989; Doyle, 1992), the strategic management and 
SMA literatures suggest that market orientation’s influence on SID making 
practices may be moderated or reinforced by a company’s strategic orientation 
(Gupta  and  Govindarajan,  1984;  Miles  and  Snow,  1978;  Porter,  1980),  
management style (Goold and Campbell, 1987), and the attractiveness 
(Brownlie, 1985; Robinson et al., 1978) and dynamism of the market in which 
they operate (Cheung, 1993).   
 Association between a company’s strategic orientation and SMA practices 
has  been  well  documented  in  the  SMA  literature  (e.g.  Cadez  and  Guilding,  
2008; Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; 
Guilding, 1999; Simons, 1987).  However, the research findings in this area are 
rather fragmented (Fisher, 1995; Langfield-Smith, 1997) as SMA scholars have 
made use of several different strategy typologies, most notably generic 
strategies (Porter, 1980), strategic configurations (Miles and Snow, 1978) and 
strategic missions (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984). Research findings do 
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indicate that there may be general differences in the SMA practices between 
the more entrepreneurial  strategy archetypes of  prospector (Miles and Snow, 
1978), differentiator (Porter, 1980) and builder (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
1984), as compared to the more conservative strategy archetypes of defender 
(Miles and Snow, 1978), cost leader (Porter, 1980) and harvester (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1984; see Chenhall, 2003 and Langfield-Smith, 1997 for reviews 
on SMA literature). 
 Though popular in the SMA literature, in practice, only two of Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) four categories have often been applied, prospectors and 
defenders; the remaining two, analysers and reactors have often been omitted 
in  the  analysis  (see  e.g.  Cadez  and Guilding,  2008;  Chen,  2008;  Haka,  1987;  
Simons,  1987).  This  may  be  because  analysers are defined as a hybrid under 
which companies operate in silos, utilising prospector configurations for some 
types of business and defender configurations for other types as they act in 
different environmental contexts. This compromises the coherence of the 
categories given that their concepts are predicated upon integrated, consistent 
approaches to strategy, structure and organisational processes. The reactor 
category is also problematic. Such companies are typically failing in terms of 
performance, having not adapted in any consistent manner to environments 
perceived as highly uncertain. Whilst Oldman and Tomkins (1999) also 
emphasise  poor  performance  as  an  additional  dimension,  it  is  not  clear  why  
this should only arise in relation to uncertain environments.  
 Available evidence of the association between a company’s strategic 
orientation and SMA practices suggests that the more entrepreneurial business 
strategy archetypes may be associated with stronger strategic orientation 
(Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985) and a broader use of planning information 
(Guilding, 1999; Simons, 1987) as compared to the more conservative business 
strategy types. Although the SID literature has not yet presented any direct 
evidence for an association between a company’s strategic orientation and SID 
making  practices  (Chen,  1995,  2008;  Haka,  1987),  the  broader  strategic  
management and SMA literatures suggest that a company’s tendency to 
emphasize strategic versus financial considerations may be moderated or 
reinforced by its strategic orientation.         
 The strategic management literature indicates, further, that a tendency to 
emphasise strategic versus financial considerations in SID making practices 
may be moderated or reinforced by a company’s management style, which can 
be categorised as strategic planning, strategic control, and financial control 
styles (Goold and Campbell, 1987). Although a management style principally 
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depicts  the  way  a  corporate  centre  attempts  to  control  other  parts  of  the  
organisation (for example by intervening in strategic planning and monitoring 
strategic performance, as in the strategic planning style, or by engaging in 
tight financial monitoring, as in the financial control style), such styles are also 
likely to be reflected in the way SIDs are approached.  It would be expected that 
strategic planning styles will drive companies to put more emphasis on 
strategic considerations and on setting less challenging financial targets while 
financial control styles generate a stronger financial emphasis and tighter 
financial targets. 
 Finally,  prior  strategic  management  and  SID  research  suggests  that  the  
business sector in which the company operates is likely to be associated with 
companies’  SID  making  approaches.  Available  evidence  indicates  that  
companies  operating  in  stable  business  sectors  may  be  more  likely  to  use  
sophisticated capital budgeting techniques (Chen, 1995) and that they may also 
gain higher benefits from using such techniques as compared to companies 
operating in dynamic business sectors (Haka, 1987). Volatile business sectors 
may drive companies towards a greater emphasis on strategic considerations 
(Cheung, 1993), although the formality of their strategic analysis may be 
influenced  by  business  sector  dynamism  (Eisenhardt  and  Sull,  2001;  
Mintzberg, 1994). A tendency to emphasise strategic considerations is likely to 
be further moderated or reinforced by market attractiveness. Companies 
operating in attractive business sectors that provide favourable prospects for 
growth and profitability are likely to put more emphasis on strategic 
considerations and to set less challenging financial targets as compared to 
companies operating in less attractive markets (Brownlie, 1985; Robinson et 
al., 1978).37  We view such  variables  as  likely  to  contribute  further  to  market  
orientation38, and a tendency to emphasise strategic considerations.     
 
3.3. A contextual approach to SID making practices 
 
The previous discussion indicates that Oldman and Tomkins’ (1999) 
framework provides a useful starting position for explaining differences in SID 
making practices. However, their original market orientation and need for 
turnaround dimensions do require modification to take account of key 
                                                  
37 Building  on  Robinson  et  al.  (1978)  and  Brownlie  (1985)  we  use  the  term  market  
attractiveness to refer to the extent to which a business sector exhibits high profit and 
growth potential.  
38 Strictly speaking this may imply a broader concept of market orientation than is 
sometimes used in the marketing literature (e.g. Doyle, 1992).  
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contextual variables pertinent to SIDs. Figure 2 integrates all these key 
contingencies into an overall contextual framework that explains differences in 
SID making  practices  in  terms of  a  company’s  ‘market orientation (which, as 
explained above, is an extension of the definition for this term used by Oldman 
and Tomkins, 1999)’ and  its  ‘performance in relation to shareholder 
expectations’. 39 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Contextual framework for strategic investment decision making practices 
 
The new framework proposed gives rise to four broad contingency positions, 
which we categorise as market creators, refocusers, value creators and 
restructurers to  illustrate  their  different  situational  contexts. 40 Well-
performing market creators are relatively free of short-term financial 
constraints and can therefore emphasise long-term market development and 
positioning. They will put a strong emphasis on strategic considerations in 
their SID making approach, and will be relatively flexible in their use of 
                                                
39 Contingency  studies  on  management  accounting  (MA)  practices  have  rarely  
conceptualised performance as an independent variable, having an influence on MA 
systems/practices.  This  study  draws  on  Oldman  and  Tomkins  (1999)  to  consider  
performance as one of the key variables influencing MA practices.  
40 Perceptive readers will recognize that our framework subsumes the well-known 
Directional Policy Matrix framework (see. e.g. Brownlie, 1985; Hussey, 1978; Robinson 
et al., 1978), which in term yields build, hold, and harvest strategy typologies of notable 
interest to e.g. Gupta and Govindarajan (1984), Langfield-Smith (1997) and Cadez and 
Guilding (2008). 
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financial targets. Similarly disposed, but experiencing greater short-term 
pressures to perform, refocusers are likely to be forced into greater 
conservatism and serious re-focusing, while still having to protect crucial 
intangible assets, including brands and technology.  Thus, refocusers will pay 
attention to both strategic and financial considerations in their SID making 
approach and set moderately tight financial targets for their SIDs. Well-
performing value creators emphasise internal efficiencies and ‘value creation’ 
for their customers, often through superior cost control. As with refocusers, 
value creators will pay attention to both strategic and financial considerations 
in  their  SID  making  approach,  and  set  moderately  tight  financial  targets.  
Finally, restructurers engage in radical re-structuring and cost-cutting due to 
strong short-term pressures to perform. Restructurers will put strong 
emphasis on financial considerations, set very tight financial targets for their 
SIDs and, in general, will be very conservative in their SID approaches.  
 
In summary our working hypothesis is as follows:  
 
The SID orientation of a company may be predicted by the four archetypes 
model reflected in Figure 2. 
 
The counterfactual is that such differences in practices may be more effectively 
explained by one or other of our single variables taken in isolation: for 
example, Miles and Snow (1978)’s major strategic configurations, or even by 
cross-country differences. A further issue in operationalizing the proposed 
framework is that, while a set of variables can be identified; there is an absence 
of any theoretical or empirical evidence suggesting that any particular 
individual variable is more influential than another. Consequently, in this 
exploratory analysis, variables are integrated on an unweighted basis. Again 
the counterfactual is that such a seemingly random approach is unnecessary: 
and that it is therefore preferable to stay with just one, more theoretically 
established categorisation approach.   
 
 
4. Research approach and methodology 
 
In order to empirically explore the above proposed framework’s explanatory 
power on SID making practices, matched comparative case studies on company 
SID practices have been undertaken. These cases were particularly pertinent to 
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our research objective for two key reasons. Firstly, they provided rich enough 
data to enable scoring along the several variables identified above as relevant 
and to explore overall SID approaches in considerable depth. Secondly, they 
enabled comparison of the SID practices across the four contextual categories 
described above. 
 To explore the influential dimensions of the four contingency-based 
typologies, companies representing diverse business sector and shareholder 
influence contexts were selected.  These comprised companies from the 
telecommunications sector (at the time of study an attractive, dynamic 
business sector) and vehicle components (at the time of study a relatively 
stable, less attractive sector). To extend the range of shareholder influence 
contexts, the vehicle component sample covered Japanese as well as U.K. and 
U.S. companies. Earlier studies had indicated that Anglo-Saxon and Japanese 
companies exhibit substantial differences in shareholder influences (Carr, 
2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1998). The resulting sample included 4 matched 
telecom companies (2 U.K, 2 U.S.) and 10 matched vehicle component 
companies  (3  U.K.,  4  U.S.  and  3  Japanese).  All  case  companies  were  large,  
multinational companies, operating in several countries, and among the global 
or regional leaders in their industries.    
 Interviews with senior executives, who had been personally involved with 
SIDs, formed the basis of the 14 case studies (see Appendix A). In 7 out of the 
14 cases, interviews were conducted with several company representatives. The 
interview  approach  was  predominantly  one  of  discussion  around  broad  
themes, aimed at obtaining managers’ own perceptions of practices and events. 
An interview guide was used to ensure cross-case comparison of specific 
themes, e.g. in the use of capital budgeting techniques. We also prompted 
managers to give their explanations of the wider aspects of management 
control, strategic planning and the competitive situation. Interviews averaged 
approximately 2.5 hours and all were taped and transcribed.     
 The  empirics  were  exploratory  in  nature  and  were  drawn  from  an  
international study on SID practices conducted by one of the authors between 
1994 and 1997. Although over a decade old, the data remains appropriate for 
an initial assessment of the corporate typologies developed in the paper. These 
typologies are expected to be enduring in nature, similar to those of Miles and 
Snow (1978) which have been in research use for over 30 years.  Moreover,  in 
three of the companies (one from each country), some further data, gathered in 
2001-2003, was available and was used to confirm the longitudinal durability 
of the typologies. For example, in all three of these cases the principal capital 
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budgeting techniques had remained the same and the hurdle rate targets had 
likewise remained largely unchanged. 
 Data analysis involved several phases. To enable positioning of the 
companies in the context of the proposed explanatory framework, investigated 
companies were first scored on a scale between 1 and 9 on all contextual 
variables. To analyse our composite strategic orientation variable, we reviewed 
the quotations for all the four sub-variables (market/financial orientation, 
strategic configuration, generic strategy and management style) individually. 
The assessment was theoretically informed and entailed searching for 
quotations that would provide an indication of, for example, a prospector type 
strategic configuration. The scores were assessed by two researchers working 
independently through all transcripts. Key quotations underlying the 
judgments were then collated to facilitate cross-case comparison across all 
variable scores. After joint analysis and comparison, the two researchers 
agreed on their final scores. To assess the validity of our scoring, we asked for 
independent reviews from experienced academics in the field from two 
different universities, working independently of each other. This analysis 
resulted in almost identical scores. The first researcher’s initial scores diverged 
one point from our original scores in two instances. The second researcher 
agreed  on  all  scores.  The  scores  used  in  the  study  were  confirmed  after  
discussion with the authors. This independent analysis resulted in no material 
differences in the scores, or changes in the categorisation of companies.   
 Where appropriate, use was made of secondary research data based on 
publicly available information. Performance scores were determined using a 
detailed financial benchmarking of companies, against each other and their 
worldwide sector peers. As the performance score aimed to capture companies’ 
long-term financial and strategic performance, benchmarking was based on 5-
year average sales growth %, 5-year average ROCE % (Y1994, Y1999 and 
Y2004), and relative market shares (Y1996). The details of the financial 
benchmarking are elaborated in more detail in Appendix B. Market 
attractiveness scores were determined by assessing the 5-year average sales 
growth  %  and  5-year  average  ROCE  %  for  the  two  business  sectors,  as  
elaborated in Appendix C. Finally, market dynamism scores were assessed first 
for the telecommunications and vehicle component sectors overall. After this, 
the  scores  for  individual  companies  were  determined in  the  light  of  evidence  
that particular companies experienced more or less dynamic environments as 
compared to their sectors overall. 
105 
 
 All of the interview transcripts were then reviewed to identify potential 
differences in the SID practices across the contextual categories. The 
transcripts were first examined for any potential differences in the use of 
capital budgeting techniques, hurdle rates, and other specifics related to the 
use of techniques. As well as analysing differences across the four contextually 
based categories, a systematic cross-check was made for differences against 
every  composite  contextual  variable  on  a  one-by-one  basis.   These  analyses  
addressed the counter-hypothesis of whether our framework does have further 
explanatory power than that possessed by any individual variable. For 
example, do we really need all our new categories, rather than say just Miles 
and Snow (1978)’s strategic configurations? Checks were also made for 
differences in the SID practices of Anglo-Saxon and Japanese companies. This 
analysis addressed the other counter-hypothesis that country context, rather 
than contextual category, might afford a more convincing explanation of 
differences observed. Since our analyses included only 14 cases, these analyses 
were inevitably very tentative, but provided, nonetheless, some indication of 
the individual variable and country influences.   
 Thereafter,  the  transcripts  were  reviewed  and  analysed  again,  this  time  
with an attempt to identify emergent themes that would characterize the 
overall SID approaches of the four corporate types. Finally, the transcripts of 
the three follow-up interviews were analysed and compared with initial 
interview transcripts to assess any changes in SID practices subsequent to 
initial interviews.  
 
 
5. Research findings 
 
5.1. Positioning companies in terms of our contextual framework 
 
Table 1 presents the scores used for positioning investigated companies against 
our earlier proposed framework. Scores for the market context and strategic 
orientation variables are aggregated first to provide overall positioning on the 
vertical axis (market orientation). The scores for the performance and 
shareholder influence variables are then aggregated to provide positioning 
along  the  horizontal  axis  (performance in relation to shareholder 
expectations). The scores for the market context and strategic orientation 
dimensions are themselves averages from component elements, drawn from 
our overall framework and are detailed separately in Table 1.  
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Table 1.  Analysis of contextual positions of investigated companies 
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Figure 3 draws on the analysis from Table 1 to position the investigated 
companies within the proposed framework. Vehicle component companies 
operating in a stable and less attractive business sector, and exhibiting diverse 
market orientation, performance and shareholder influence contexts are 
spread among the market creator, value creator and restructurer categories. 
Telecom companies operating in a dynamic and attractive business sector and 
showing a general tendency to be market orientated are, on the other hand, 
clustered exclusively in the upper market creator and refocuser categories. 
Although substantial differences are evident for the two sectors, there is 
nevertheless a significant level of overlap, particularly in the market creator 
category suggesting that some companies, even located in such different 
sectors, are subject to similar overall contextual influences.41   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Contextual positions of investigated companies42 
  
                                                
41 Most companies were well distinguished by our four contextual categories, but for 
three, positions were less clear-cut. This grouping virtually on the border between 
market creators and value creators,  nevertheless,  lay  distinctly  apart  from  market 
creator companies in our sample, and exhibited distinctive SID making practices.  
42 Pseudonyms are used throughout, suffixes ‘Brit’, ‘Am’ and ‘Jap’ indicating British, 
American and Japanese origins, and ‘Tel’ and ‘Comp’ indicating telecommunications 
and vehicle component sectors. 
 
108 
 
 
5.2. Analysis of capital budgeting techniques for contextual categories 
 
Our analysis in Table 2 shows little systematic variation in terms of the actual 
choice of specific capital budgeting techniques employed. Companies typically 
employ about four different techniques, DCF techniques and particularly IRR 
being  the  most  popular  and  also  the  most  influential.  Any  differences  by  
category are generally subtle. Value creators and market creators most 
frequently  prioritize  some  form  of  DCF  technique;  they  downplay  the  
traditional payback method, sometimes preferring return on capital methods. 
Re-focusers and restructurers, by comparison, are distinctive only in that all of 
them utilise EPS growth targets, a technique utilised by no value creators and 
just one market creator. All refocusers and restructurers also perceive 
substantial shareholder pressures, so this may be the reason for the more 
extensive use of EPS growth targets. Refocusers and value creators utilise a 
greater number of capital budgeting techniques as will be discussed later. 
 
Categories Capital 
budgeting 
technique most 
frequently 
prioritised 
Other techniques 
applied (listed in 
the order of 
prioritisation) 
Average 
number of 
techniques 
applied 
    
Market creators IRR Return target, NPV, 
Payback, EPS growth, 
Sensitivity analysis  
3.4 
Value Creators IRR/NPV/ 
Return target 
Payback, Sensitivity 
analysis 
4.3 
Refocusers NPV/EPS growth IRR, Return target, 
Payback, Sensitivity 
Analysis 
5.0 
Restructurers IRR/Payback EPS growth, 
Sensitivity analysis 
3.5 
    
All companies IRR NPV, Return target, 
Payback, EPS growth, 
Sensitivity analysis  
3.9 
 
Table 2. Use of capital budgeting techniques by contextual categories 
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Table  3  on  financial  targets  and  time  horizons  adopted  in  applying  capital  
budgeting techniques exhibits more systematic differences among the 
contextually based categories. IRR hurdle rates rise as we move from the 
strategically orientated market creator category towards the more financially 
orientated restructurer category. The average hurdle target rates are 16% for 
market creators, 18% for value creators,  20%  for refocusers, and  22%  for  
restructurers.43 These differences in the hurdle rates appear to reflect 
differences in the cost of capital, as we find the premium set over cost of capital 
to show less systematic difference across our contextual categories. The most 
noteworthy difference here is that the most strategically orientated market 
creators appear to be willing to accept lower premiums. The payback target 
and time horizon  figures  for  the  market creator, value creator and refocuser 
categories are, on the other hand, remarkably similar. 
 
Categories IRR target Premium 
over cost of 
capital 
Payback  
target 
Time 
horizon 
 % % Years Years 
     
Market creators 16 6.3 5 8 
Value Creators 18 8.5 4 11 
Refocusers 20 9.5 5+ 10 
Restructurers 22 8 2.5 3 
     
All companies 18 7.4 4 9 
 
Table 3. Financial targets and time horizons by contextual categories 
 
Reflecting their weak performance and strong shareholder influence, 
restructurers exhibit a consistent, distinctly conservative approach. Their IRR 
target hurdle rates are correspondingly higher, averaging 22% compared to 
18% average for our whole sample. Similarly, their payback targets are shorter, 
averaging 2.5 years compared to 4 years for our whole sample. Their time 
                                                  
43 Please note that this data was gathered in the 1990’s. These hurdle rates may hence 
seem high in comparison with current interest rate levels.  
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horizons  are  even  more  distinctive,  averaging  only  3  years,  compared  with  9  
years for our whole sample.  
 
5.3. Overall SID approaches  
 
More in-depth analysis of the qualitative interview data suggests more 
profound differences in the overall SID approaches across our four contextual 
categories. Most significantly, the data suggests systematic, expected 
differences in the extent to which SIDs are based on strategic as opposed to 
financial considerations. As expected, market creators exhibit a strong 
emphasis on strategic considerations and use financial analysis in a supportive 
role. Restructurers,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  put  strong  emphasis  on  
financial considerations and pay very little attention to strategic analysis. Value 
creators and refocusers demonstrate a more balanced emphasis on both 
strategic and financial considerations, but exhibit other marked differences in 
their overall SID approaches. The overall SID approaches of our four 
contextual categories are portrayed in more detail in the following sections.  
 
5.3.1. Market creators 
 
Consistent with the contextual framework, market creators tend to put strong 
emphasis on strategic considerations when making decisions on strategic 
investments. Although market creators often also conduct financial analyses, 
these analyses tend to have a secondary, supportive role in their strategic 
investment decision making. Executive Vice President of Operations at 
AmComp4 explained:  
 
“We  will  still  argue  for  strategic  decision  making  as  the  dominant  basis  for  
investment strategy after going through all this generation of (financial) 
valuation…Financial people are support people, not decision makers.”  
 
The strategic emphasis is also reflected in the fact that market creators often 
determine specific strategic criteria for evaluating their strategic investments. 
Market creator companies are also willing to allow for significant flexibility in 
the  use  of  financial  targets.  If  an  investment  is  viewed  as  strategically  
significant, there could even be attempts to modify financial valuations in order 
to meet the set financial criteria. Executive Director at BritTel1 explained: 
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“If  we  saw  IRR’s  which  are  low,  then  frankly  we   wouldn’t  be  very  interested  in  
investing there…if the first cut is not looking right, but you still feel deep down it is 
an interesting investment, we will still try to justify it financially.” 
 
Strict financial targets could be seen as a hindrance for achieving the rather 
aggressive  growth  targets  of  many  market creator companies.  The  Head  of  
Strategic Planning at BritTel2 commented:  
 
“Any fool can put in a big hurdle rate but what that does is - you know- if X has a 
lower hurdle rate than me, they will accept growth opportunities that I will reject.” 
 
Some very prospectively oriented market creator companies have also adopted 
very bold attitudes towards incorporating synergies into calculations. They 
consider potential investments as part of their global investment portfolio, and 
pay strong attention to getting synergies out of these businesses at an operating 
level. In contrast, some less prospective market creators have a more cautious, 
yet open, attitude towards calculating synergies. They take into account 
synergies that can be measured in advance.  
 
5.3.2. Value creators 
 
Value creators tend to take a more balanced approach to SID making by paying 
attention to both strategic and financial analysis. Central to the value creator 
approach tends to be an intention to provide decision-makers with a multi-
faceted, thorough analysis. Vice President of financial administration at 
AmComp1 explained this approach: “I think AmComp1 culture is, we want to 
make every analysis as accurate as possible, and then react and use the data 
to make decisions.” Reflecting the intention to conduct profound analysis, 
value creators are  often  not  content  with  using  only  standard  strategic  
techniques, and have developed other, complementary techniques to assist 
strategic evaluation.  This was exemplified by the comment of the Vice 
President of financial administration at AmComp1:  
 
“We'll think about it (BCG, Five Forces), but we are not rigorous to say those are the 
only things we are going to think about.… We have got methodologies that we have 
developed overtime.”  
 
As the strategic investment decisions of value creators are influenced by 
strategic considerations, value creators are, like market creators, willing to 
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stretch  their  financial  targets  if  investments  are  viewed  as  strategically  
significant. Senior Vice President of AmComp2’s automotive business noted:  
 
“We  wouldn’t  want  to  (go  below  the  return  target),  but  in  a  few  cases  we  have,  
rarely, but we have…I could tell you that I have never gone into single digits, but I 
have on occasion looked at something in the 10% range.” 
 
Value creators tend to take a rather open attitude towards synergies when 
evaluating their strategic investments. The Director responsible for 
acquisitions, divestitures and joint ventures at AmComp3 commented: 
 
“We look at all the kind of cost and sales based synergies, technology, product, you 
name  it;  we  look  at  it  fairly  broadly  and  rigorously,  speculating  of  potential  
synergies,  probably  putting  more  weight  on  cost  base  because  that's  more  in  our  
control…” 
 
5.3.3. Refocusers 
 
As with the value creators, the two refocusers in our sample pay attention to 
both  strategic  and  financial  analysis.  Whereas  value creators tend  to  put  
specific emphasis on the thoroughness of their strategic analysis, the two 
refocusers in  our  sample  exhibit  a  tendency  to  strive  towards  very  
sophisticated financial analysis. The corporate development director at AmTel1 
explained their approach: 
 
“Yes,  strategy  is  important  and  it  has  to  fit…otherwise  we  won't  do  it,  but  that  is  
only the first  cut  and the first  threshold decision criteria.   It  is  always in the end 
going to come down to, ’Is it financially attractive for us to do?’”   
 
Striving towards very thorough and sophisticated financial analysis is reflected 
in refocusers’ attempts to conduct their analysis in accordance with the latest 
financial theory, for example by calculating the cost of capital on a continuous 
basis. The corporate development director of AmTel1 explained:  
 
“You  see  our  philosophy  is  to  determine  the  cost  of  capital  as  best  we  can  and  
recognise there is going to be some fluctuation. We try to keep abreast of what’s 
going on in the financial theory as much as possible and we try to use it as much as 
practical.”  
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The Vice President of strategic management at AmTel2 stated for his part:  
 
“They re-assess the cost of capital, I think on an hourly basis in our financial 
organisation, so that it is always going on...we try to analyse those situations, we 
try to model those situations and run sensitivity analysis.“  
 
High shareholder influence, which is typical of refocuser companies, is 
reflected in shareholder value creation being viewed as a primary driver when 
making decisions on strategic investments. Vice President of strategic 
management at AmTel2 explained: 
 
“We have all the primaries (financial analysis) you ever want to see, but essentially 
if you boil it down to its least common denominator… you have to build growth on 
earnings per share.” 
 
Perhaps reflecting the high shareholder influence, refocusers tend to take a 
much more cautious attitude towards calculating synergies than their market 
creator and value creator peers. They incorporate synergies into calculations 
only when there is a very high probability for these synergies to materialize.  
 
5.3.4. Restructurers 
 
As suggested by the contextual framework, restructurers exhibit a very strong 
financial emphasis. Strategic considerations are given very little attention. 
Deputy Marketing Director at BritComp2 commented bluntly:  
 
“We are going in to make money, and to return cash. We are not just doing it for 
strategic reasons. Hence, the emphasis is on financial side when looking at these 
projects… So we don’t accept their (Germans’) view which is that strategy is what 
counts in any conflict with the financials. From our perspective, this would be 
´nuts’.”   
 
Potentially influenced by their low performance and high shareholder 
influence, restructurers tend to set very tight financial targets for their SIDs. 
The director responsible for finance and acquisitions at BritComp3 explained:  
 
“We use the sensitivity analysis and we use the gap between the two hurdle rates, 
you might say we are ultra conservative… Now that means that we are more likely 
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to  turn  down  deals  that  they  would  go  forward  with  and  we  have  experience  of  
that.”      
   
The financially constrained position of restructurer companies also tends to 
drive  them  to  take  a  very  short-term  perspective  in  evaluating  SIDs.  As  
expected, restructurers are very cautious in their attitude towards calculating 
synergies when evaluating strategic investment decisions. The cautious attitude 
towards  synergies  is  driven  by  the  high  shareholder  influence  encountered  by  
restructurers. The director responsible for finance and acquisitions at 
BritComp3 explained: 
 
“When you have built a successful business to date and the shareholders are behind 
you and you have a good market  rating,  to  bring in the unquantifiables  into your 
next  year  you  are  running  a  very  big  risk,  because  it  is  not  only  the  risk  for  the  
acquisition  to  the  brink  of  benefits  you  thought  it  was  going  to  get,  but  it  is  the  
impact  it  has  on  your  total  business  because  all  of  a  sudden  the  confidence  in  the  
management by investors goes and so your market rating goes. Overall the loss of 
value to shareholders is very, very significant, so if you like, we are cautious.”  
  
To conclude, the qualitative data analysis provides significant evidence 
confirming expected differences in the extent to which SIDs are based on 
strategic as opposed to financial considerations across our four contextual 
categories. We find also other marked differences in the contextual SID 
approaches. These are summarised on the following page in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Contextual strategic investment decision making approaches 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
 
This study provides evidence of substantial differences in the way companies 
make  their  decisions  on  strategic  investments.  These  differences  are  not  
revealed simply in regard to the choice of capital budgeting techniques, but are 
also particularly apparent in the way the techniques are used, and in how they 
influence decision making on strategic investments.  
 Given reports of the widespread use of capital budgeting techniques such as 
DCF, the extent of convergence in the choice of techniques is not surprising 
(see  e.g.  Graham  and  Harvey,  2001;  Sangster,  1993).  What  makes  this  more  
notable is the fact that, in the research design of this study, key contextual 
variables have been deliberately extended (e.g. market context and 
country/shareholder influence context). Yet, the degree of convergence in the 
use  of  capital  budgeting  techniques  remains  high.  This  is  despite  the  
international nature of the study and prior evidence of cross-country 
differences in the use of capital budgeting techniques (e.g. Carr and Tomkins, 
1996, 1998; Jones et al., 1993).   
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 Nevertheless, close observation of the manner in which these techniques 
really influence SIDs reveals differences in approaches that do, indeed, vary in 
accordance with the contextual framework proposed. Correspondingly, market 
creators exhibit the most strategically orientated approach to SIDs. Financial 
analyses have a more supportive role and they are likely to be over-ridden or 
even manipulated by decision-makers. At the other extreme, restructurers 
emphasise financial considerations and are more rigid and conservative when 
handling targets and non-quantifiables. As expected, value creators and 
refocusers pay attention to both strategic and financial considerations. They 
also emerge as the most thorough and also the most active in terms of the 
number of techniques utilised. Refocuser practices reflect perceived pressures 
to improve shareholder value, with a heavy emphasis on EPS growth targets; 
value creators do not use such targets at all and, by comparison, are more 
amenable to strategic arguments.  
 Correspondingly, from Figure 2, a consistent pattern of IRR rates is 
apparent, increasing as we move from the most strategically orientated market 
creator category to the most financially orientated restructurer category. 
Restructurers are also unique in adopting far shorter term time horizons and 
paybacks targets, whilst all other categories here exhibit very similar practices.  
 The counter-argument to using the four typology framework developed is 
that differences in SID making practices may be explained more simply and 
plausibly, by an individual variable. This counter-factual was addressed by 
systematically cross-checking for differences against every contextual variable 
on a one-by-one basis. Since the analysis included only 14 cases, the results 
must be interpreted with care but, given this caveat, individual variables do 
appear to provide only a partial indication of why SID practices differ. For 
example, the variables included in the composite strategic orientation variable 
(strategic configuration, generic strategy, market/financial orientation and 
management style) were each found to have different impacts on SID practices. 
None of the individual variables appeared to dominate other explanatory 
variables.   
 Considering Miles and Snow (1978) in isolation, our market creators 
versus value creators at first sight seem similar to more traditional prospector 
versus defender typologies. However, our tentative uni-variable analysis 
indicates that the latter categorisation does not predominate other explanatory 
variables. Furthermore, the Miles and Snow model does not handle the issue of 
poor/failing performance well. For Miles and Snow only reactors (an entirely 
different category not endorsed in other SMA studies) are associated with 
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poorer performance. Our poorer performing cases might conceivably have been 
classified as reactors had they all grouped just above the mid-way vertical axis 
given their uncertain environments, offset by ill-adaptive market orientations. 
We  observed,  by  contrast,  two  groups,  one  relatively  higher  and  the  other  
relatively  lower  on  our  vertical  ‘market orientation’ axis. Thus, poorly 
performing types do not conform to just one single reactor typology. Moreover, 
these two groups (differently positioned in our framework as respectively 
refocusers and restructurers) exhibit different SID making behaviours, and 
these would have been inexplicable if Miles and Snow’s typology were used. 
Finally the hybrid analyser position, half-way between prospectors and 
defenders, can also be accommodated in our framework.   
 The strongest counter-argument to our more complex categorisation is that 
differences in country contexts alone may explain differences in practice. Here, 
the literature suggests a strong convergence in practice within Anglo-Saxon 
countries, such as the U.K. and the U.S.A, and differentiation in countries such 
as  Japan (Carr,  2005;  Carr  and Tomkins,  1998).  When comparing  the  cross-
country influence to the explanatory power of our contextual framework, our 
tentative analysis of 14 cases indicates that the country context does have a 
particularly strong influence on the number of capital budgeting techniques 
and the level of IRR target hurdle rates, but the proposed contextual 
framework better explains differences in the time horizon adopted. When 
addressing the broader SID making approaches, we find our contextual 
framework has a much stronger explanatory power when compared to the 
cross-country influence. Although all three Japanese companies in our sample 
fall into the more strategically oriented market creator category, this category 
also  includes  companies  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  U.K.  and  U.S.  contexts,  
providing evidence that companies from quite different country environments 
are subject to similar contextual influences and exhibit similar behaviour in 
terms of SID making practices. The thesis of cross-country influence would 
also fail to explain the intra-country differences in SID making practices that 
have been found (see Figure 2 for the contextual positions of investigated 
companies and Figure 4 for the contextual SID making approaches). 
 Each of the individual variables used in the study do appear to contribute, 
in part, to the explanation for differences in SID making practices.  However, 
when combined into the four contextual categories, explanation is enhanced 
considerably. The proposed corporate typologies model also affords 
recognition of country context effects as extreme as those found in Japan, in so 
far as these are effectively transmitted through the in-direct country effects 
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included in the framework (see e.g. Carr, 2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1998).44 The 
proposed  model  has  thus  the  virtue  of  wider  applicability  than  models  that  
omit these important indirect country effects. It is suggested here that 
researchers should use universal frameworks with some appreciation and 
understanding of cultures quite different to their own.      
 While the use of the four firm types developed in this paper does contribute 
to the understanding of how contextual factors can help explain SID practice 
(as demonstrated above), their novelty and limited testing means that their 
generalizability  has  yet  to  be  fully  established.  14  cases  categorised  into  four  
typologies composed from a wide range of variables cannot aspire to statistical 
rigor. The justification for limiting the number of cases is that our research is 
exploratory, case-based and involves considerable attention to contextual 
considerations (Butler et al., 1993; Marsh et al., 1988). Nowhere is this more 
important and nowhere is survey-based, statistically orientated research more 
vulnerable than in decision making at a genuinely strategic level. 
Confidentiality considerations and the sheer difficulty of responding to 
complex, strategic oriented questions, compromise the generation of reliable 
data from forced choice scales. 
 
 
 7. Conclusion and directions for future research 
 
Empirical research in management accounting (MA) consistently demonstrates 
that both similarities and differences arise in the intrinsic nature of techniques 
and in the way in which they are applied. Identifying the determinants of 
practice is a central quest for MA researchers. Without such knowledge, 
explanations and understanding of the discipline will be defective and 
prescription hazardous. One way of tackling this quest is the route followed in 
this  paper.  MA  variation  can  be  accounted  for  as  a  response  to  a  set  of  
situational characteristics which can be used to define explanatory contexts 
which can be used to categorise corporate behaviour. This is an approach 
widely adopted in the investigation of how strategy impinges on MA practice. 
 The contribution of this paper has been to encompass a wide range of 
acknowledged variables into a single overall contextual framework and to 
explore this framework’s potential for explaining differences in SID making 
                                                  
44 Previous studies have provided evidence for significant cross-country differences in 
shareholder influence, market orientation and management style, in particular between Anglo-
Saxon and Japanese companies (see e.g. Carr, 2005; Carr and Tomkins, 1998). 
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practices.  The empirical aspect of the research comprised an exploratory set of 
14 matched field case studies from the U.K., U.S. and Japan, providing 
coverage of vehicle components and telecommunications sectors.  Application 
of  the  four  contextual  categories  in  the  framework  provided  a  successful  
explanation of variation in companies’ overall SID approaches and the specific 
decision support techniques adopted.   
 The  findings  indicate  substantial  differences  in  approach  across  the  four  
firm typologies, particularly in terms of the emphasis on strategic versus 
financial considerations, the thoroughness and rigidity of financial analysis and 
the attitudes towards incorporating less easily quantifiable factors such as 
synergies into calculations. Additionally, IRR target rates are higher in the 
most strategically orientated market creator category as compared to the most 
financially orientated restructurer category. Choice of specific investment 
techniques exhibits more moderate systematic variation, but this can be 
explained by the near universal adoption of discounting techniques in large 
firms.           
 Thus the empirics, although limited in scale, do support the potential of the 
proposed framework to explain SID practice. In order to confirm this potential 
and  to  more  fully  investigate  the  utility  of  the  typology,  further  research  is  
needed. First, there is a need for deeper organisational field studies, to verify 
and further develop understanding of the nature of SID making practices and 
to further elaborate the implications of the firm types for the finance function. 
While covering three continents and 14 cases, the scope of the empirics 
precludes study of the related underlying organisational processes as proposed 
by Miller and O’Leary (2005, 2007). An enhancement of the clarity of key 
variables and expected relationships from process-centred research could 
provide a basis for studies designed to provide a more extensive and rigorous 
statistical analysis. A key challenge in pursuing larger scale studies of this type 
is  access  to  reliable,  credible  data  on  the  commercially  sensitive  and  highly  
complex data pertinent to SIDs. It would also be desirable to have more 
longitudinal studies to explore further the question of consistency of SID 
making practice and the applicability of the four proposed firm types over time.  
 Finally, the developed contextual framework may have a wider applicability 
for  explaining  differences  in  SMA  (as  opposed  to  merely  SID)  practice.  Most  
variables  in  the  framework  were  derived  from the  broader  SMA and strategic  
management literatures.  Therefore, further studies could, for example, seek to 
examine whether the framework can help explain differences in companies’ 
utilisation of strategic cost management tools, of externally orientated SMA 
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techniques (see e.g. Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Guilding, 1999; Guilding and 
McManus, 2002) or of more strategically oriented controls, such as the 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 2001).  
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Appendix A. Background information about the interviews and 
SIDs discusseda 
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Appendix B. Analysis for the performance scores 
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Appendix C. Analysis for the market attractiveness scores 
 
 
Company 
Name 
  
  
Averaged 5 
Year Sales 
Growth 
for the 
Industrya 
Y1996 
Averaged 5 
Year ROCE % 
for the 
Industryb 
Y1996 
Scoresc,d 
  
  
    
BritTel1 44 10 8 
BritTel2 44 10 8 
AmTel1 44 10 8 
AmTel2  44 10 8 
BritComp1 9 8 4 
BritComp2 9 8 4 
BritComp3 9 8 4 
AmComp1 9 8 4 
AmComp2 9 8 4 
AmComp3 9 8 4 
AmComp4 9 8 4 
JapComp1 9 8 4 
JapComp2 9 8 4 
JapComp3 9 8 4 
    
 
 aAveraged 5 Year Sales Growth calculated by dividing the total Averaged 5 Year Sales 
Growth of all companies in the industry by the number of companies in the industry. 
bAveraged 5 Year ROCE calculated by dividing the total Averaged 5 Year ROCE for the 
whole industry by the number of companies in the industry. 
 cThe scores for market attractiveness determined intuitively by taking into account 
average 5 year sales growth and ROCE % figures. 
 dThe scores for telecommunications industry based on 52 companies listed on the 
Thompson database, the scores for the vehicle component industry based on 638 
companies listed on Thompson. 
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Shaping strategy formation with 
knowledge-integrating corporate-level 
management control systems 
 
Katja Kolehmainen and Teemu Malmi 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study seeks to provide new insight into the roles management control 
systems (MCSs) play in shaping strategy formation by examining the use of 
knowledge-integrating corporate-level MCSs. The paper argues that the role of 
MCSs  in  shaping  strategy  formation  may  be  more  multifaceted  than  what  is  
suggested by prior management accounting literature. Prior evidence indicates 
that MCSs shape strategy formation by triggering on-going strategic debate 
and organisational learning. This study suggests that MCSs also have more 
immediate influence over strategy formation - they facilitate the integration of 
strategically critical knowledge and contribute to business managers 
possessing more complete knowledge when they formulate their business 
strategies. Furthermore, the paper indicates that when corporate-level MCSs 
are used for this purpose, they share characteristics with interactive control 
systems (ICSs). Since the purpose of such a corporate-level MCSs is to 
integrate strategically critical knowledge rather than to trigger on-going 
organisational learning, their focus, temporal and organisational properties 
differ from those previously specified concerning learning-oriented business-
level use. More specifically, such systems provide a more concrete and finite 
time and space for the interaction. Finally, this paper suggests that the role of 
MCSs in enhancing decision-making may not be limited to information 
generation. MCSs may also combine individuals’ specialised, qualitative 
knowledge  in  a  way  that  it  is  more  readily  applicable  throughout  the  
organisation. Based on these findings, we propose an extension to Simons’ 
(1990) process model of the relationship between business strategy and MCSs 
by adding a corporate-level perspective to it. 
 
Key words: strategy, management control system, interactive control system, 
knowledge integration, organisational learning 
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1. Introduction 
 
How strategies are formed in organisations remains ambiguous (Whittington 
and Cailluet, 2008). Much of the academic discussion on strategy formation 
has  been  characterised  by  a  fierce  debate  between  two  schools  of  thought,  
known as the ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ schools of strategy formation (Brews and 
Hunt, 1999). Proponents of the so called ‘planning school’ argue that explicit 
strategies, formed through a process a conscious thought, are beneficial both in 
stable and unstable business environments (Ansoff, 1991, 1994; see also Brews 
and Hunt, 1999). The ‘learning school’ tradition criticizes the underlying 
premises of the planning school and maintains that strategies emerge through 
a process of incremental learning (Mintzberg, 1990, 1991, 1994; Quinn, 
1980).45 Recently, strategy scholars have suggested alternative approaches for a 
reconciliation between these schools, including ‘strategy as structured chaos’ 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998), ‘strategy as simple rules’ (Eisenhardt and 
Sull, 2001), ‘strategy as guided evolution’ (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), ‘strategy 
formation as planned emergence’ (Grant, 2003), and ‘strategy as a pattern of 
attention focusing’ (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio and Joseph, 2005, 2008). Common to 
these approaches is the notion of guiding the strategy formation process, either 
explicit or implicit, – with only limited structure.46  
 The management accounting literature suggests that a selective use of 
management control systems (MCSs) may provide one alternative for 
integrating the ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ school approaches. Simons’ (1990, 
1991, 1995) field studies indicate that managers seek to trigger organisational 
learning. They shape the emergence of new strategic initiatives by choosing to 
involve themselves personally with only few, typically one, MCS. By using some 
MCSs  in  a  more  interactive  way,  managers  seek  to  focus  the  organisation’s  
attention on key strategic uncertainties, and thereby trigger strategic debate 
and foster organisational learning. 
 Influencing  strategy  formation  by  guiding  strategic  debate  and  
organisational learning is, however, likely to be slow and ambiguous (Ansoff, 
1991; Goold, 1996, Pascale, 1984). Corporate-level managers may have an 
incentive to develop more immediate ways to shape business strategy 
                                                  
45 Mintzberg et  al.  (1998) used the term ‘planning school’  to  refer  only to one of  their  
identified ten schools  of  thought on strategy formation.  We draw on Brews and Hunt 
(1999) to use the term ‘planning school’ more generally to refer to an approach to 
strategy formation that emphasises formal analysis and planning.  
46 A potential for reconciliation between the planned and emergent approaches of 
strategy formation was also noted by Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) initial writings on 
deliberate and emergent strategies. 
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formation  (Goold  and  Campbell,  1987;  Goold  et  al.,  1994).  In  particular,  in  
companies where strategic decision-making authority is delegated to a business 
level, corporate-level managers have an interest to establish systems and 
processes to ensure that business-level strategic decisions are in line with 
corporate  objectives  (Grant,  2003;  Ocasio  and  Joseph,  2005,  2008).  Their  
ability to call business strategies into question is, however, restricted by the 
fact  that  strategic  knowledge  of,  for  example  technology  and  markets,  is  
dispersed throughout the organisation (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 
1996b; Teece, 2000; Tsoukas, 1996). As a consequence, corporate-level 
managers have an interest to also develop processes and systems that enhance 
the transfer and integration of strategically critical knowledge (Grant, 1996a, 
1996b, Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, 2000).47 This enables corporate-level 
managers not only to ensure that they are themselves in a better position to 
review business-level strategic plans: also business-level managers possess 
more  complete  knowledge  in  order  to  make  informed  strategic  decisions.48 
How formal organisational means may be used to enhance knowledge 
integration and sharing remains, however, a somewhat obscure phenomenon 
(Buckley and Carter, 2004; Foss et al., 2010; Foss and Pedersen, 2004), 
because  the  knowledge  management  literature  has  tended  to  focus  on  
cognitional issues, knowledge flows and informal aspects of the organisation 
(Foss, 2007; Foss and Pedersen, 2004). 
 Recent advancements in MCS literature suggest that MCSs may possess 
knowledge management properties (Grandori, 1997; Roberts, 2006; Turner 
and Makhija, 2006), serving also as instruments for knowledge integration 
(Ditillo, 2004). Available evidence suggests that the design of knowledge-
integrating MCSs is context-specific, being influenced by the codifiability and 
complexity  of  the  knowledge  which  is  to  be  integrated  (Ditillo,  2004).  The  
evidence indicates that when knowledge is characterised by a low level of 
codifiability and cognitional complexity – which  is likely to be the case when 
strategically critical knowledge is integrated for strategy formation purposes – 
formal management accounting systems may not provide adequate means for 
knowledge integration. Effective knowledge integration is more likely to 
become mobilised through verbal face-to-face interaction, which facilitates the 
transformation of private, largely uncodifiable knowledge into shared 
                                                  
47 Please see section 3 for a conceptual discussion on the terms ‘knowledge’ and 
‘knowledge integration’. 
48 The notion of ‘completeness’ refers to the degree to which the critical knowledge for 
decision-making is entirely sufficient and available for the decision maker’s use 
(Turner and Makhija, 2006).  
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knowledge which can be expressed in more explicit terms. (Ditillo, 2004; 
Grant, 1996b; Nonaka, 1991, 1994)  
 Prior evidence of the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs has focused on 
the project team level, where verbal, face-to-face communication can occur 
naturally, as part of the regular interaction between project participants 
(Ditillo, 2004). At higher organisational levels such face-to-face interaction 
may, however, not occur without intervention by managers. Formal processes 
and platforms may be needed to enable specialists from different locations, 
functions and cultures to interact, and thereby integrate their specialised 
knowledge (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996b; Kulkki and Kosonen, 
2001). How MCSs may serve as levers for knowledge integration at higher 
organisational levels, including business and corporate levels, remains unclear. 
 This  study  seeks  to  shed  new light  on  the  knowledge-integrating,  strategy  
formation shaping role of MCSs. It focuses on the corporate-level use of MCSs. 
We define corporate-level MCSs as systems that corporate-level managers use 
to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of business-level managers are 
consistent with the organisation’s objectives.49 Our conceptualisation thus 
acknowledges that planning systems can constitute a significant ex ante 
control-oriented part of an overall control package (Flamholtz et al., 1985; 
Otley and Berry, 1980; Malmi and Brown, 2008). Our empirical examination 
draws on an exploratory case study in two global multi-business companies. 
They represent different business strategies and environmental contexts.  
 Our analysis suggests that the role of MCSs in shaping strategy formation 
may be more multifaceted than suggested by existing management accounting 
literature. Prior evidence indicates that MCSs shape strategy formation by 
triggering on-going strategic debate and organisational learning (Simons, 
1990, 1995). Our analysis suggests that MCSs may also have a more immediate 
influence  over  strategy  formation:  they  may  facilitate  the  integration  of  
strategically critical knowledge, and thereby contribute to business managers 
possess more complete knowledge when they formulate their business 
                                                  
49 We use the term ‘corporate-level system’ to refer to systems that address issues that 
are common to the whole organisation – such as corporate-level strategic issues – and 
that are used principally at a corporate rather than business level. Organisation-wide 
systems such as budget planning systems are thus not regarded as corporate-level 
systems in this study. Further, we use the term ‘corporate-level managers’ to refer to 
those  parties  who  are  in  the  position  to  exert  control  over  business  managers.  Such  
parties  include  the  CEO,  the  Board  members  and,  depending  on  the  company  in  
question, managers responsible for key corporate functions such as finance & control 
and strategic planning.  
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strategies.50 This enables corporate-level managers to exert influence over 
business strategy formation, while retaining authority for business strategy 
formulation at a business level. Our analysis also indicates that when 
corporate-level MCSs are used for this purpose, they share characteristics with 
interactive control system (ICSs) (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995). Since the purpose 
of such corporate-level ICSs is to integrate strategically critical knowledge, 
their focus, temporal and organisational properties differ, however, from those 
previously specified concerning business-level, learning-oriented ICSs (Bisbe et 
al., 2007; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995), providing a more concrete and finite time 
and space for the interaction.51 Finally, our analysis provides further evidence 
that  the  role  of  MCSs  in  enhancing  decision-making  may  not  be  limited  to  
information generation. MCSs may also assist in combining individuals’ 
specialised, qualitative knowledge, in a way that it is more readily applicable 
throughout the organisation. These findings are integrated, proposing an 
extension to Simons’ (1990) process model of the relationship between 
business strategy and MCSs: we add a corporate-level perspective to the model.   
 The remainder of the paper is organised into six sections. First, we address 
prior  literature  on  the  role  of  MCSs  in  shaping  strategy  formation,  by  paying  
particular emphasis on Simons’ (1990, 1991, 1995) findings about the learning-
oriented, strategy formation shaping role of MCSs. The subsequent section 
focuses on the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs. It discusses conceptual 
differences between data, information and knowledge as well as between 
knowledge integration and organisational learning; and addresses prior 
evidence  of  the  knowledge  integrating  role  of  MCS.  The  subsequent  section  
introduces the research approach of the study. Thereafter, we present the case 
                                                  
50 While organisational learning and knowledge integration are inevitably interrelated 
concepts (see e.g. Bell et al., 2002; Crossan et al., 1999; Garvin, 1993; Huber, 1991; 
Thomas et al., 2001), they differ in their scope and time orientation. Organisational 
learning has a broader scope and longer time orientation. Organisational learning 
typically aims at rather abstract, long-term outcomes such as strategic renewal 
(Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Fried, 2010; Kuwada, 1998) and adaptation (Edmonson 
and Moingeon, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Knowledge integration, on the other 
hand, has more immediate and concrete objectives. Its focus is on the effective 
application of existing knowledge, rather than the acquisition and creation of new 
knowledge (Grant, 1996a, 1996b). A more thorough discussion of the conceptual 
differences between ‘organisational learning’ and ‘knowledge integration’ is presented 
in section 3.2. 
51 We use the term business-level  MCS to refer  to MCSs,  such as budgets  and quality  
systems, that are used extensively throughout the organisation, and the term business-
level ICS to such business-level MCSs with which top managers choose to involve 
themselves personally in order to trigger strategic debate across several organisational 
levels and/or functions (Simons, 1990, 1991). As noted earlier in footnote 5, we use the 
term ‘corporate-level system’ to refer to systems that are used principally at a corporate 
rather than business level. 
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analysis, and its theoretical implications. The concluding section discusses the 
broader implications of these findings and suggests areas for further research.  
 
 
2. The role of MCSs in shaping strategy formation  
 
Simons’ (1990, 1991, 1995) field studies have laid the foundation for studying 
the role of MCSs in strategy formation. His investigations into the 
‘management processes of control and strategy’ suggested that top managers 
choose to involve themselves personally with some - typically one - MCS in 
order to focus attention on strategic uncertainties. Simons defined those 
uncertainties as dimensions that top managers believe they must monitor 
personally  to  ensure  that  the  goals  of  the  firm  are  achieved.  His  findings  
indicated that top managers trigger strategic debate and foster organisational 
learning about the uncertainties by using some MCSs in a more interactive 
way.  Simons  (1990,  1991,  pp.  49-50)  referred  to  this  type  of  MCSs  as  
interactive control systems (ICSs). Such systems tended to reflect four 
conditions: i) information generated by the MCS is an important and recurring 
agenda  addressed  by  the  highest  levels  of  management,  ii)  the  process  
demands frequent and regular attention from operating managers at all levels 
of the organisation, iii) data are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face 
meetings of superiors, subordinates and peers, and iv) the process relies on the 
continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions, and action 
plans.52  
 Simons  (1990)  integrated  his  findings  into  a  process  model  of  the  
relationship  between  business  strategy  and  MCSs.  He  proposes  a  two-way  
relationship between strategy and MCSs. While strategy influences the use of  
MCSs by determining key strategic uncertainties and by influencing top 
managers in their choice of MCSs for interactive use, the use of such interactive 
MCSs does, on the other hand, direct and foster organisational learning. This 
influences business strategy formation by triggering new strategic initiatives.  
                                                  
52 Bisbe et al. (2007) have subsequently sought to specify the construct in more specific 
terms by identifying five principal dimensions of ICS properties: i) an intensive use by 
top management, ii) an intensive use by operating managers, iii) a pervasiveness of 
face-to-face challenges and debates, iv) a focus on strategic uncertainties, and v) a non-
invasive, facilitating and inspirational involvement. Bisbe et al. (ibid, p. 798) highlight, 
however, that the nature, meaning, and properties of ICS may depend on the purpose 
of such systems; and emphasise that consideration for the purpose and context of ICS 
is required when defining the construct. As Bisbe et al. were building their specification 
of ICS on an in-depth examination of Simons’ (1987, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 2000) 
writings, they were implicitly analysing ICS at the business level. 
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 Simons’ (1990) conceptualisation of the role of MCSs in shaping strategy 
formation is strongly influenced by the ‘learning school’ perspective. MCSs 
shape strategy formation by guiding organisational learning – by stimulating 
learning about strategic uncertainties, and by consequently shaping the 
emergence  of  new  strategic  initiatives.  Simons  (1995,  pp.  115-116)  makes  his  
view explicit in his subsequent argument by proposing an inverted relationship 
between strategy, planning and control “which equates interactive control with 
strategy formation and strategic planning with implementation”. Strategic 
planning could be conceptualised as a diagnostic tool, the principal purpose of 
which is to limit search activities. To Simons, “new strategic initiatives are 
developed not through strategic planning, but rather through interactive 
controls that guide the development of new strategic initiatives within the 
constraints provided by boundary systems”,  of  which  strategic  plans  
constitute a part. As this approach entails an intention by top management to 
guide the emergence of new strategic initiatives, it represents an alternative for 
integrating the ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ schools of strategy formation. While 
strategies  are  allowed  to  emerge  in  a  bottom-up  fashion,  the  selective  use  of  
MCSs enables top management to influence the range of issues to which the 
new strategic initiatives are likely to be related.53   
 Shaping strategy formation by guiding strategic debate and incremental 
learning is, however, likely to be slow and ambiguous (Ansoff, 1991; Goold, 
1996; Pascale,  1984).  The use of organisation-wide ICSs may also be costly.  It  
may lead to positive performance outcomes only in situations in which the 
organisation is going through a major strategic redirection. (Abernethy and 
Brownell,  1999;  Kober  et  al.,  2007)  Corporate-level  managers  may  have  an  
incentive to develop more immediate ways to shape business strategy 
formation (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Goold et al., 1994; Grant, 2003). Their 
ability to call business strategies into question is, however, likely to be hindered 
by the fact that strategic knowledge of, for example technology and markets, is 
scattered throughout the organisation (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 
1996b; Grant, 1997; Teece, 2000; Tsoukas, 1996). Thus, corporate-level 
managers may have an incentive to develop processes and systems that 
                                                  
53 Simons’  (1990,  1995,  2000,  2005)  stance  on  organisational  learning  could  be  
classified as the process school of organisational learning, which considers that 
organisations have only limited capacity to process information (Bell et al., 2002; e.g. 
Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1991). While organisations are viewed to possess a 
capacity to learn when required, management is considered to have a critical role in 
nurturing an organisation’s information processing capability by removing barriers to 
effective and efficient information-processing practices (Bell et al., 2002). 
Organisational  learning  is  considered  to  be  incremental,  and  it  evolves  over  time  
(Miner and Mezias, 1996; cf. e.g. Argyris, 1977; Argyris and Schön, 1978).   
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facilitate the integration and sharing of strategically critical knowledge (see e.g. 
Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996a, 1996b, Kogut and Zander, 1992). This 
may enable corporate-level managers not only to ensure that they are in a 
better position to review business-level strategic plans themselves: also that 
business-level managers possess more complete knowledge when making 
strategic decisions.  
 
 
3. The role of MCSs in facilitating knowledge integration 
 
 
3.1. Data, information and knowledge 
 
Data, information and knowledge are related but not interchangeable concepts.  
They are often conceptualised as representing a hierarchy of meaning, depth 
and  relevance  to  action  (e.g.  Ackoff,  1989;  Buckley  and  Carter,  2004;  
Davenport  and  Prusak,  1998;  Rowley,  2007).  The  term  data refers to 
unprocessed discrete facts and figures, which bear little relevance or purpose 
by themselves (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Elearn, 2007; Zeleny, 2005). 
Once data is interpreted and structured so that it has meaning for the user, it 
becomes information (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Davenport and Prusak, 1998; 
Elearn, 2007). For example, plotting sales data on a chart to identify trends 
may enable converting data into information that has meaning and value for 
the user (Elearn, 2007).  
 Whereas information may be created by interpreting and structuring data, 
knowledge derives  only  partially  from  information,  and  it  cannot  be  
conceptualised simply as ‘structured information’ (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998; Nonaka, 2001; Zeleny, 2005; cf. Ackoff, 1989; Buckley and Carter, 
2004). Knowledge has a personal, human quality (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998;  Nonaka  et  al.,  2001;  Takeuchi,  2001).  It  resides  primarily  at  an  
individual  level  –  in  the  minds  of  ‘knowers’  (Davenport  and  Prusak,  1998;  
Grant, 1996b; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka et al., 2001). Knowledge 
accumulates over time through experience (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka and Teece, 2001); it contains subjective 
insights and judgement (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Elearn, 2007; Nonaka et 
al.,  2001);  and  it  is  impacted  by  the  values  and  beliefs  of  the  ‘knower’  
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Kulkki and Kosonen, 2001; Takeuchi, 2001). 
Knowledge is also more closely related to action. Unlike information that 
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focuses on ‘what’ something is, knowledge involves an understanding of how 
something works. (Ackoff, 1989; Nonaka and Teece, 2001; Zeleny, 2005)54 
 The knowledge management literature has typically distinguished between 
explicit or articulated knowledge  which  can  be  expressed  in  formal  and  
systematic  language  (Hedlund,  1994;  Nonaka,  1991)  and  revealed  and  
transferred through communication (Grant, 1996b); and between tacit 
knowledge which has a stronger personal quality which makes it more difficult 
to formalize (Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Polanyi, 1966). While highlighting the 
distinction between different types of knowledge, the knowledge management 
literature has been less specific about the definition of knowledge or the 
distinction between explicit knowledge and information (Zeleny, 2005; see e.g. 
Grant, 1996b, Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1991). While we acknowledge 
that the difference between information and explicit knowledge is subtle and 
ambiguous  (see  e.g.  Kogut  and  Zander,  1992),  we  suggest  that  the  personal,  
subjective dimension of explicit knowledge is the distinctive characteristic: it 
distinguishes explicit knowledge from information. While being less subjective 
than  the  highly  personal  tacit  knowledge  (Nonaka  et  al.,  2001),  explicit  
knowledge contains subjective insights and judgement that do not characterise 
the more objective information (see Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Elearn, 
2007).  What  distinguishes  explicit  knowledge  from  tacit  knowledge  is  its  
stronger capacity for articulation, formalisation and communication (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996b; Nonaka et al., 2001).  
   
3.2 Knowledge integration and organisational learning 
 
Since knowledge resides primarily at the individual level – among specialists 
from various geographical locations and organisational entities (Buckley and 
Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Kosonen and Kulkki, 2001) – the 
organisational capability to amplify, explicate, transfer and integrate 
knowledge is critical for competitive advantage (Grant, 1996a; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Roberts, 2006; Teece, 2000). As a significant part 
of critical knowledge is tacit (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
                                                  
54 For the purposes of this paper we define knowledge according to Davenport and 
Prusak  (1998,  p.5)  as  “a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information,  and  expert  insight  that  provides  a  framework  for  evaluating  and  
incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the 
minds  of  knowers.  In  organisations,  it  often  becomes  embedded  not  only  in  
documents or repositories, but also in organisational routines, processes, practices 
and norms.” 
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Nonaka, 1991, 1994), which is slow, costly and uncertain to transfer (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992, 1995), the transformation and integration of knowledge to a 
format that is more readily applicable throughout the organisation becomes a 
critical organisational capability (Nonaka, 1991, 1994; Grant, 1996b; Teece, 
2000).  
 Knowledge integration involves combining individuals’ specialised 
knowledge  in  a  way  that  it  is  more  readily  applicable  throughout  the  
organisation (Buckley and Carter, 2004, Grant, 1996a, 1996b). The focus is 
specifically at knowledge application, rather than knowledge acquisition or 
creation (Grant,  1996a, 1996b).  Since the knowledge being integrated is  often 
complementary in nature, knowledge integration may, however, also be value-
adding. It can produce new knowledge (Buckley and Carter, 2004). Knowledge 
integration is typically mobilised through organisational routines, procedures, 
processes, structures, documents or other repositories (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Morris and Empson, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Roberts, 2006; Teece, 
2000).55 
 Knowledge integration and organisational learning are, inevitably, 
interrelated concepts (see e.g. Bell et al., 2002; Crossan et al., 1999; Garvin, 
1993; Huber, 1991, Mintzberg et al., 1998; Thomas et al., 2001).56 The effective 
use of knowledge – through, for example, knowledge acquisition, information 
distribution and interpretation, and organisational memory (Huber, 1991), or 
through intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing knowledge 
(Crossan et al., 1999; Crossan and Berdrow, 2003) - is generally seen as a key 
element of the organisational learning process. Knowledge integration and 
organisational learning differ, however, in their scope and time orientation. 
                                                  
55 For the purposes of this paper, we adopt the definition of ‘knowledge integration’ 
brought forward by Buckley and Carter (2004), and define the term as “a combination 
of  complementary  knowledge  which  may  be  value-adding  and  result  in  the  
production of new knowledge”.  Our conception of knowledge integration is thus 
broader than that of Grant (1996a, 1996b), which focuses solely on the application of 
existing knowledge and argues that knowledge acquisition/creation occurs solely at an 
individual level.  
56 The organisational learning literature has reached little converge or consensus of 
what is meant by the term or the basic nature of organisational learning because of the 
diversity of research domains and schools of thought in which the learning phenomena 
have been explored (Bell et al., 2002; Crossan et al., 1999; Edmonson and Moingeon, 
1998;  Fiol  and  Lyles,  1985;  Huber,  1991).  For  example,  Bell  et  al.  (2002)  have  
categorised the literature into the economic, developmental, managerial and process 
schools of organisational learning. There seems, however, to be wide agreement on that 
organisational learning is a process in which organisation’s members use information 
or  knowledge  in  a  way  that  it  supports  strategic  renewal  and  an  organisation’s  
adaptation to its environment (see e.g. Crossan et al., 1999; Edmonson and Moingeon, 
1998; Fiol and Lyles, 1985).  
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Organisational learning has a broader scope and a longer time orientation. It is 
generally viewed as a rather open-ended process, which aims at fairly abstract 
outcomes, such as the enhancement of an organisation’s long-term 
performance  (Garvin,  1993;  Senge,  1990;  Thomas  et  al.,  2001),  strategic  
renewal (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003; Fried, 2010; Kuwada, 1998; Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985; Quinn, 1980; Simons, 1990, 1995), adaptation (Edmonson 
and Moingeon, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982), and, ultimately, survival 
(Nelson  and  Winter,  1982).  Knowledge  integration,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a  
narrower scope and more concrete objectives. It aims at integrating dispersed, 
specialised knowledge in organisational routines, procedures, processes, 
structures, documents or other repositories (Cyert and March, 1963; Grant, 
1996a, 1996b; Morris and Empson, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Roberts, 
2006; Teece, 2000). The focus is more on the effective application of existing 
knowledge, rather than on the acquisition or creation of new knowledge that 
would enhance strategic renewal and adaptation over time (Grant, 1996a, 
1996b).  
 
3.3. MCSs as knowledge-integrating mechanisms 
 
The role of MCSs in enhancing decision-making is widely acknowledged within 
the  management  accounting  literature  (see  e.g.  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  
Zimmerman, 1997, 2001). Accounting based MCSs, in particular, are generally 
considered to provide an efficient and effective means for structuring data into 
more meaningful information (see e.g. Anthony and Govindarajan, 2003; 
Drury, 2005). Such formal systems may not, however, provide adequate means 
for capturing the private, qualitative and subjective insights that characterise 
knowledge (McDermott, 1999; Mohamed, 2006; Nonaka et al., 2001).  
 Recent advancements in the MCS literature suggest that MCSs may also 
possess knowledge management properties (Grandori, 1997; Roberts, 2006; 
Turner and Makhija, 2006), serving a role in knowledge integration (Ditillo, 
2004). Available evidence indicates that MCSs may be used to foster the type of 
knowledge integration that is particularly suitable for the specific type of 
knowledge in question. It  suggests that when knowledge is  characterised by a 
high level of codifiability and the purpose is to integrate a large number of 
highly codifiable pieces of knowledge, action controls can be used - not only to 
control individuals’ behaviour, but also to foster knowledge integration 
through codification and documentation. When the purpose is, on the other 
hand, to integrate highly specialised technical knowledge, result controls can 
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be used to integrate and embody the diverse technical knowledge. Finally, 
when knowledge is characterised by low level codifiability and cognitional 
complexity, informal face-to-face interaction can provide an effective means for 
achieving both knowledge integration and control. (Ditillo, 2004)57  
 Human interaction is likely to be critical when strategically critical 
knowledge is being integrated for strategy formation purposes. Strategically 
critical knowledge is likely to include diverse personal and qualitative insights 
that cannot become compressed into codifiable pieces of information. 
Processes and forums for human interaction are needed. These enable 
individuals to articulate their knowledge, enhancing the development of shared 
understandings and language. This facilitates the transformation of private, 
largely uncodifiable knowledge into more explicit knowledge that is more 
readily applicable throughout the organisation (McDermott, 1999; Mohamed et 
al,  2006;  Nonaka  et  al.,  2001;  Grant,  1996b;  Teece,  2000).  Prior  evidence  of  
the knowledge-integrating role of MCSs has focused on the project team level, 
where verbal, face-to-face communication can occur naturally, as part of the 
regular interaction between project participants (Ditillo, 2004). Nevertheless, 
how  MCSs  may  serve  as  levers  for  knowledge  integration  at  higher  
organisational levels remains unclear. 
 
 
4. Research approach 
 
Given the limited prior knowledge of the role of corporate-level MCSs in 
facilitating knowledge integration and in shaping strategy formation, we 
adopted an exploratory research approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Otley and Berry, 1994; Scapens, 1990). Although the empirical 
examination was informed by prior theoretical constructs - in particular the 
construct of ICS (Bisbe et al., 2007; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995) and the process 
model of the relationship between MCS and business strategy (Simons, 1990, 
1991) - these constructs served mainly as theoretical frames of reference that 
guided the empirical analysis (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; Siggelkow, 2007). 
The research approach was open-ended and empirically sensitive in character, 
                                                  
57 Ditillo (2004) and Caglio and Ditillo (2008) use the term ‘knowledge complexity’ to 
refer to the three types of knowledge integration situation mentioned here. More 
specifically, they use the term ‘computational complexity’ to refer to situations in which 
a large number of codifiable pieces of knowledge need to be combined, the term 
‘technical complexity’ to situations in which highly specialised technical knowledge is 
being integrated, and the term ‘cognitional complexity’ to situations in which 
knowledge resources are insufficient and new problem solving is required.  
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in order to facilitate the emergence of new theoretical insights (Ahrens and 
Dent, 1998; Keating, 1995; Vaivio, 2008).  
 The empirical investigation drew on case studies in two global multi-
business companies. These represent different business strategies and 
environmental contexts. The first case study focused on Titan, a company that 
operates in a relatively stable and mature business environment. It builds its 
competitive advantage largely on cost advantages.58 As this initial investigation 
yielded interesting preliminary findings of the role of corporate-level MCSs in 
facilitating knowledge integration and shaping strategy formation, we decided 
to  examine  the  phenomenon  further,  and  in  more  organisational  depth,  in  a  
contrasting  contextual  setting.  Our  second  case  study  focused  on  Saturn,  a  
company that operates in a dynamic business environment characterised, for 
example, by short product life cycles. Saturn competes largely through product 
innovation and marketing. It is widely acknowledged for its innovation 
capability, and it also invests heavily in brand building. Both case companies 
are large multinational companies, being amongst the global leaders in their 
respective industries. Our choice to focus the analysis on two organisations 
with different business strategies and business environments was motivated by 
prior evidence: this indicated that these contextual factors could influence the 
role  of  MCS  in  shaping  strategy  formation  (Grant,  2003;  Simons,  1990).  
Choosing two case companies with contrasting characteristics was expected to 
provide some insight into whether the found practices could be applicable to 
organisational contexts outside those investigated in this study (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Lukka and Kasanen, 1995; Scapens, 
1990; Spicer, 1992; Vaivio, 2008).  
The case data was gathered during a period of four years, between May 2006 
and September 2010. As the study sought to examine the use of corporate-level 
MCSs, our empirical examination focused primarily on corporate-level 
executives, and their intentions in using MCSs. Interviewed corporate-level 
managers represented essential corporate staff functions, such as corporate 
strategy, HR, finance and control, branding and marketing. Some of the 
corporate-level managers also had prior experience of operating at a business 
area level. The interviewees included also business area and business unit level 
managers in order to provide some indication of the extent to which corporate 
managers’ intentions in regard to using MCSs were effective in practice. In 
total,  32  interviews,  lasting  from  30  to  150  minutes,  were  conducted  (See  
                                                  
58 The pseudonyms ‘Titan’ and ‘Saturn’ are used throughout the paper to refer to the 
case companies. 
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Appendix A).59 Of the 32 interviews, 28 were tape recorded and transcribed.60 
When tape recording was not possible, notes were taken. These notes were 
immediately transcribed after the interviews and were sent for validation to the 
interviewees (McKinnon, 1988). 
Following the explorative, open-ended approach of the study, interviewees 
were first approached with fairly open questions. For example, interviewees 
were asked to provide their views on ‘how strategies are formed and what is the 
role of MCSs in strategy formation’. As the objective was to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the role of MCSs in shaping strategy formation, management 
practices and management systems were addressed broadly. Since the data 
analysis proceeded in parallel with data gathering, the researcher was 
increasingly able to pose more specific questions, probing deeper into initial 
ideas as the project and the data collection progressed. (Ahrens and Dent, 
1998; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; McKinnon, 1988; Vaivio, 2008)  
Interview data were complemented with internal documents. We studied 
planning process descriptions and documents related to the performance 
measures used at corporate and business levels (McKinnon, 1988; Scapens, 
1990, Vaivio, 2008). Numerous publicly available documents related to the 
case companies were also used. These documents included, for example, 
broker presentations, press releases and articles and books which addressed 
these  case  companies.  Finally,  multiple  informal  discussions  with  key  
informants enabled us to engage in more general discussions regarding the 
case companies’ management approach and their use of MCS, providing a 
platform for more detailed questions. This made it possible to elaborate further 
on initial theoretical ideas (See Appendix A for a list of informal discussions). 
The empirical data comprised, in total, over 47 hours of face-to-face discussion 
with key informants. 
Consistent with the explorative, open-ended character of the study, the data 
analysis  commenced  during  the  data  gathering  phase.  It  involved  several  
rounds of iterative reflections between data and theory (Ahrens and Dent, 
1998;  Ahrens  and  Chapman,  2006).  The  data  analysis  involved  searching  for  
emerging themes of significance, reorganising data according to themes, and 
using  these  themes  as  input  to  further  interviews  (Ahrens  and  Dent,  1998).  
Internal and public documents were used to elaborate on and confirm issues 
                                                  
59 One interview with two overseas executives was conducted over phone through a 
conference call.  
60 Two interviews could not be recorded because the interviewees did not provide 
permission for recording and two telephone interviews with overseas executives could 
not be recorded due to technical limitations. 
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that arouse in interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). An on-going research 
relationship  with  the  case  company  provided  the  researchers  with  the  
opportunity to test initial theoretical understandings with key informants 
during the data gathering and analysis phase. The overall analysis was also 
verified by key informants at both case companies (Scapens, 1990). 
 
 
5. Case analysis 
 
This empirical section is divided into three subsections. The first outlines the 
organisational structure and the strategic planning processes of the two case 
companies. The second section illustrates how the case companies use 
corporate-level planning systems as mechanisms for knowledge integration 
and sharing. The third subsection describes how the corporate managers of the 
two case companies use these corporate-level planning systems as 
management control systems to shape business strategy formation.  
 
5.1 Organisational structure and strategic planning process 
 
Saturn is organised principally along three global business areas. Each of 
these is responsible for a distinct set of products and customer segments. 
Business areas constitute the key unit of profit and loss responsibility, and they 
are given clear authority for their business strategies and operations. Their 
performance is evaluated mainly based on financial performance in regard to, 
for  example,  sales  growth,  profitability  and  efficiency.  Business  areas  are  
supported by two global horizontal organisations that have group-wide 
responsibility for sales, marketing, purchasing and logistics as well as 
technological competitiveness. Some of these horizontal organisations are 
further divided into regional entities.  
 The  strategic  planning  process  starts  with  a  ‘world  map  process’.   This  
scans the environment very broadly and aims to identify points of discontinuity 
in  the  world.  The  ‘world  map  process’  is  followed  by  another  externally  
oriented process - referred to as the ‘business environment outlook process’ - 
which focuses on business related issues in the environment,  serving as input 
to both corporate and business-level strategies. Next, the business-level 
strategy formulation work starts. After the business strategies are presented to 
the executive management group, they, alongside financial long range plans, 
are being finalised and communicated extensively throughout the organisation. 
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 Titan has recently been reorganised along four global product divisions. In 
addition there are geographical responsibilities in the biggest growth areas. 
The four global product divisions are further divided into business units, 
accountable for profit and loss. Similarly to Saturn, strategic decision making 
authority is located at a business level. Global product divisions operate rather 
independently. Their performance is monitored only according to four 
financial criteria: ROCE, sales, operating margin, and EBITDA or EBIT 
(depending on the product division in question). Occasionally, additional 
measures related to for example customer satisfaction are added - in order to 
signify the importance of improving performance in that area.  
 The strategic planning process centres on a discussion between the Board 
and the  operating  management.  The  process  starts  in  early  spring.  Divisional  
management and area managers give presentations about their operations’ 
current status and the future outlook. Based on these presentations, the Board 
identifies a limited number of strategic themes. These are used to provide focus 
for subsequent strategy formulation work. The process culminates in August: 
business strategies – formed around the specified strategic themes - are 
discussed with the Board.  
 Although the decision-making on business strategies is clearly positioned at 
a  business  level  in  both  case  companies,  the  strategy  formulation  work  is  
steered by establishing group guidelines and a schedule for the strategic 
planning process. The guidance is more specific in Saturn in which business 
managers  are  given  detailed  guidance  also  in  regard  to  the  type  of  expected  
process outcomes. At Titan, the business managers are given much more 
discretion over the actual outcomes of the strategic planning processes. They 
are, for example, not given any specific templates or formats that they should 
apply. 
 
5.2 Corporate-level planning system as mechanism for knowledge 
integration and sharing 
 
Both case companies use corporate-level planning systems as mechanisms for 
knowledge integration and sharing. In Saturn the business environment 
outlook process is used explicitly for this purpose. The Corporate Strategy 
Director described the purpose of the process: 
 
“Well,  the  purpose  of  the  process  is  to  generate  our  best  understanding  of  
strategically relevant development issues in our business environment. There are 
an  awfully  great  number  of  issues  happening  in  our  environment,  but  with  this  
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process we aim to screen those issues that need to be taken into account when 
businesses consider their strategies… The key motivation for the process is both 
developing an understanding of the external business environment and sharing the 
view on that;  maybe it  is  more that  we have a shared understanding…that we do 
not have competing views.”  
 
The business environment outlook process is explicitly positioned at a 
corporate level with an aim of achieving a comprehensive, business area 
neutral  view  of  the  business  environment.  The  process  scope  is  determined  
accordingly  –  focusing  on  strategic  issues,  such  as  technology  and  consumer  
trends,  that  are  common  to  all  business  areas.  The  process  is,  however,  
purposefully kept open-ended in nature. This seeks to facilitate the emergence 
of all strategically critical issues during the process. 
  Each part of the business environment process work has a dedicated owner 
and a facilitator. Together with a representative of Corporate Strategy, they 
select participants who they assume to possess the most critical knowledge 
related to the specific streams. Attention is also paid to that the participants 
would holistically represent different parts of the organisation. As the process 
proceeds, new individuals with specialised knowledge get involved in the 
process. Participation in the process is regarded as a privilege, and there are 
generally considerably more people willing to participate in the process than 
what could be involved at a particular moment.61 The Corporate Strategy 
Director explained this further: 
 
 How we do it in practice is that we mobilize an extensive organisation to address 
these issues…We have about a dozen people working on the process full time, in 
other words use over half of their time on the process, but then as contributors I 
would say that  we have close to a hundred,  could be over.  But they are not  using 
very much of their time on the process…But, it is a rather major effort.” 
 
The  Marketing  Planning  Director  for  one  of  the  business  areas,  who  had  
personally been involved with the process, recalled for her part:  
 
                                                  
61 Individuals have, in general, strong incentives for sharing their personal insights and 
knowledge at Saturn. The annual performance evaluation focuses not only the extent to 
which individuals have been able to reach their targets, but also on the extent to which 
they have reached these targets by acting in accordance with the organisational values. 
As sharing one’s knowledge with other organisational members is regarded as one of 
the key organisational values, an individual’s career development in the company is 
partly dependent on his/her willingness and ability to share his/her knowledge. The 
organisational culture does also, in general, encourage individuals to express their 
views.   
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“The process seeks to get input from a large number of key people with a purpose of 
testing  ideas.  Based  on  this  input  an  overall  view  is  constructed,  which  is  again  
tested  here  and  there.  So  it  is  not  kind  of  that  there  would  be  a  specific  group  of  
people who would meet at regular intervals and would then develop a report…It is 
very much so that we seek touch base from different directions.”  
 
Top management is also highly involved in the process. The CEO reviews and 
comments the progress and results. Reviewing is organised thorough separate 
meetings, and through formal governance bodies, such as the group executive 
board. External experts are also included to provide complementary views to 
the process. Overall, the process involves a large number of individuals with 
specialised knowledge, in order to generate a holistic, multifaceted view of 
significant developments in the business environment. The Head of Strategic 
Planning commented this as follows:  
 
“Complementing different perspectives is very important, because the parameters 
we have to take into account in our strategic decision making are also multiple, and 
we need to be able  to take them into account broadly in our decision making…For 
example in our recent workshop we gathered a large number of different types of 
inputs  prior to the discussion. We interviewed over 80 internal and external 
experts. We could hence also draw on their personal insights in our discussion.”  
 
The  process  is  organised  through a  series  of  workshops  that  provide  a  forum 
for articulating personal insights, and facilitating discussion and debate about 
these insights.  Data and insights are gathered and articulated through several  
forms of interaction – such as emails, telephone conversations and face-to-face 
discussions. But it is these face-to-face workshops that facilitate the combining 
of different perspectives, and refining insights. The Head of Strategic Planning 
continued:  
 
“Discussing these issues face-to-face is very important. Many issues, such as data 
and charts about the market development, can, in a way, be “no-brainers”….But it 
is  when we discuss these issues – when everyone can bring their  own perspective 
and knowledge - when these insights are refined… As an example in our recent 
workshop we had representatives from all key units where we addressed all the 
streams and inputs and sought to determine the most critical planning assumptions 
and their implications (questions) for us. So in a way we seek to refine and iterate 
the  insight  in  several  phases  to  make  sure  that  we  can  distil  the  most  critical  
statements and questions for us.” 
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All participants are expected to bring their specialised knowledge to the 
process. Discussing these issues face-to-face facilitates the articulation of 
qualitative, personal insights. The Head of Strategic Planning explained this 
further: 
 
“If we consider, for example the individuals, who work close to our customers, they 
produce the data about what the customer has said, as  well as  the figures and 
priorities of that particular customer. But their insight may then enable them to say 
that  even  though  this  is  what  the  customer  says,  the  customer  may  actually  be  
considering other alternatives based, for example, on these events in the past…. So 
in a way all participants produce their own contribution building on their own 
experience, context and knowledge.” 
 
Although the process is owned and driven by the strategic planning function, 
the finance & control function is also involved. It ascertains that all financial 
figures used in the process are realistic. The Chief Financial Officer commented 
their role in the process:  
 
"The parameters that the finance & control function produces for the strategic 
planning  process  are  corporate  finance  type  of  parameters,  such  as  WACC.  The  
parameters  related  to  for  example  the  market  size  are  produced  by  the  strategic  
planning function…Then, of course, if any internal financial information is required 
during the process, we will produce that… We have a finance & control unit - which 
reports directly to me - referred to as 'business planning support' which produces 
all the financials needed during the strategic planning process.” 
 
Knowledge integration takes a very explicit form in Saturn. The process results 
in 20-30 explicit statements related to how the company considers the business 
environment’s future - on strategically important dimensions - within a 3-5 
year perspective. These statements need to be backed up with supporting data 
and analysis. The group of statements typically comprises estimates and views 
relating  to  industry  level  “megatrends”,  as  well  as  to  trends  in  consumer  
behaviour. Some of the statements maintain an acute status over several years. 
But the statements typically include also new pronouncements. These 
statements require managers’ immediate attention. The Global Head of 
Marketing explained: 
 
“These statements, they can be quite diverse. There are statements related to 
consumer behaviour, and then there are statements related to industry megatrends. 
So  these  statements  are  related,  but  they  may  address  quite  different  issues.  So  
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there is in a way a b-to-be perspective and a consumer perspective - these 
statements are not completely commensurable...The group of statements typically 
comprises of new statements, and statements that have risen earlier, but that have 
remained relevant. That is probably why not all statements are treated equally. If a 
particular issue is still relevant, but we know that we are already addressing it in 
several ways, we do not have to emphasise it that much anymore.” 
 
The Head of Strategic Planning explained this further: 
 
”These statements relate to changes in the current planning assumptions, to new 
planning assumptions or to changes in their prioritisation. We may also identify 
new causalities... a particular trend may, for example, reinforce or undermine 
other trends.” 
 
Developing  a  shared  view  on  the  statements  entails  lively  face-to-face  
discussion and debate. As the process involves specialists from very divergent 
organisational entities, the end-result is inevitably a compromise. The 
Corporate Planning and Analysis Director observed:  
 
“The validation of statements is happening already during the business 
environment outlook work and when the statements are kind of released, they have 
already been validated by all businesses. And of course it is a compromise…but it is 
already  during  the  work  that  they  need  to  kind  of  settle  on  where  the  corporate  
wide view on that particular trend is. “  
 
Sometimes the participants may not arrive at a common understanding about 
all the statements. These statements may still provide valuable insight to the 
subsequent strategy formulation work. The Head of Strategic Planning 
commented:  
 
”We may not necessarily have a shared understanding of every statement, and that 
is  perfectly  fine.  There  are  always  issues  like,  say  the  GDP  growth  rate,  which  is  
likely to be close to the forecasted level unless something extraordinary happens. 
But then, we have issues like, the competition parameters in a particular market – 
that consumers will emphasize a particular aspect over another one during the 
following three years – that is merely a belief, an assumption….We may say that 
this  is  not  even  a  shared  view,  but  within  our  best  knowledge  there  is  a  high  
probability that these will be the key competition parameters in that particular 
market.  In  our  decision  making  we  may  then  have  to  take  this  uncertainty  into  
consideration  by,  for  example,  developing  a  real  option  type  approach,  which  
enables us to react if the key competition parameters materialize to be different 
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from those assumed. But this is still valuable, because these statements are not 
really  meant  to  be  the  end  result;  their  purpose  is  to  enable  us  to  make  informed  
decisions.” 
 
By contrast, Titan uses a more informal approach for integrating and sharing 
strategically critical knowledge. Knowledge integration and sharing is, in 
practice, facilitated by providing a system for an open and inspirational face-
to-face  interaction.  Similarly  to  Saturn,  the  process  is  steered  by  focusing  the  
discussion around a few strategic themes. These are common to all product 
divisions. Diverging from Saturn, where the process is purposefully kept open-
ended  in  nature  the  process  is  more  focused  at  Titan.  It  focuses  on  a  few  
predefined strategic themes. These tend to change annually. They provide a 
clear focus for discussion and knowledge integration. The Chief 
Communications Office and a long-time management group member 
explained:  
 
”The  strategy  process  varies  somewhat  from  year  to  another…  The  annually  
changing themes are defined in cooperation between the management team and the 
Board…During  some  years  there  have  been  special  themes  such  as  ‘large  growth  
markets’  and  what  is  our  strategy  there  and  what  is  our  strategy  in  ‘saturated  
European and North-American markets’.”   
 
The  Senior  Vice  President,  in  charge  of  one  of  the  major  product  divisions  
recalled for his part:  
 
”There  can  be,  for  example  this  -  which  we  find  very  important  -  that  how  we  
ensure that  we are close to the customer in the value chain.  It  is  an example of  a 
theme that has been common for all businesses. So the strategic theme is the same, 
but the business area specific solutions may be very different. “ 
 
The integration and sharing of knowledge culminates during the second phase 
of the strategic planning process: the members of the extended management 
group engage in an open and inspirational discussion on the strategic themes. 
The group includes top managers in charge of product divisions, geographical 
areas and main functional areas. And as the managers are expected to provide 
grounded presentations related to the strategic themes, the process enhances 
the integration and sharing of strategically critical knowledge. Similarly to 
Saturn, external experts are engaged in the process. They provide 
complementary views. Key individuals with specialised knowledge are also 
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involved, but to a considerably lesser extent than in Saturn. The Chief 
Communications Officer explained:  
 
“Well,  it  depends  on  the  theme  how  it  is  addressed,  but  I  do  not  think  that  the  
process would extend to a third layer…some experts are involved to examine some 
specific themes”. 
 
Discussion about the themes is non-invasive and facilitative in character. The 
Chief Communications Officer crystallised, referring to the second phase of the 
discussion: “It is very interactive, open debate. We discuss these issues freely 
based on the presentations.” 
In both case companies these corporate-level systems also serve to integrate 
and share knowledge about key strategic uncertainties. This is, however, not 
the principal purpose of these systems. There are several other systems and 
processes in place to cover important strategic uncertainty areas. The 
Corporate Planning and Analysis Director of Saturn commented for their 
part:  
 
“In very many ways actually (strategic uncertainties are followed)…So we have 
different kinds of intelligence processes on different layers. We have on corporate 
level this industry intelligence group that is for example all the time regularly 
sending  updates  on  the  key  competitors  and  now  we  are  not  including  the  
traditional competitors, but…not even necessary competitors, but industry 
players…Then on a more kind of generic basis…deep dive studies by using both 
external  and  internal  resources  on  selected  topics  and  they  are  usually  related  to  
these sort  of  weak signals  or strategic  threats  or strategic  uncertainties…and then 
on corporate level also one very big effort is this business environment 
outlook…that obviously tries to cover all of the significant uncertainty areas in the 
analysis…So  it  depends  on  the  aggregation  level  that  you  want  to  look  into,  but  
there is certainly someone.”  
 
The Chief Legal Officer at Titan explained for their part:  
 
“Many strategic  uncertainties  are followed up in a centralised way.  For example,  
for  environmental  issues  we  have  a  dedicated  organisation  that  follows  these  
uncertainties.”  
 
The Chief Corporate Technology Officer added, on his part:  
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“Well, it (information related to strategic uncertainties) is gathered by the strategic 
planning process and in several other meetings…and this business intelligence 
network is one standard source of information…management group gets for 
example from Asia quarterly a brief business intelligence report that addresses 
local  development,  what the competitors have done,  what the mega trends are,  so 
that management group would be more aware of what is going on.” 
 
5.3 Shaping business strategy formation 
 
In addition to facilitating knowledge integration and sharing, these corporate-
level planning systems also serve as mechanisms for shaping business strategy 
formation. While the authority for strategic decision-making is clearly located 
at a business level, these systems seek to shape business strategy formation. 
They provide business-level managers with more complete knowledge about 
strategically critical issues, and they focus managers’ attention to the most 
pivotal strategic issues. This represents a non-invasive, enabling approach to 
exerting influence over business strategy formation. It seeks to mobilise 
business managers’ knowledge, and it enables them to deal more effectively 
with their inevitable contingencies (Adler and Borys, 1996; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008). Simultaneously it creates 
some boundaries to the range of issues that they should take into account in 
their decision-making. The Head of Strategic Planning at Saturn explained 
how the business environment outlook process is used as an enabling 
mechanism for exerting influence over business strategy formation:  
 
”These statements enable us to determine our (corporate-level) strategic priorities. 
But these statements also enable us to provide a framework for strategic decision-
making - because we cannot, of course, control everything top-down.  So in a way, 
this  business  environment  outlook  process  enables  us  to  say  that  “ok,  if  you  make  
your  decisions  based  on  these  statements,  your  decisions  should  not  go  too  much  
wrong.” 
 
Sharing the results of the business environment outlook is given high priority. 
Previously, the results were first shared and discussed in a senior management 
workshop, involving 150-160 top managers. Currently, the results are even 
more tightly integrated to the strategy formulation work and they are brought 
up in several forums involving top and middle-level management. The 
Marketing Planning Director commented again:  
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“This  (business  environment  outlook  process)  is  a  kind  of  kick  off  for  the  actual  
strategy  work…  then  everyone  who  is  involved  in  the  strategy  work,  and  that  is  
again a rather extensive group of  people,  they do of  course get  this…the aim is  to  
use this to understand some specific sub-strategy.” 
 
The  Global  Head of  Marketing  explained  for  his  part  the  extent  to  which  the  
statements are shared within the organisation.  
 
”We do not necessarily communicate these statements down to the grass root level; 
they are shared mainly among those who make strategic decisions. At that level it is 
important to have this type of insights. But these statements influence for example 
what  products  we  develop…  And  I  would  say  that  people  do  commit  to  these  
statements – once these issues have been identified their relevance is not questioned. 
And I  would like to point  out  that  our organisational  culture is  not  militaristically 
strict – we do in general open for discussion considerably more issues than many 
other companies would.”  
 
To provide even more readily applicable guidance to the strategy formulation, 
the business environment outlook process also seeks to explicate a list of key 
questions that business areas should take into account in their strategy 
formulation work. These questions seek to enhance the application of the 
knowledge integrated during in the business environment outlook process. 
They also provide focus for the strategy formulation work. The Corporate 
Strategy Director explained:   
 
”There are basically two dimensions… On the other hand, what are the questions for 
us, and then we seek to partially examine also what are the implications of that for 
us. The distinction is important, because the implications are in fact partially 
strategy already and our aim with the business environment outlook work is not to 
formulate strategy, but to determine strategic boundaries, which is then input to 
actual strategy. But it includes, in addition to the statements, also what are the key 
questions, i.e. the implications for us. These implications are formulated through 
key questions.”  
 
The Global Head of Marketing illustrated this further: 
 
”An example of a consumer behaviour related statement could be “greenness grows 
in  all  of  us”.  This  of  course  raises  the  question  whether  our  product  development  
should develop more green products, whether our production processes should be 
modified, whether we should be proactive and become greener than our 
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competitors, and whether we should emphasise greenness in our marketing... Then, 
there are also statements related to business and industry level phenomena- such as 
“cloud  computing”.  This  is  of  course  a  trend  that  does  not  influence  our  
communication or marketing to consumers, but we need to think whether this trend 
should somehow be reflected in our solutions to consumers.“ 
 
To explain how the business environment outlook process had influenced the 
formulation of brand and marketing strategies in practice, the Global Head of 
Marketing continued: 
 
”Well,  if  we  think  of  the  brand  and  marketing  strategy,  of  course  they  are  
influenced by the business environment outlook process. If we think of the Saturnus 
brand,  what are the core elements of  our brand,  these issues do not  change on an 
annual basis. But it [the business environment outlook process] influences how we 
interpret  our  vision.  We  need  to  have  a  good  understanding  of  where  we  are  
leading  the  business,  and  we  need  to  make  sure  that  the  brand  core  essence  and  
marketing efforts are aligned to that. So it [business environment outlook process] 
has an influence on our campaigns and any outward oriented marketing activity.” 
 
In Titan the influence over business strategy formation is also non-invasive 
and enabling in character. The discussion over strategic themes serves not only 
to provide managers with a more complete knowledge over strategically critical 
issues: they also provide clear focus to the strategy formulation work. As the 
system  enables  changing  the  themes  on  an  annual  basis,  it  provides  a  
mechanism for dynamically focusing managers’ attention to the strategic issues 
that are most relevant at a specific point in time. The Senior Vice President in 
charge of one of the global product divisions commented:  
 
“Yes,  the  themes  change  annually…It  is  related  to  what  is  the  focus  then.  What  is  
topical, what is important at a specific point in time.”  
 
The Chief Legal Officer commented for his part: “Selected themes are expected 
to be reflected in the plans at several levels.” 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The above analysis of the two corporate-level systems provides, we argue, new 
insight  into  the  role  of  MCSs  in  shaping  strategy  formation.  While  these  two  
systems are essentially planning systems – established to facilitate the process 
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of strategic planning – they also provide a means for exerting influence over 
business strategy formation, and serve as MCSs from the corporate managers’ 
perspective (Flamholtz et al., 1985; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Otley and Berry, 
1980). The practice at Titan appears fairly conventional - in the sense that the 
board and top management select few strategic themes which guide strategy 
work at divisions and business units. In contrast, the system in Saturn appears 
more unique. It entails an extensive involvement of experts from various parts 
of the organisation, resulting in a list of explicit statements and questions that 
shape the subsequent strategy formulation work.  
  Hence, the case analysis indicates that the role of MCSs in shaping strategy 
formation may be more multifaceted than suggested by prior management 
accounting literature. Previous studies have suggested that MCSs shape 
strategy formation by triggering on-going strategic debate and organisational 
learning (Simons, 1990, 1995). This study suggests that MCSs may also have a 
more immediate influence over strategy formation: they can facilitate the 
integration of strategically critical knowledge. This gives business managers 
more complete knowledge for formulating their business strategies. This also 
provides an effective, enabling way for exerting influence over business 
strategy formation, while retaining authority for decision making at a business 
level (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008).   
 This approach shares characteristics with recent advancements in the 
strategic management literature, which suggest reconciliation between the 
‘planning’ and ‘learning’ schools of strategy formation by guiding strategy 
formation with only limited structure (see e.g. Brews and Hunt, 1998; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997, 1998; Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Grant, 2003; Lovas 
and Ghoshal, 2000; Ocasio and Joseph, 2005, 2008). It corresponds 
particularly closely to Grant’s (2003) concept of ‘planned emergence’: business 
managers exhibit substantial autonomy and flexibility in strategy making, but 
corporate management seeks to shape the strategy making by providing the 
structure and context for the planning. Similarly to the ‘planned emergence’ 
approach illustrated by Grant (2003), the approach presented in this paper 
involves providing channels and forums for communication and knowledge 
sharing. How this approach differs from the approach illustrated by Grant is 
that, particularly in the case company Saturn, a strong emphasis is paid to 
integrating knowledge in a very explicit and readily digestible form. This 
facilitates that the knowledge sharing is not limited to those participating in the 
process, but can be shared more extensively throughout the organisation 
(Grant, 1996b; Teece, 2000). To further promote the application of this 
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knowledge in actual strategy formulation, the knowledge is also presented in a 
format where explicit questions become addressed in the strategy work. While 
the intention to use a corporate-level planning system as a mechanism for 
knowledge integration is, as such, not particularly novel, it is this purposeful 
use of the system as a mechanism for transforming subjective personal insights 
into very explicit, readily applicable knowledge that may be shared beyond 
those participating in the process, and the emphasis paid onto applying this 
knowledge in the subsequent strategy formulation work that make the 
approach presented in this paper as novel.  
 The  two  corporate-level  MCSs  illustrated  in  this  paper  also  share  
characteristics with the concept of ICS. They represent an inspirational, 
facilitating and non-invasive management process, which involves intensive 
face-to-face challenge and debate (Bisbe et al., 2007; Simons, 1990, 1995). 
Their focus, organisational and temporal properties differ, however, from those 
previously specified regarding business-level learning-oriented ICSs (Bisbe et 
al., 2007). While the absence of some of the specified ICS properties may 
indicate that the systems illustrated in this paper are essentially different from 
the  concept  of  ICS,  the  divergence  in  the  properties  may  also  result  from  the  
different purpose and context of these systems and those previously discussed 
in the management accounting literature (Bisbe et  al.,  2007, pp. 798).  As the 
purpose of these systems is to facilitate the integration of strategically critical 
knowledge, dispersed among specialists from various geographical locations 
and organisational entities (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 1996a, 1996b; 
Kosonen  and  Kulkki,  2001),  it  is  essential  to  establish  a  more  concrete  and  
finite  time  and  space  for  the  interaction  than  that  previously  described  
regarding business-level learning-oriented ICSs. An interactive use of one of 
the more standard MCSs - such as a profit planning system or brand revenue 
budget  (Simons,  1991)  -  would  not  facilitate  the  simultaneous  face-to-face  
interaction of geographically and organisationally distant individuals, which is 
needed for transforming their personal, qualitative knowledge into explicit and 
shared knowledge (Nonaka, 1991, 1994). Rather than facilitating continuous 
discussion and interaction throughout the organisation (Simons, 1990, 1995), 
these systems are thus used on a repetitive basis. This, more finite temporal 
scope also contributes to these systems being more firmly integrated with the 
annual strategic planning process. They can also provide more immediate 
influence over business-level strategy formulation work.  
 The organisational properties of these processes are also more limited than 
those previously specified regarding business-level learning-oriented ICSs. 
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Rather  than  entailing  an  intensive  use  by  top  and  operating  level  managers  
throughout the organisation (Bisbe et al, 2007; Simons, 1990; 1995), these 
knowledge integration-oriented systems entail an intensive involvement by top 
management and key individuals with specialised knowledge. This more 
limited organisational involvement contributes to that face-to-face interaction 
and  debate  between  the  process  participants  is  feasible.  Finally,  the  focus  of  
these  systems  differs  also  to  some  extent  from  that  previously  specified  
regarding business-level learning-oriented ICSs. Similarly to the business-level 
ICSs, these systems also serve to integrate and share knowledge about strategic 
uncertainties (see Bisbe et al., 2007, Simons, 1990, 1995), but it is not the 
primary purpose of these systems.62 There are several complementary MCSs in 
place to ensure that strategic uncertainties are addressed in sufficient depth 
and breadth. These systems focus on key corporate-level strategic issues – such 
as  ‘expanding  to  growth  markets’  and  ‘technological  development’.  This  
enables corporate management to ensure that these corporate-level strategic 
issues are reflected in the business-level strategic plans, and that managers 
possess more complete knowledge about these issues when formulating their 
strategies.  
 Despite  these  dissimilarities  in  terms  of  focus,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  
temporal and organisational properties, we conceptualise the corporate-level 
systems illustrated in this paper as ICSs on the basis of their strong emphasis 
on face-to-face interaction and debate, and their enabling influence over 
business strategy formation (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995). The differences we 
identified in these properties we interpret as manifestations of the different 
purpose  and  context  of  the  systems  illustrated  in  this  paper  and  those  
previously discussed in the management accounting literature (See Bisbe et al., 
2007, pp. 798). Table 1 presents a comparison of the purpose and properties of 
the learning-oriented business-level ICSs and the knowledge integration-
oriented corporate-level ICSs illustrated in this paper. 
  
                                                  
62 The term strategic uncertainty refers to a contingency that could provide threats or 
opportunities as circumstances change (Daft et al., 1988; Simons, 1991). 
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Learning-oriented 
business-level ICS 
(Bisbe et al., 2007; 
Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995) 
 
Knowledge 
integration-oriented 
corporate-level ICS 
   
Purpose  To trigger strategic debate and 
organisational learning  
 To shape the formation of 
emergent business strategies  
 To integrate and share 
knowledge 
 To shape the formation of 
intended business strategies 
 
Properties  Focus on strategic 
uncertainties  
 An inspirational, facilitating 
and non-invasive management 
process, in which top and 
operational level managers 
involve themselves intensively 
in face-to-face challenge and 
debate  
 Continuous process that is not 
necessarily integrated to the 
strategic planning process  
 Focus on corporate-level 
strategic issues 
 An inspirational, facilitating 
and non-invasive 
management process, in 
which top management and 
key individuals with 
specialised knowledge 
involve themselves 
intensively in face-to-face 
challenge and debate  
 Repetitive process that is an 
integral part of the strategic 
planning process 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the purpose and properties of learning-oriented business-level ICS and 
knowledge integration-oriented corporate-level ICS. 
 
Moreover, the case analysis indicates that corporate and business level MCSs 
may be used to shape business strategy formation in different ways. Previous 
studies have indicated that business-level MCSs shape the formation of 
emergent business strategies by focusing an organisation’s attention to 
strategic uncertainties, and by triggering strategic debate and organisational 
learning about these uncertainties (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Kober et al., 
2007; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995). This case analysis suggests that corporate-
level MCSs may be used to exert more immediate influence over business 
strategy formation. They may be used to focus organisation’s attention on key 
corporate-level strategic issues, to facilitate knowledge integration and sharing 
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about these issues, and to exert non-invasive influence over the formulation of 
intended business strategies. Figure 1 combines these key findings to propose 
an extension to Simons’ (1990) process model of the relationship between 
strategy and MCS that integrates the corporate-level perspective to the model. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure  1. Integrated process model of the relationship between strategy and MCSs (the 
business-level model adopted from Simons, 1990).63 
                                                
63 We  draw  on  Ocasio’s  (1997)  ‘attention-based  view  of  the  firm’  to  refer  to  the  term  
‘strategy’ a pattern of organisational attention, the distinct focus of time and effort by 
the firm on a particular set of issues, problems, opportunities, and threats. Further, we 
build on Thomson and Baden-Fuller (2010, pp. 22) to distinguish between ‘corporate’ 
and ‘business’ strategy on the basis of whether the issues are related to the long-term 
direction and scope of the whole corporation, or the business unit in question. Our 
definition of corporate strategy is thus broader than the traditional definition, which 
views corporate strategy as the question of which businesses should a corporation 
compete in, and how can these businesses be managed so that they create “synergy” 
(Dess and Lumpkin, 2003, pp. 188; Goold et al., 1994, pp. 5). 
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In addition to the found similarities in the use of corporate-level MCSs, the 
case analysis also indicates contextual differences in the scope and the scale of 
organisational involvement between the two processes illustrated in this paper. 
The process scope is considerably broader at Saturn. The process is guided by 
determining a few broadly defined streams, such as ‘customer groups’ and 
‘technology’.  But  it  is  purposefully  kept  open-ended  in  nature,  in  order  to  
ensure that any strategically critical issues would not be ignored in the analysis. 
The  process  is  much  more  focused  at  Titan.  It  focuses  on  a  few  predefined  
strategic  themes  that  tend  to  change  annually,  providing  a  clear  focus  for  
discussion and knowledge integration. The scale of organisational involvement 
is also considerably more extensive at Saturn. In addition to the top managers 
who are highly involved in the process, the process involves an extensive group 
of specialists. At Titan, top management is highly involved, but key individuals 
with specialised knowledge are involved to a considerably lesser extent than in 
Saturn. Even though this study did not directly seek to examine any contextual 
influences  on  the  use  of  MCSs,  prior  evidence  indicates  that  these  found  
differences could have been influenced by the different business strategy and 
business environment contexts of the two case companies. Prior studies have 
indicated that companies operating in a dynamic business environment and 
with an entrepreneurial, product differentiation type strategic orientation are 
likely to use broader scope of planning information and to be more extensive in 
their environmental scanning as compared to companies operating in less 
dynamic business environments and with a more conservative, cost-focused 
strategic orientation (see e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Chenhall and Morris, 1995; 
Guilding, 1999; Simons, 1987).   
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Strategies are formed through multifarious processes. On one hand, they result 
from a process of conscious thought. Explicit strategies are formulated based 
on rigorous analysis. (Ansoff, 1991, 1994) On the other hand, they emerge as 
patterns of organisational behaviour thorough a process of incremental 
learning (Mintzberg, 1990, 1991, 1994; Quinn, 1980). Previous studies have 
indicated that MCSs shape strategy formation through triggering strategic 
debate and organisational learning (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995). This study 
suggests  that  the  influence  of  MCSs  may  also  be  mobilised  by  using  MCSs  as  
knowledge-integrating mechanism to ensure that managers possess more 
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complete knowledge when formulating their business strategies. In both 
approaches the use of MCSs is enabling in character - designed to enable 
managers to deal more effectively with inevitable contingencies (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004). 
 Shaping strategy formation thorough the use of MCSs may not, however, be 
unproblematic. Available evidence indicates that using MCSs to exert influence 
over strategy formation entails judgement in regard to the set of issues – be it 
strategic uncertainties (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995) or corporate-level strategic 
issues  as  in  the  case  studies  illustrated  in  this  paper  –  on  which  the  
organisation’s or managers’ attention is focused. Although such attention 
focusing is likely to enhance strategic alignment (Ocasio and Joseph, 2005, 
2008), it may also reduce an organisation’s capability to account for changing 
circumstances (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Doz and Kosonen, 2008; Gray, 
1990; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000). Further research is needed to establish how 
MCSs may be used to shape strategy formation - without realizing the potential 
negative consequences of such intervention. Further investigation could also 
shed more light on the potentially differential  ways by which the influence of 
corporate and business-level MCSs on strategy formation may be mobilised.  
 This study suggests also, that further clarification about the focal essence 
and contextual properties of ICS are needed. This study has presented a 
comparison of the properties of learning-oriented business-level ICSs (Bisbe et 
al.,  2007;  Simons,  1990,  1991,  1995)  and  knowledge  integration-oriented  
corporate-level  ICSs.  The  found  differences  in  the  focus,  as  well  as  in  the  
organisational and temporal properties between these systems could indicate 
that  the  systems  illustrated  in  this  paper  are  essentially  different  from  the  
concept of ICS. We have interpreted these differences as manifestations of the 
different purpose and context of the systems illustrated in this paper and those 
previously specified in the management accounting literature (Bisbe et al., 
2007, pp. 798). We have argued that these systems’ strong emphasis on face-
to-face  interaction  and  their  enabling  influence  over  business  strategy  
formation (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1995) suggest their substantial similarity with 
the concept of ICS.  Further empirical research could seek to provide additional 
evidence and specification on the contextual variation in the purpose and 
properties of ICSs.  
 Finally, this paper suggests for that the decision-making enhancing role of 
MCSs is not necessarily limited to information generation. MCSs may also 
combine individuals’ specialised, qualitative knowledge in a way that it is more 
readily applicable throughout the organisation. The study provides evidence for 
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Ditillo’s  (2004)  earlier  findings  that  when  knowledge  is  characterised  by  low  
level of codifiability and cognitional complexity, formal management 
accounting systems may not suffice to facilitate knowledge integration. Human 
interaction processes may be needed. They provide a context where personal 
qualitative insights may be articulated and integrated. This interaction may be 
guided by focusing attention to predefined issues. Future studies could 
continue to develop a more fine-grained understanding of the role of MCSs as 
knowledge-integrating mechanisms. So far, the knowledge-integrating role of 
MCSs  has  been  examined  at  the  project  team  (Ditillo,  2004)  and  corporate  
levels. Future studies could extend the examination to other organisational 
contexts, including the role of MCSs in integrating knowledge across several 
organisational levels, functions, and localities.  
The approach for shaping strategy formation illustrated in this paper may be 
dependent on particular organisational and individual characteristics. It is 
critically  dependent  on  individuals’  willingness  to  share  and  explicate  their  
knowledge (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Foss and Pedersen, 2004), their ability 
to absorb new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Szulanski, 1996), and an 
organisation’s capability to integrate knowledge (Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Kogut 
and Zander, 1992). Prior literature indicates that the existence of a shared 
cognitive background and understanding (Buckley and Carter, 2004; Grant, 
1996b), common objectives for the knowledge integration (Teece, 2000) and 
an incentive system that rewards knowledge sharing between individuals 
(Simons, 2005) may facilitate such integration.  
 This study has only started to scratch the surface of corporate-level MCSs 
as knowledge integrating, strategy formation shaping mechanisms. More 
comprehensive organisational investigations are needed to develop a profound 
understanding of the challenges associated with their use. Further empirical 
research is also needed to provide a larger empirical base for the development 
of theoretical propositions that may be used in studies designed to provide 
more extensive statistical analysis. The found similarities in the approach 
across the studied companies provides some tentative indication of that the 
approach found in this paper could also be applicable to organisational 
contexts outside those investigated in this study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Lukka and Kasanen, 1995; Scapens, 1990; Spicer, 1992; 
Vaivio,  2008).  The  found  differences  in  the  scope  and  the  scale  of  
organisational involvement between the two processes illustrated in this paper 
indicate, however, that there may be contextual differences in the specificities 
of these processes.  These need to be examined further.  
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 Notwithstanding these limitations, this study provides new insight into how 
the influence of MCSs on strategy formation may be mobilised in practice. It 
indicates that this influence may be more multifaceted than suggested by prior 
management accounting literature. It argues that MCSs may be used to shape 
the formation of both emergent and intended strategies, and that corporate 
and business level MCSs may differ in their influence.  
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Appendix: Interviews and informal discussions 
 
INTERVIEWS    
    
With Whom Level Date Duration 
(min) 
    
Titan    
    
Executive Vice President, Corporate 
Communications 
corporate 24 May, 2006 60 
Senior Vice President, Legal Affairs corporate 29 May, 2006  90 
Senior Executive Vice President, 
Product Division X 
business 
area 
31 May, 2006 90 
Executive Vice President, Corporate 
Technology and Asia Pacific 
corporate 6 June, 2006 120 
Senior Executive Vice President, 
Product Division Y 
business 
area 
14 June, 2006 60 
Senior Executive Vice President, 
Corporate Services (including HR) 
corporate 15 June, 2006 60 
Executive Vice President, Corporate 
Strategy 
corporate 21 September, 
2006 
150 
    
Saturn    
    
Corporate Planning & Analysis 
Director,  
Former Strategic Planning Director 
for the largest business area 
corporate 21 June, 2006 
10 July, 2006 
120 
90 
Marketing Planning Director for the 
largest business area 
business 
area 
10 August, 2006 90 
Corporate Planning & Analysis 
Director with Finance & Control 
background 
corporate 14 August, 2006 90 
Vice President, Rewards & Benefits 
and Competence & Performance 
Management Director (joint 
telephone interview through 
conference call) 
corporate 23 August, 2006 90 
Corporate Planning & Analysis 
Director,  
corporate 13 September, 
2006 
90 
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Former Strategic Planning Director 
for the largest business area 
Head of Finance & Control corporate 21 September, 
2006 
60 
Vice President, Business 
Improvement Services, and  
Senior Development Manager, 
Business Improvement Services 
corporate 13 October, 
2006 
90 
Corporate Strategy Director corporate 23 October, 
2006 
90 
Senior Development Manager, 
Business Improvement Services 
corporate 27 October, 
2006 
60 
Vice President, Business 
Improvement Services 
corporate 3 November, 
2006 
60 
Corporate Strategy Director corporate 29 November, 
2006 
60 
Competence & Performance 
Management Director 
corporate 30 November, 
2006 
90 
Director, Business Development & 
Strategy Projects, R&D for the 
largest business area 
business 
area 
7 January, 2008 90 
Corporate Planning & Analysis 
Director 
corporate 14 January, 
2008 
30 
Director, F&C, Business Unit X 
within the second largest business 
area 
business 
unit 
14 January, 
2008 
90 
Director HR, Executive 
Development, Talent and 
Performance Management, HR 
Development 
corporate 22 January, 
2008 
90 
Strategy & Portfolio Manager for one 
of the sales categories 
business 
unit 
14 March, 2008 60 
Cost Management and Business 
Control Director for purchasing at 
the largest business area 
business 
unit 
15 March, 2008 30 
Former Senior Manager, third 
largest business area 
business 
area 
11 June, 2009 30 
Finance Director I for a major 
horizontal organisation (telephone 
interview) 
business 
area 
15 June, 2009 30 
Finance Director II for a major business 17 June, 2009 40 
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horizontal organisation area 
Senior Vice President, Global Head 
of Marketing 
corporate 31 August, 2010 60 
Executive Vice President, Chief 
Financial Officer 
corporate 27 September, 
2010 
50 
Head of Strategic Planning, 
Corporate Strategy 
corporate 28 September, 
2010 
90 
 
 
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS    
    
With Whom Level Date Duration 
(min) 
    
Titan    
    
Senior Advisor, Former Chief 
Financial Officer 
corporate 2 December, 
2005 
60 
Executive Vice President,  
Corporate Strategy 
corporate 27 February, 
2006 
90 
Chief Financial Officer corporate 4 May, 2007 60 
    
Saturn    
    
Corporate Planning & Analysis 
Director 
corporate 23 May, 2006   
9 June, 2006 
27 October, 
2006 
19 January, 200 
60 
60 
60 
30 
Senior Manager, Strategy & 
Business Development for the 
largest business area  
business 
area 
2 April, 2006  
20 April, 2006 
28 September, 
2007 
22 June, 2009 
30 
30 
60 
30 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how substantial dynamism can be built into strategic 
performance measurement systems (SPMSs), and how such flexible and 
adaptable SPMSs can be used for strategic alignment. It draws on an in-depth 
case study of a successful global leader in the telecommunications industry. 
This research suggests that building substantial dynamism into SPMSs, and 
using such flexible and adaptable SPMSs for strategic alignment,  may require 
companies to seek a balance between empowerment and alignment. To do so, 
they may need to adopt a combination of management practices that differ 
considerably from those prevalent for more stable SPMSs. Further, this 
research argues that subjectivity may be a central feature in a dynamic SPMS. 
Indeed, it could be essential both more effectively to empower managers to 
take primary responsibility for measures, and to provide them with sufficient 
leverage to account for changes in the external and internal contexts. The paper 
concludes by discussing theoretical and managerial implications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Strategic performance measurement systems (SPMSs) have become an integral 
part of contemporary management practice.1 They  provide  managers  with  a  
potentially effective mechanism for enhancing strategic alignment, by enabling 
the translation of strategy into a set of financial and non-financial measures 
that may be cascaded throughout the organisation.2 By enhancing strategic 
alignment, however, SPMSs may also introduce organisational rigidity and 
slow down the organisation’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances.3  
 Academic accounts have often underlined the need to enhance the 
dynamism of SPMSs.4 Most writers have argued that the overall development 
of an SPMS should include a periodic review process that enables managers to 
ensure  measures  remain  relevant  in  the  light  of  external  and  internal  
development.5 Specific audit tools have also been proposed that provide 
detailed guidance for the review.6  
 Much of the prior research on dynamic SPMSs has tended to be conceptual 
in nature.7 Those studies providing empirical evidence have tended to focus on 
manufacturing companies, examining how the evolution of SPMSs may be 
managed over time.8 Much less  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  ways  in  which  
substantial dynamism can be built into SPMSs in order make frequent 
modifications to the measures possible. Yet, such a capability is likely to be 
vital in turbulent industries where companies seek strategic agility – the 
capability to change strategies and business models rapidly.9 Not surprisingly, 
an examination of the ways  companies seek to create sufficient dynamism into 
their SPMSs in such businesses has been highlighted as one of the key areas for 
future research on SPMSs.10 This  paper  aims  to  respond  to  these  calls  by  
drawing on an inductive, in-depth case study of DynComp, a successful global 
leader in the turbulent telecommunications industry.11 The paper examines 
how a substantial element of dynamism can be built into SPMSs, and how such 
a flexible, fluid and adaptable SPMS can be used for strategic alignment.12 
Diverging from much of the research on SPMSs, which has tended to focus on 
systems such as the Balanced Scorecard – which measure performance at an 
organisational  level  –  the  study  presented  here  responds  to  recent  calls  for  a  
broad examination of SPMSs, and extends the examination to include systems 
that measure contribution to strategic performance at an individual level.13  
 This in-depth examination of the use of SPMSs at DynComp suggests that 
building substantial dynamism into SPMSs and using such flexible and 
adaptive SPMSs for strategic alignment may drive companies to seek a balance 
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between empowerment and alignment. This requires companies to adopt a 
combination of management practices that differ considerably from those 
prevalent for more stable SPMSs. The analysis suggests that building 
substantial dynamism into SPMSs may require companies to place the 
emphasis on individual-level SPMSs and to engage managers throughout the 
organisation to take primary responsibility for the relevance of measures. This 
allows for the incorporation of action-oriented measures, and enables 
discussion about measures to be embedded within the on-going interaction 
between managers and subordinates. Further, the analysis indicates that 
relying  on  this  kind  of  empowering  approach  may  require  companies  to  
establish alignment processes that give top management indirect influence at 
an individual level. These alignment processes – such as corporate-wide 
strategic focus areas and the evaluation of individuals’ values-related behaviour 
– may enable top management to influence individual-level target-setting and 
behaviour, while primary responsibility for target-setting and performance 
evaluation still remains with the individual manager. Finally, this case study 
indicates  that  building  and  using  a  more  fluid,  dynamic  SPMS  may  drive  
companies to a position where they allow – in fact, make unavoidable – greater 
subjectivity in the performance evaluation process than is generally suggested 
by the SPMS and management control literature.14 This analysis suggests that 
subjectivity may be essential both more effectively to empower managers to 
take primary responsibility for measures, and to provide them with sufficient 
leverage to account for changes in the external and internal contexts. 
  This paper is structured in a way that reflects the study’s inductive 
approach.15 After discussing the research perspective, the paper proceeds to 
illustrate how SPMSs are used at DynComp. The paper concludes by discussing 
the theoretical and managerial implications of the study. These implications 
include making connections with the strategic planning literature that has been 
extensively covered in Long Range Planning, providing further evidence that 
governance channels may facilitate responsibility for strategic planning to be 
shared between corporate executives and middle-level managers, and 
indicating that these channels may foster strategic dialogue throughout the 
organisation, including with those organisational actors that may otherwise lie 
outside the strategic core.16 
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2. Research approach 
 
Given the limited empirical evidence available to suggest how a substantial 
element  of  dynamism  can  be  built  into  SPMSs  or  how  such  flexible  and  
adaptable  SPMSs  can  be  used  for  strategic  alignment,  this  study  adopted  an  
inductive approach to develop new theoretical insights. As the need for 
dynamic, more fluid SPMSs was assumed to be particularly pressing in 
turbulent industries (characterised by rapid and unpredictable change, short 
product  life-cycles  and  temporary  advantages),  DynComp  –  a  leading  global  
player in the telecommunications industry – was chosen as the research site.17 
As a successful leader in a turbulent industry, it was conceivable that DynComp 
had adopted novel management practices. Although the research is based on a 
case study of a single setting, it aims to contribute beyond empirical 
description, by providing new theoretical insights. This study follows the 
theory-building case study process proposed by Eisenhardt. Since the adopted 
single-case design did not enable any cross-case analysis, it does not provide 
precise theoretical propositions. Rather, it presents empirically grounded 
reflections and new theoretical insights.18  
 The case data was principally gathered between May 2006 and March 
2008, with some additional interviews conducted in June 2009 (see Table 1).  
Theme interviews with corporate, business area, and business unit level 
managers provided the principal source of field data. The corporate-level 
managers who were interviewed represented key corporate functions, such as 
corporate strategy, finance & control and HR, while the business area and 
business unit managers represented key business areas and horizontal 
organisations. Some of the corporate-level managers also had prior experience 
of  operating  at  a  business  area  level  and  could  therefore  also  draw  on  this  
experience.19  
 Altogether,  22  interviews  with  an  average  length  of  over  70  minutes  were  
conducted (see Appendix A). Of the 22 interviews, 18 were tape-recorded and 
transcribed.20 When tape recording was not possible, notes were taken. These 
notes were immediately transcribed after the interviews and were sent for 
validation to the interviewees. Following the inductive approach adopted, 
interviewees  were  first  approached  with  open  questions.  For  example,  
interviewees were asked to provide their views on ‘how management control 
systems are used for strategic alignment’. They were then asked more specific 
questions relating to SPMS, including the type and number of measures,  and 
the processes of defining measures and evaluating performance. Since data 
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analysis proceeded in parallel with data gathering, the researcher was able to 
pose increasingly specific questions and probe deeper into initial ideas as the 
project and the data collection progressed.  
 Interview data were complemented with relevant internal documents, such 
as planning process descriptions, performance appraisal schemes, operational 
mode specifications and documents relating to the use of performance 
measures. A variety of public documents – for example, analyst presentations, 
press releases and press articles – were also drawn upon. Finally, informal 
discussions with key informants enabled the researcher to engage in more 
general discussions regarding DynComp’s management approach and their use 
of SPMS, provided a platform for more detailed questions, and thereby made it 
possible to elaborate on initial theoretical ideas (See Appendix A). Table 1 
provides an overview of the data used in this study.  
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Type of data What included Purpose When gathered 
Theme 
interviews/ 
corporate-level 
managers 
Theme interviews with 
executives representing 
key corporate functions 
such as corporate 
planning & analysis, 
corporate strategy, 
finance & control and 
HR. Many of the 
interviewees also had 
prior business 
experience. 
To provide a multifaceted 
understanding of the use of 
SPMSs as well as the links 
between SPMSs and other 
control systems.  
Principally June to 
December 2006, two 
interviews in January 
2008 
Theme 
interviews/ 
business-level 
managers 
Theme interviews with 
business-level managers 
representing major 
business areas and 
horizontal 
organisations. 
To deepen understanding of 
the use of SPMSs and to 
probe corporate-level views.  
One interview in 
August 2006, four 
interviews  
January to March 
2008, three interviews 
in June 2009 
Internal 
documents 
DynComp planning 
process descriptions 
(two successive 
versions), performance 
appraisal process 
descriptions, 
operational mode 
specification. 
To provide an overview of 
the overall strategic planning 
process, appraisal process, 
DynComp Common 
Measures, and the principles 
and operational modes in 
general.  
June 2006 to January 
2007 
Public 
documents 
Press releases, analyst 
presentations, annual 
reports, information 
provided at DynComp’s 
home pages, academic 
and business press 
articles on DynComp. 
To provide complementary 
data about DynComp’s 
business environment, 
corporate and business 
strategy, performance, 
management approach and 
the use of SPMSs. 
May 2006 to March 
2008 
Informal 
discussions 
Informal discussions 
with key informants, 
such as representatives 
of corporate planning & 
analysis and strategic 
planning. 
To deepen the 
understanding of DynComp’s 
management approach and 
the use of SPMSs through 
general discussions, asking 
detailed questions and 
probing initial theoretical 
ideas. 
May 2006 to June 
2009 
 
Table 1. Description of data used  
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Consistent with an inductive approach, data analysis commenced during the 
data-gathering phase. The analysis involved several iterative rounds of 
reflection between data and theory, as well as the triangulation of data from 
different sources.21 An on-going research relationship with the case study 
company provided the researcher with the opportunity to test initial theoretical 
understandings with key informants during the data-gathering and analysis 
phase.  The  overall  analysis  was  also  verified  and  accepted  as  accurate  by  
multiple key informants at DynComp.  
 
 
3. Case analysis of the use of SPMS at DynComp 
 
3.1. Organisational context: an empowering management approach 
 
Like most large multinationals, DynComp operates a complex matrix 
organisation. Sitting on top of the matrix are three global business areas, each 
responsible for distinct sets of products. Each business area is given clear 
responsibility over its business strategies and operations. They also constitute 
individual key entities with responsibility for profit and loss, although some 
business areas are further divided into separate profit and loss units. The 
business areas are supported by global horizontal organisations, which hold 
group-wide responsibility: for example, for sales, marketing, purchasing and 
technological development. Some of these horizontal organisations are further 
divided into regional entities.  
 DynComp’s management approach is characterised by empowerment, 
openness and the encouragement of diverse perspectives. These principles are 
clearly expressed in the message of the chairman of the board, presented as a 
prologue to the ‘Operational Mode’ internal document:  
 
“Within DynComp, we have always focused strongly on performance, at the same 
time cultivating an atmosphere of openness and positive, energising change. We 
thrive on active discussions, where people from every part of the organisation are 
given a strong voice. Places where opinions can be expressed freely, and indeed 
challenged freely, with all voices equally valued.”  
 
The management approach also places strong emphasis on strategic dialogue. 
The strategy formation process involves an extensive group of people, and the 
strategies are extensively discussed throughout the organisation. Finance 
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director A for a major horizontal organisation explained how he had sought to 
enhance understanding of strategy in practice: 
 
“Sometimes I have been involved in the so-called DynComp café process, which 
involves  a  large  group  of  people  from  all  around  the  world.  So  I  have  sometimes  
myself been involved in innovating our strategy… If I have been not involved in that 
process, I have participated in a “strategy release event” and familiarised myself 
with  the  material  that  is  available  on  our  intranet.  We  have  quite  extensive  
strategy-related  material  on  our  intranet;  videos,  stories,  blogs  etc.  And  our  
department head also discusses the strategy with us, what it means to us.” 
 
Management training is also used to strengthen managers’ understanding of 
strategy. Training is typically organised in the context of a specific strategic 
theme. For example, if the management training is organised in the context of 
‘market retention’, managers may be asked to define product attributes that 
would enhance market retention. As management training thus typically 
requires managers to consider how a particular strategic theme could be 
deployed in practice, it enhances managers’ internalisation of strategy. As 
training is often organised along group work, managers can also share views of 
how a particular strategic theme could be deployed in practice.  
 DynComp also places a very strong emphasis on organisational values. The 
recruitment process emphasises value compatibility, values are extensively 
communicated on the company’s intranet pages, and organisational values are 
linked  to  the  way  individual-level  performance  is  evaluated.  This  strong  
emphasis  placed  on  organisational  values  is  also  reflected  in  that  the  
management approach aims to balance ‘value-based’ versus ‘fact-based’ 
management.22 The relative emphasis of the two approaches has changed over 
time. During the period of research, the emphasis had recently re-shifted 
towards ‘value-based management’, and the current aim was to place equal 
emphasis on the two approaches. 
 
3.2. Stable organisational level SPMS for performance monitoring 
 
The performance of business areas and horizontal organisations is evaluated at 
a corporate level by employing a small group of measures known as DynComp 
Common Measures. These measures are identical in each of the company’s 
three  business  areas  and have  been chosen to  include  only  elements  that  are  
truly common among these areas. Consequently, there is an emphasis on 
financial measures related to growth, profitability and productivity, although 
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strategic measures such as market share and customer satisfaction are also 
included. Many of the measures are considered to be drivers of economic value 
added (EVA) growth. Indeed, some measures, such as market share, are 
carefully followed by stock market analysts. Horizontal organisations are 
evaluated by using a more limited set of these measures, reflecting their 
specific functional roles.  
 Although the group operates in a turbulent industry, the composition of 
DynComp Common Measures tends to be stable in that they are not normally 
reviewed as part of the annual strategy process. Such revision occurs on an ‘as-
needed’  basis;  for  example,  in  relation  to  major  changes  in  strategy  or  
organisation. The stability of the DynComp Common Measures was described 
by the finance and control director of one of the business units:  
 
“Well,  if  you  think  of  this  from  the  Common  Measure  perspective,  DynComp’s  
overall operations do not change every six months… strategies are not changed all 
the  time…so  if  we  look  at  things  from  a  bird’s-eye  view,  the  view  does  not  really  
change that much…and many of the financial figures are derived directly from 
accounting, so they cannot change that much.” 
  
Although  the  composition  of  the  measures  is  not  actively  reviewed,  
performance in relation to these measures is followed intensively. As the 
corporate strategy director explained: “At this corporate-level DynComp 
Common Measures are followed very actively,  monthly,  so I  would say that 
they are perhaps the most important element by which top management gets 
an understanding of what is really going on.” The main purpose of the 
DynComp Common Measures could thus be summarised as the monitoring of 
business area and horizontal organisation performance in terms of key 
financial and strategic measures. This aims to ensure that ‘things are on track’ 
and the corporation as a whole is adding value for shareholders.  
 In  addition  to  the  DynComp  Common  Measures  that  are  followed  at  a  
corporate level, business areas and horizontal organisations also set their own 
targets; these are derived directly from their specific business strategies. 
Although the use of balanced scorecards (often referred to simply as scorecard 
at DynComp) is not forced on business areas and horizontal organisations, 
scorecards are widely used throughout the organisation. In terms of the actual 
measures used, there seems to be a tendency to emphasise financial and 
process measures, although customer and people perspectives are also 
included.23  
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 The composition of the scorecards, like that of the DynComp Common 
Measures, is not systematically reviewed as part of the annual strategy 
planning process. Business areas still tend to review their measures but do not 
change them very often because they capture such fundamental dimensions of 
performance. The business development and strategy projects director for R&D 
at a business area explained:  
 
“These scorecard elements that are included …they are based on such high-level 
principles that they might not change if we set an objective A or B, that is strategy A 
or B…So the measures and their underlying logic may stay the same.”  
 
3.3. Flexible individual-level SPMS for dynamic strategic alignment 
 
An individual-level SPMS, referred to as ‘the performance appraisal process’, is 
used for enhancing dynamic strategic alignment at DynComp.24 In practice, 
strategic alignment is enhanced by transforming strategic objectives into action 
plans, which are then translated into individual action-oriented targets.  
 
“Actually, strategic objectives need to be transformed into action plans. So for every 
strategic  objective  you  need  to  establish  an  action  plan  that  defines  the  way  by  
which you intend to reach the objective… of  course that  link works in some cases 
and  in  some  cases  not  as  well,  but  anyway  we  aim  at  that…”  (corporate strategy 
director).  
 
‘By  that  [performance  appraisal  process]  individuals  get  action  points  for  the  
following six-month period – which are derived from specific strategies. The action 
points follow a strategy implementation plan that is developed during the strategy 
generation phase.’ (marketing planning director for the largest business area)  
 
These action-oriented strategic targets are often defined in a qualitative form. 
Managers are still requested to set a priori minimum, maximum and target 
values for the measures (see Table 2 for examples).  
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Example of a qualitatively 
defined strategic target 
 
Example of a quantitatively 
defined strategic target 
   
Minimum Drafting new credit policy 
documentation in cooperation 
with all business areas. 
To develop one new business 
case.  
On target Finalising the new credit 
policy documentation so that it 
has been approved by all 
business areas and relevant 
organisational bodies. 
To develop three new business 
cases. 
Maximum Implementing the new credit 
policy so that there is evidence 
of successful cases where the 
new credit policy has been 
implemented in practice. 
To develop five new business 
cases. 
 
Table 2. Action-oriented strategic targets: example of a qualitatively and quantitatively defined 
target 
 
In addition to the action-oriented strategic targets, the performance appraisal 
plans typically also include operational and scorecard-related, mainly financial 
targets.25 The link between the organisational and individual-level SPMSs is 
hence enhanced by cascading key scorecard targets down to the performance 
appraisal plans. These scorecard-related targets tend to form a firm part of the 
performance appraisal plans for individuals in line management positions. 
Managers throughout the organisation have otherwise considerable freedom to 
determine the most appropriate targets to be included in their subordinates’ 
performance appraisal plans.26 As the performance appraisal process aims to 
focus individuals’ attention on the strategically and tactically most significant 
and timely issues, the number of bonus-related individual-level targets is 
limited to six. A global process tool is used to ensure that the global guidelines 
in relation to the number of measures are also followed in practice. As limiting 
the number of individual-level targets to only six is sometimes challenging, 
managers are also allowed to set a maximum of three other targets that do not 
have influence on the bonuses.  
 This room for manoeuvre makes the performance appraisal process a very 
effective and flexible mechanism for strategic alignment. The corporate 
planning & analysis director explained:  
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“At that [individual level] you can combine financial targets, quantitative targets, 
more value-driven type of targets and very qualitative targets. There is a lot of 
room  for  variety.  It  combines  them  and  links  them  to  concrete  strategy  
implementation. That is why I think it is very important.”  
 
This flexibility also makes the performance appraisal process an effective 
mechanism for local adaptation.27 The same director continued:  
 
“Both strategic targets and tactical focus areas may vary by location…since we 
have the flexibility and we have no built-in pressure for these to be exactly the same 
for example by country. Of course it pays off to take advantage of it.”  
 
Subordinates are actively involved in defining their own targets. Targets are 
typically defined in the bi-annual face-to-face meetings between managers and 
subordinates. Involving subordinates in the definition of their own targets 
enhances strategic dialogue and also enables managers and subordinates to 
form shared views of these targets.28 But discussion about the measures is not 
limited to the bi-annual meetings in which subordinates’ individual targets are 
defined.  As  strategic  targets  are  action-oriented  and  often  defined  in  a  
qualitative form, embedding discussion about these targets into the on-going 
interaction between managers and subordinates follows logically, in a natural 
way. A former senior manager for a business area recounted:  
 
“I  think that  integrating strategic  targets  to the individual-level  target-setting is  a 
very good control approach, as it enhances strategic dialogue. These issues are 
discussed constantly. I myself tended to discuss these targets with my boss and my 
subordinates on a monthly basis. I always had a feeling that when we then, every 
six months, sat down to evaluate performance, I already knew beforehand what my 
own and my subordinates’ evaluation would be like. This discussion was genuine, 
on-going management.”  
 
Finance director A for a major horizontal organisation commented on her part:  
 
“We  are  constantly  in  contact  with  our  subordinates…  And  I  would  assume  that  
everyone follows his or her targets constantly. I for example have a habit of going 
through  my  targets  a  few  times  during  every  six-month  period.  I  focus  on  the  
actions that we have agreed upon.”  
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As decision-making on measures is largely delegated to individual manager 
level,  it  is  generally  a  swift  process.  The  only  precondition  is  that  a  manager  
and his/her subordinate agree on the measures. The flexibility of the system – 
by allowing for the incorporation of action-oriented targets – also facilitates 
frequent modifications to the measures in practice. As these measures focus on 
specifying the real actions that are expected of individuals during the following 
six-month period, they can be effectively managed at a manager level, without 
having to accommodate any wider implications for the company’s information 
systems. In practice, the action-oriented strategic targets and operational 
targets tend to change frequently, while the financial and other scorecard-
related measures are more stable. As individuals are often held accountable for 
issues for which they do not have full control, these frequent modifications 
tend to reflect managers’ intentions to focus attention, rather than a drive to 
refine individuals’ accountabilities.29  
 Thus, the performance appraisal process provides managers with a very 
adaptable and flexible mechanism for strategic alignment. As the performance 
appraisal process also fosters on-going strategic dialogue throughout the 
organisation, it also contributes to DynComp’s capability for making strategy 
revisions in a timely fashion. 
 
3.4. Enhancing strategic alignment with corporate-wide strategic focus 
areas 
 
At the time our research for this paper was conducted, the performance 
appraisal  process  had  recently  been  modified,  thereby  permitting  top  
management to determine strategic focus areas which can then be reflected in 
individuals’ performance appraisal plans.30 This process enables top 
management to exert influence on individual-level target-setting, while 
primary responsibility for measures remains at individual manager level. These 
strategic focus areas are considered to be an important mechanism for 
enhancing strategic alignment, and for focusing attention on the strategically 
and tactically most significant and timely issues. As top management is able to 
change strategic focus areas frequently, these focus areas also build dynamism 
into SPMSs. According to the corporate planning & analysis director: “It is the 
machine with which we make strategic changes and with which we can also 
focus on tactically most important issues.” As these strategic focus areas are 
often defined on a rather abstract level, they entail local interpretations of their 
individual-level implications. Finance director B commented:  
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“Well,  strategic  focus areas are very much given.  Then it  is  pretty much up to the 
manager to define how they are reflected…When we get a focus area, say Sox 
compliance,  then  I  as  a  superior  try  to  communicate  the  theme  so  that  my  
subordinates  can  identify  issues  that  contribute  to  the  theme  and  which  they  can  
influence with their own work...”  
 
Finding  a  link  between  an  abstract  group-wide  strategic  focus  area  and  
individual-level  strategic  targets  can  sometimes  be  challenging.  Finance  
Director B continued:  
 
“But to what extent individuals feel that they can influence the outcome...It depends 
very  much  on  what  level  in  the  organisation  an  individual  is  working,  if  they  are  
given a very comprehensive target and they operate in a very limited area, then 
they may feel that they cannot influence the target with their own actions.”  
 
3.5. Enhancing cooperation by evaluating individuals’ values-related 
behaviour 
 
DynComp has also developed a process through which top management aims 
to influence the way in which individuals seek to reach their individual targets. 
This process, referred to as ‘the overall performance evaluation process’, runs 
in parallel with the bi-annual performance appraisal process. While the 
performance appraisal process focuses on setting individual level targets and 
monitoring  performance  in  relation  to  the  set  targets,  the  annual  overall  
performance evaluation process extends evaluation to also encompass the 
extent to which targets have been sought in accordance with organisational 
values – thus paying attention both to what has been achieved (referred to as 
the ‘what’ in the evaluation), and how these results have been achieved 
(referred to as the ‘how’ in the evaluation). 
 Where the bi-annual performance appraisal process is linked to monetary 
bonuses (in a way that allows non-trivial subjectivity – more on this below), the 
annual evaluation has broader implications. It is related to merit increases, 
rises in base salary and opportunities to attend expensive training and equity 
programmes. Reflecting the re-emphasis on ‘value-based management’ at 
DynComp, the guidelines for weighting the ‘what’  and the ‘how’ in the overall  
performance evaluation changed shortly before the period of research, from the 
previous 60/40 (what/how) to the current equal weighting.31 
 With the overall performance evaluation process, the organisation seeks to 
mitigate some of the potential dysfunctional consequences often associated 
with linking rewards to performance measurement.32 As individuals are often 
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kept accountable for issues for which they do not have full control, particular 
emphasis is placed on enhancing cooperation between individuals.33 The senior 
development manager from business improvement services explained:  
 
“This approach enhances cooperation and the achievement of targets in practice…if 
you measured only cold figures that are easier to measure, you could undermine 
cooperation and create short cuts that would be detrimental for the ability to 
perform in the long-term.” 
 
The research interviews with business unit level managers provide 
corroborating evidence that the system is working. The strategy and portfolio 
manager for one of the sales categories explained:  
 
“We evaluate both what you reach and how you reach that.  The how part  is  also 
important there. If you try relentlessly to push your own issues through, without 
paying attention to others, it is not in accordance with company values. And it will 
be taken into account in the evaluation. It [evaluating the how] is an essential part 
of the overall evaluation.”  
 
The evaluation of the ‘how’ is facilitated in practice by providing detailed 
descriptions of values-related behaviours. The cost management and business 
control manager explained:  
 
“We are given clear documentation for that…the PowerPoint presentation provides 
clear examples of what is “exceptional”, “on target” and “improvement required” 
level  behaviour in relation to each value.  I  have found the guidance helpful  when 
discussing  this  with  my  team  members.  It  enables  them  to  clearly  see  what  is  
generally  expected  and  it  helps  me  to  explain  what  exceptional  behaviour  is,  for  
example.” 
 
There are also slightly modified versions of the descriptions available for 
managers in order to take into account their leadership role.34   
 
Although  these  detailed  descriptions  aim  to  provide  objectivity  to  the  
evaluation, the evaluation of individuals’ values-related behaviour is still 
inherently subjective. As managers are not obliged to use these descriptions, 
and sometimes are not even aware of their existence, these descriptions are not 
always  followed  in  practice.  The  finance  &  control  director  for  one  of  the  
business units commented:  
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“Yes, I do take values into consideration in performance evaluation. But it is 
subjective…everyone has his/her own values and they are more or less in line with 
organisational values…I follow no particular format where I could tick that this 
went well and this did not go well.” 
 
As  with  the  strategic  focus  areas,  the  evaluation  of  values-related  behaviour  
also entails making local interpretations of centrally defined abstract 
constructs. The business development & strategy projects director for R&D at a 
business area remarked:  
 
“Evaluation of individuals’ values-related behaviour does include subjectivity. It 
requires in a way an interpretation of how that person can contribute to that value. 
In  practice  a  superior  and  subordinate  discuss  together  how,  and  with  what  
operation models and action points, an individual could contribute to that value.”  
 
The evaluation of values-related behaviour is also rather sensitive, and based 
very much on a manager’s subjective judgement:  
 
“If I think of my own managerial work, we have gone through this point by point. 
But this is often a rather sensitive topic. At the end it would be very hard for anyone 
to work here unless he had internalised our company values. So these values are 
quite difficult to evaluate. In principal, if a manager wanted, he could categorise 
individuals either as that they have behaved in accordance with company values, or 
that they have not. So it depends very much on the discussion between a manager 
and his subordinate.” (Finance director B)  
 
As managers  are  only  advised  to  apply  the  recommended equal  weighting  on  
the ‘what’ and the ‘how’, the weighting of these two elements also introduces 
subjectivity in practice. Overall, the evaluation of values-related behaviour 
provides managers with leverage for subjective judgement. Finance director B 
concluded:  
 
“I think these values provide managers with a subjective element in the evaluation. 
They  can  always  refer  to  that  if  all  quantitative  targets  have  been  reached.  It  
provides managers with some leverage.” 
 
3.6. Enabling subjectivity by strengthening procedural justice in the 
performance evaluation and reward process 
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Overall, the performance evaluation and reward process is hence quite 
subjective at DynComp. In addition to the subjectivity arising from the 
interpretation of centrally defined abstract constructs – strategic focus areas 
and organisational values – managers are permitted substantial subjectivity in 
evaluating their subordinates’ performance. This enables managers to take into 
account changes in the external and internal contexts. The business 
development & strategy projects director for R&D explained this:  
 
“You  can  in  practice  either  modify  your  target-setting  or  be  flexible  in  the  
evaluation.  In  principle,  you  can  make  changes  to  the  target-setting  during  the  
whole six-month period. Of course you need to have a good reason for that, not only 
that the targets could not have been reached. On the other hand, you may also be 
flexible in the evaluation…for example now, in this changed market situation, we 
were given guidance to take that into account when we evaluate to what extent our 
subordinates have reached their targets.” 
 
Finance director B commented for her part:  
 
“Well  yes,  we  have  had  particular  review  points…if  we  think  of  for  example  the  
spring period; we have tended to review the targets in March…whether there really 
has been a need to revise targets has been very much up to the manager and his/her 
subordinate  to  decide…Personally  I  have  modified  the  targets  a  few  times,  due  to  
organisational changes.” 
 
As the performance evaluation and reward process includes this level of 
subjectivity, it is essential to enhance the fairness of the process.35 Several 
features of DynComp’s approach appear to contribute to procedural justice. 
Individuals are strongly and genuinely involved in the definition of their own 
targets.  Managers  seek  to  be  well-informed  about  their  subordinates’  
performance by gathering information from different sources. “We gather 
feedback from people with whom a subordinate works – from his colleagues, 
subordinates and other superiors – feedback on how he operates in practice” 
(business development & strategy projects director for R&D). Rooting 
discussion on measures in the on-going interaction between managers and 
subordinates further contributes to managers’ understanding of their 
subordinates’ performance. This is essential as individuals are often assigned 
qualitative action-oriented strategic targets which entail exercising managerial 
judgement in the evaluation. Anchoring dialogue on measures in the ongoing 
discussion also enables managers to be better informed about a potential need 
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to modify target-setting, or to be flexible in evaluating performance. Managers 
also pay attention to developing trust within the manager-subordinate 
relationships.  
 
“Subjectivity presumes that there is trust and security in the relationship between 
the manager and the subordinate. There cannot be any feelings of distrust…I think 
it  is  simply  that  you  as  a  manager  try  to  be  as  righteous  and  fair  as  possible.”  
(Former senior manager for a business area)  
 
The organisation has also developed processes and systems that force 
managers to make at least part of their subjectivity explicit. Finance director A 
explained:  
 
“We provide everyone also with written feedback; what you have achieved, what 
has been good in your work, where you could still improve. This written feedback is 
provided also about whether and how an individual has behaved in accordance 
with the company values.” 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the individual-level SPMS requires managers to 
define a priori minimum, maximum and target levels also encourages them to 
make their potential subsequent modifications explicit.  
 In addition, the performance evaluation and reward process seem to be 
oriented more towards enhancing personal development than toward enforcing 
strict  accountability.  If  an  individual  fails  to  reach  his/her  targets,  a  personal  
‘development plan’ is developed to guide development. As a result individuals 
do not feel  threatened by the process and can better accept the fact that their 
evaluations are to a large extent subjective.   
 Finally,  procedural  justice  is  also  enhanced  by  cultivating  relevant  
managerial capabilities. As individual-level target-setting and performance 
evaluation require managers to make local interpretations of the individual-
level implications of strategic focus areas and corporate values, DynComp’s 
overall management style and management training seek to ensure solid and 
pervasive manager understanding of these elements.  
 
3.7. The overall SPMS constructed from stable and dynamic elements 
 
As the previous discussion illustrates, DynComp’s overall SPMS is composed of 
stable  and  more  dynamic  elements.  These  are  linked  primarily  by  cascading  
key targets and measures from the DynComp Common Measures down to the 
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scorecards, and on to the individual-level SPMS. While the organisational-level 
SPMS, the DynComp Common Measures and the scorecards tend to focus on 
stable, more fundamental issues and are oriented towards performance 
monitoring, the individual-level SPMS – the performance appraisal process – 
is used as a flexible and dynamic mechanism for strategic alignment. It also 
fosters strategic dialogue, and strengthens DynComp’s capability to make 
timely strategy revisions. While the scorecard-related measures tend to remain 
stable, other parts of the individual-level SPMS – the strategic and operational 
targets – tend to change frequently. Table 3 presents a synthesis of the 
corporate, business and individual level SPMSs at DynComp. 
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Level/ 
system 
 
Functional 
organisation 
responsible 
for the system 
Type of 
measures  
How often 
measures 
reviewed 
Purpose 
Corporate 
level/ 
DynComp 
Common 
Measures 
 
Finance & 
control 
Common measures 
related to e.g. 
growth, 
profitability, 
productivity, 
customer 
satisfaction and 
market share. 
Emphasis on 
financial measures. 
Stable. Reviewed 
on an as-needed 
basis. 
To monitor 
business area 
and horizontal 
organisation 
performance in 
relation to key 
financial and 
strategic 
measures in 
order to 
enhance that the 
corporation as a 
whole is adding 
value to 
shareholders. 
Business area 
level/ 
Scorecard 
 
Finance & 
control 
DynComp Common 
Measures as well as 
business area 
specific measures 
defined at business 
area level. Emphasis 
on financial and 
process measures; 
measures related to 
customer and 
people perspectives 
also included.   
Fairly stable. 
Business area’s 
own discretion.  
To monitor 
performance in 
relation to key 
financial and 
non-financial 
measures. 
Individual 
level/  
‘performance 
appraisal 
process’;  
linked also to 
annual 
‘overall 
performance 
evaluation’  
HR Typically a mixture 
of strategic targets, 
operational targets 
and scorecard-
related, mainly 
financial measures. 
Strategic targets 
and operational 
targets often action-
oriented in nature 
(with pre-defined 
maximum, 
minimum and 
target values).  
Every six months. 
(More frequently 
if needed due to 
changes in 
external or 
internal factors.) 
To enhance 
dynamic 
strategic 
alignment, 
foster strategic 
dialogue, and 
enable timely 
strategy 
revisions. 
 
Table 3. Synthesis of corporate, business and individual level SPMS at DynComp 
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In Figure 1 on the following page, the interplay between corporate, business 
and individual-level SPMSs at DynComp is described. The corporate-level 
SPMS – the DynComp Common Measures – is used to set targets for business-
level SPMSs by defining key measures and their target levels. The business-
level SPMS – the scorecard – provides input to the annual business-level 
strategic action planning. As the composition of business-level SPMS is not 
expected to be reviewed within the annual strategy process, the link of strategic 
action planning to the definition of business-level SPMS measures is not 
always strong. Finally, both business-level SPMS and business-level strategic 
action  planning  provides  input  to  the  individual-level  SPMS  –  the  business-
level SPMS by cascading key, mainly financial, targets, and the strategic action 
planning by providing input to defining strategic action-oriented targets.  
 Clearly, an individual-level SPMS is used as a central and dynamic lever to 
ensure  strategic  alignment.  The  fact  that  it  is  linked  not  only  to  the  
organisational-level SPMS by cascading down key targets and measures, but 
also to several other key alignment processes, reflects the central role of the 
system. Perhaps the most significant link is from strategic action planning to 
the individual-level SPMS. Through this mechanism, strategic action plans are 
translated into action-oriented strategic targets. By defining corporate-wide 
strategic focus areas, top management is able to enhance strategic alignment 
while primary responsibility for measures remains at the individual manager’s 
level. Finally, by coupling organisational values to the individual-level SPMS, 
top  management  aims  to  enhance  cooperation  and  to  influence  the  way  
individuals seek to reach their individual targets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interplay between corporate, business and individual level SPMSs at DynComp 
Corporate
Business area &/or 
Business unit
Individual
SPMS Strategic focus areas
Organisational 
values
SPMS
Strategic 
action 
planning
Individual level SPMS
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The overall SPMS aims to enhance strategy alignment, while simultaneously 
allowing for sufficient dynamism and flexibility to cope with the dynamic 
business environment. By triggering strategic dialogue, it also contributes to 
the organisation’s capability for timely strategy revisions. The business 
development & strategy projects director for R&D at a business area 
commented:  
 
“It [the overall SPMS] clearly reflects our objective to be simultaneously very 
profitable,  to  systematically  build  forward,  and  as  we  know  that  we  operate  in  a  
very  dynamic  business  environment,  to  be  sufficiently  fast  in  order  to  respond  to  
changes.  In a way this  system enables us to achieve this… It  works well  and it  is  
after all a sufficiently light system. It can be implemented even in an organisation 
of this size and facing such a complex business environment.” 
 
The fact that DynComp operates in a dynamic industry is generally viewed by 
managers as amplifying the need for flexibility in the system.  
 
“It [operating in a dynamic industry] is likely to increase the importance of 
flexibility  in  the  system.  A  dynamic  business  environment  increases  demands  for  
strategic agility. If the business environment was very stable, I believe there would 
be fewer needs for country and business unit-specific differences or for flexibility in 
the target-setting at an individual level.” (Director, corporate planning & analysis)  
 
Another key informant commented: “Well, it [operating in a dynamic business 
environment]  is  likely  to  increase  the  need  for  variety  and  flexibility  [in  the  
overall SPMS system].” (a business unit level finance and control director) 
 
The  coupling  of  organisational  values  to  the  individual-level  SPMS  is  also  
perceived as influenced by operating in such an environment. The corporate 
planning and analysis director further commented:  
 
“I also believe that if the business environment was very stable, the coupling of 
organisational values to performance measurement would be of less 
importance...because in a dynamic industry you cannot determine clearly 
beforehand how things will go. When there is more uncertainty, individuals have to 
be able to act in accordance with a specific value framework, even in unforeseeable 
situations.” 
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According to the director responsible for performance management, 
organisational values also contribute to providing stability to the overall 
system.  
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The in-depth examination of the use of SPMSs at DynComp suggests that 
building substantial dynamism into SPMSs and using such flexible and 
adaptive systems for strategic alignment may require companies to seek a 
balance between empowerment and alignment.36 Seeking such a balance may 
not, however, necessarily entail any significant trade-off between these two 
elements. The DynComp case illustrates that a combination of complementary 
management practices may allow companies to achieve both high 
empowerment and high alignment. The case analysis suggests that these 
management practices differ considerably from those prevalent for more stable 
SPMSs. The analysis offers a number of implications for academics as well as 
practitioners. 
 First, the case analysis suggests that building substantial dynamism into 
SPMSs may require companies to adopt more empowering approaches than 
suggested by the prior literature on dynamic SPMSs. Previous studies have 
proposed  that  dynamism  can  be  built  into  SPMSs  by  establishing  review  
processes  and  audit  tools  that  enable  managers  to  monitor  whether  the  
measures remain relevant in the light of external and internal developments.37 
The evidence presented here indicates that such approaches may not provide 
sufficient flexibility or adaptability for companies that need to retain the 
capability to make frequent modifications to their measures. In these kinds of 
companies, it may be more effective to place the emphasis on individual-level 
SPMSs and to engage managers throughout the organisation to take primary 
responsibility for the relevance of measures. This can provide an effective 
approach for mobilising local knowledge in relation to the most significant and 
timely  issues,  and  result  in  the  definition  of  more  valid,  reliable  and  
understandable measures.38 The evidence presented here indicates that it can 
also foster on-going strategic dialogue, and strengthen the organisation’s 
capability to make timely strategy revisions.  
  Further,  the  analysis  suggests  that  the  capacity  to  be  receptive  to  the  
incorporation of action-oriented strategic targets – that may often be defined 
in a qualitative form - may be a central feature of an empowering approach 
when it comes to building dynamism into SPMSs. It may be essential both for 
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anchoring the dialogue on strategic measures in the on-going discussion 
between  managers  and  subordinates,  and  for  enabling  managers  to  make  
modifications to their subordinates’ measures without having to take into 
account the cumbersome implications of these changes for the company’s 
information systems. The inclusion of action-oriented strategic targets may 
also provide an effective mechanism for enhancing strategic alignment, as such 
targets may be derived directly from strategic action plans. The SPMS 
literature generally suggests that individual-level strategic targets should 
preferably be quantitative in nature. The analysis indicates that in developing 
flexibility into individual-level SPMSs, it may be essential to allow for the 
incorporation of action-oriented, potentially qualitative strategic targets, in 
order to enhance the dynamism of SPMSs.39 
 Furthermore, the analysis suggests that permitting only a limited number 
of individual-level targets may also be central to such an empowering approach 
to building dynamism into SPMS. This may focus attention more effectively on 
significant and timely issues than does the more standard practice that permits 
up to 25 individual level targets.40 Permitting only a small number of individual 
level targets may also enable frequent modifications, as it may prevent 
confusion, and make it easier for individuals to reorientate to the changing sets 
of measures.  
 In addition, the analysis suggests that in order for companies to be able to 
rely on an empowering SPMS for strategic alignment, they may need to 
establish alignment processes that provide top management with indirect 
influence at the individual level. These alignment processes – such as the 
corporate-wide strategic focus areas and the evaluation of individuals’ values-
related behaviour, illustrated in this paper – may enable top management to 
influence individual-level target-setting and behaviour, while  primary 
responsibility for target-setting and performance evaluation remains at the 
level  of  an  individual  manager.  The  SPMS literature  has  tended to  regard  the  
alignment of individual-level strategic targets as a rather straightforward 
process - entailing the cascading of key financial and non-financial targets 
through organisational-level SPMSs to the individual level.41 The analysis 
indicates that if primary responsibility for measures is located at the level of an 
individual manager, additional, more indirect alignment processes may be 
needed to ensure that individual-level measures and behaviour are in line with 
the company’s strategic priorities.  
 Further, the analysis indicates that allowing considerable subjectivity in the 
performance  evaluation  and  reward  process  may  be  central  to  building  and  
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using dynamic SPMSs, and to achieving a balance between empowerment and 
alignment.  The  evidence  presented  here  indicates  that  the  use  of  indirect  
alignment processes is likely to introduce subjectivity into performance 
evaluation and reward processes. As these kinds of alignment processes aim to 
influence individual-level target-setting and behaviour while locating primary 
responsibility for target-setting and performance evaluation at an individual 
manager’s level, they entail local interpretation of their individual-level 
implications. The use of these alignment processes may also entail evaluating 
performance on qualitatively defined performance dimensions – such as the 
implementation of strategic actions or behaviour in accordance with company 
values – the evaluation of which is inherently subjective, in spite of attempts to 
increase  objectivity  by,  for  example,  providing  detailed  guidance  on  how  
values-related behaviour could be evaluated in practice. Room for subjective 
judgement may also be essential to allow managers to take into account 
external and internal events when evaluating their subordinates’ performance. 
Whereas the SPMS and management control literature generally highlights the 
negative consequences of subjectivity – bias, favouritism and loss of motivation 
–  this  analysis  indicates  that  subjectivity  may  be  an  essential  feature  of  a  
dynamic SPMS. It may be essential both for empowering individual managers 
to take primary responsibility for strategic measures, and for providing 
managers with sufficient leverage to account for changes in the external and 
internal contexts.42  
 Finally, the analysis suggests that in order to allow considerable subjectivity 
in the performance evaluation and reward process, companies may need to 
develop systems, processes and capabilities that strengthen procedural justice 
in the process. As prior literature on subjective performance measurement has 
tended to focus on the determinants and consequences of subjectivity, prior 
studies  have  presented  only  very  limited  empirical  evidence  as  to  which  
procedural features may enable a productive use of subjectivity in performance 
evaluation.43 The conceptual management accounting and performance 
measurement literature has suggested that a superior’s trustworthiness and 
ability to be well-informed about his/her subordinates’ performance may be 
essential conditions for strengthening procedural justice, and for avoiding the 
typical dysfunctions of subjectivity.44 This literature also argues that 
embedding discussion on performance measures in the on-going interaction 
between  managers  and  subordinates  may  be  an  essential  enabler  for  
subjectivity, by helping managers to develop a thorough understanding of their 
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subordinates’  performance  and  the  contexts  within  which  they  seek  to  reach  
their targets.45  
 The DynComp case provides empirical evidence for these arguments. It 
illustrates that rooting dialogue about measures within everyday management 
may indeed be an important enabler of subjectivity, as it strengthens managers’ 
understanding about their subordinates’ performance, and enables managers 
and subordinates  to  develop  shared  views  of  these  measures  –  particularly  if  
subordinates are involved in the definition of their own targets. The analysis 
suggests that embedding discussion on measures in the on-going interaction 
may  be  particularly  important  when some of  the  dimensions  being  measured  
are qualitative in nature, and when managers need to be well-informed about a 
potential need to modify target-setting or to be flexible in evaluating 
performance. The DynComp study suggests further that the introduction of 
subjectivity into performance evaluation may also drive managers to seek 
information from different parts of the organisation, in order to be better 
informed when making judgements about their subordinates’ performance. 
The DynComp case also provides evidence for that building trust in the 
superior-subordinate relationship is essential for enabling a productive use of 
subjectivity in performance evaluation.46 
  Other procedural features may also be essential for enabling subjectivity. 
The evidence presented here indicates that the adoption of performance 
measurement and reward processes geared to personal development, rather 
than strictly accountability-oriented, –may also be an essential enabler of 
subjectivity. Such processes may enhance subordinates’ acceptance of 
subjectivity, as they do not feel threatened by the consequences. The analysis 
suggests, as well, that the establishment of processes and systems that force 
managers to make at least part of  their subjectivity explicit  may also enhance 
that subjectivity, in that they will increase transparency in the evaluation and 
strengthen  subordinates’  capability  to  react  to  subjective,  potentially  
undesirable,  evaluations.  As  a  final  point,  the  analysis  also  indicates  that  the  
cultivation of relevant managerial capabilities may also be needed to enable a 
productive use of subjectivity in performance evaluation. This may be 
particularly important when individual-level target-setting and performance 
evaluation rely on managers’ interpretations of abstract, centrally defined 
constructs – such as corporate-wide strategic focus areas and corporate values.  
 Table 4 on the following page compares the management practices found at 
DynComp and those generally suggested by the SPMS and management 
control literature. It suggests that building substantial dynamism into SPMSs 
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and  using  such  flexible  and  adaptive  SPMSs  for  strategic  alignment  requires  
companies to adopt management practices that differ significantly from those 
suggested by the prior literature. The analysis suggests that a combination of 
these identified management practices may be needed to achieve a balance 
between empowerment and alignment. 
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The approach found  
at DynComp 
 
The approach generally 
suggested by the SPMS 
and management control 
literature 
Approach to building 
dynamism into SPMS 
 Placing emphasis on individual level 
SPMS 
 Engaging managers throughout the 
organisation to take central 
responsibility for the relevance of 
measures 
 Establishing periodic 
review processes to the 
organisational level SPMS  
 Using formal audit tools to 
assist in the review 
process47 
Type of individual level 
strategic targets 
 Action-oriented, often qualitatively 
defined measures 
 Quantitatively defined 
measures48 
Number of individual 
level targets 
 Limited, up to 6 measures  Large, up to 25 measures49 
Approach to exerting 
top management 
influence on individual 
level target setting 
 Cascading key, mainly financial 
measures through organisational 
level SPMS  
 Establishing additional alignment 
processes that provide top 
management with indirect influence 
on individual-level target-setting 
and behaviour  
 Cascading key financial 
and non-financial 
measures through 
organisational level SPMS50 
Type of performance 
evaluation and reward 
process 
 Performance evaluation and reward 
process permits substantial 
subjectivity 
 Performance evaluation 
and reward process aims at 
objectivity51 
Approach to  
strengthening 
procedural justice in 
the performance 
evaluation and reward 
process 
 Building trust in the superior-
subordinate relationship 
 Seeking to be well-informed about 
subordinates’ actions and 
performance 
 Embedding discussion about 
measures to the on-going 
interaction between a manager and 
a subordinate 
 Developing a personal development-
oriented performance evaluation 
and reward process  
 Establishing processes and systems 
to make subjectivity explicit  
 Cultivating relevant managerial 
capabilities 
 Building trust in the 
superior-subordinate 
relationship52 
 Seeking to be well-
informed about 
subordinates’ actions and 
performance53 
 Embedding discussion 
about measures to the on-
going interaction between a 
manager and a 
subordinate54 
 
Table  4.  Comparison of the approach found at DynComp and that generally suggested by the 
SPMS and management control literature 
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Further research could continue to develop a more fine-grained understanding 
of  how  companies  seek  a  balance  between  empowerment  and  alignment  in  
building and using dynamic SPMSs. The analysis indicates that a combination 
of management practices related to, inter alia, the location of the decision-
making authority on measures, the type and number of performance measures 
permitted,  the  type  of  processes  for  strategic  alignment,  and  the  type  of  
performance evaluation and reward processes applied may be essential for 
enhancing such a balance. Further studies could investigate what other 
combinations of management practices may enable companies to achieve this 
kind of balance. 
 Further research could also seek to shed more light on the role of 
subjectivity in contemporary organisations. This study suggests that we may 
have to re-evaluate our current understanding of how companies mobilise 
SPMSs.  In  the  light  of  the  empirical  observations,  is  it  conceivable  that  
organisations operating in turbulent industries may be particularly prone to 
turn away from an overreliance on formal quantified strategic 
measurements?55 For more than a decade, quantitative strategic measurements 
have been advanced as critical elements for a successful strategic alignment. 
The analysis indicates that subjectivity may reintroduce itself into strategic 
evaluation. 
 This study has also implications for the strategic planning literature that 
has formed a central dimension of this journal. It provides further evidence 
that governance channels may facilitate sharing responsibility for strategic 
planning between corporate executives and middle-level managers.56 It 
suggests that these channels may facilitate the integration of corporate and 
local level strategic dialogues, and that corporate-level guiding principles – 
such as strategic focus areas and organisational values – may provide a means 
for  such  integration.  Previous  studies  have  found that  CEOs may  use  guiding  
principles, such as value creation and justice, to guide their strategic decision 
making.57 This study indicates that such principles may also be developed on a 
corporate level, and that training and on-going discussion on these principles 
may be used to improve their internationalisation by individual managers. 
Further  studies  could  seek  to  shed  more  light  on  how  such  corporate-level  
principles may be transposed to individual managers. This study also indicates 
that  governance  channels  may  foster  strategic  dialogue  throughout  the  
organisation, and help to engage those organisational actors that may 
otherwise lie outside the strategic core.58 Further investigations could tell us 
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more about how governance channels may be used to bring more peripheral 
actors closer to the strategic core.  
 As  this  study  is  based  on  an  in-depth  case  study  in  a  single  organisation,  
further qualitative research should also be conducted in order to enrich the 
suggested theoretical perspectives, providing a larger empirical base for the 
development of theoretical propositions that may later be tested. The 
empowering approach demonstrated here may be challenging. It requires the 
adoption  of  management  practices  that  differ  considerably  from  those  
prevalent for more stable SPMSs. Such an approach may be particularly 
suitable for companies which operate in turbulent industries, as they need to 
build the capability for making frequent modifications to their performance 
measures. Such an empowering and flexible approach may also be particularly 
suitable for multinational companies (MNCs) which need to build flexibility 
into their SPMSs in order to allow for local adaptation of their measures. 
Companies operating in stable industries, and with a less multinational 
orientation, may find less empowering approaches for building dynamism into 
SPMS to be more appropriate.59  
 Earlier studies have also indicated that several other contextual factors, 
such as size,  the country of  origin and the type of business strategy may have 
an influence on the development and use of SPMSs.60 Further studies could 
hence also attempt to include companies of different size, country of origin and 
business strategy.  Finally,  because this study is  limited by an exploration in a 
single empirical context, where the emphasis is placed on top management 
views, more comprehensive organisational investigations, for example 
exploring how SPMSs are mobilised on several organisational levels, may be 
needed.  
 With  regard  to  implications  for  practice,  the  analysis  highlights  the  
complexity and challenge of building and using dynamic SPMSs (Please see 
Figure 2 on the following page). The analysis indicates that building substantial 
dynamism into SPMSs may necessitate a significant change in the management 
approach, shifting primary responsibility for the measures to the managers 
throughout the organisation. It may also entail placing the emphasis on 
individual-level SPMSs, and using the organisational-level SPMSs, such as the 
Balanced Scorecard, in a more management-by-exception type of role – for 
monitoring performance on fundamental issues that remain relevant over time. 
Further, the creation of dynamic SPMSs may involve developing such flexibility 
into the individual-level SPMS that it allows for the incorporation of action-
oriented, qualitative measures; permitting only a small number of individual-
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level targets; and establishing several alignment processes that give top 
management indirect influence on individual-level target-setting and behavior. 
As a final point, it may also mean allowing for considerable subjectivity in 
target-setting and performance evaluation, and developing processes, systems 
and capabilities that help ensure the performance evaluation and reward 
process is perceived as fair by employees. This analysis suggests that a 
combination of these management practices may be needed to achieve a 
balance between empowerment and alignment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Implications for managers: lessons from the DynComp case 
 
 
 
1. Engage managers throughout the organisation to take central 
responsibility for the relevance of measures. 
2. Use individual level SPMS as a dynamic lever for strategic 
alignment. Use organisational level SPMS for monitoring 
performance on fundamental issues that remain relevant over time. 
3. Develop such flexibility into the individual level SPMS that it allows 
for the incorporation of action-oriented strategic measures. 
4. Establish alignment processes that provide top management with 
indirect influence on individual level target setting and performance 
evaluation while retaining central responsibility at the level of an 
individual manager.  
5. Provide managers with sufficient leverage in the performance 
evaluation to account for changes in the external and internal 
contexts. 
6. Develop processes, systems and capabilities that contribute to the 
performance evaluation process being perceived as fair by 
employees. 
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Appendix A: Interviews and informal discussions 
 
INTERVIEWS    
    
With Whom Level Date Duration  
(min) 
    
Corporate planning & analysis 
director,  
former strategic planning director for 
the largest business area 
corporate 21 June 2006 120 
Corporate planning & analysis 
director,  
former strategic planning director for 
the largest business area 
corporate 10 July 2006  90 
Marketing planning director for the 
largest business area 
business 
area 
10 August 2006 90 
Corporate planning & analysis director 
with finance & control background 
corporate 14 August 2006 90 
Vice president, rewards & benefits and 
competence & performance 
management director (joint telephone 
interview through conference call) 
corporate 23 August 2006 90 
Corporate planning & analysis 
director,  
former strategic planning director for 
the largest business area 
corporate 13 September 
2006 
90 
Head of finance & control corporate 21 September 
2006 
60 
Vice president, business improvement 
services and senior development 
manager, business improvement 
services 
corporate 13 October 2006 90 
Corporate strategy director corporate 23 October 2006 90 
Senior development manager, business 
improvement services 
corporate 27 October 2006 60 
Vice president, business improvement 
services 
corporate 3 November 
2006 
60 
Corporate strategy director corporate 29 November 
2006 
60 
Competence & performance corporate 30 November 90 
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management director 2006 
director, business development & 
strategy projects, R&D for the largest 
business area 
business 
area 
7 January 2008 90 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 14 January 2008 30 
Director, F&C, business unit x within 
the second largest business area 
business 
unit 
14 January 2008 90 
Director HR, executive development, 
talent and performance management, 
HR development 
corporate 22 January 2008 90 
Strategy & portfolio manager for one of 
the sales categories 
business 
unit 
14 March 2008 60 
Cost management and business control 
director for purchasing at the largest 
business area 
business 
unit 
15 March 2008 30 
Former senior manager, third largest 
business area 
business 
area 
11 June 2009 30 
Finance director I for a major 
horizontal organisation (telephone 
interview) 
business 
area 
15 June 2009 30 
Finance director II for a major 
horizontal organisation 
business 
area 
17 June 2009 40 
    
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS    
    
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 23 May 2006   60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 9 June 2006 60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 27 October 2006 60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 19 January 2007 30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business 
area  
business 
area 
2 April 2006  30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business 
area 
business 
area 
20 April 2006 30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business 
area 
business 
area 
28 September 
2007 
60 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business 
area 
business 
area 
22 June 2009 30 
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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to elaborate the concept of values-based control – a control 
approach whereby managers utilize organisational values for influencing 
organisational  members’  behaviour.  The  paper  begins  with  an  analysis  of  key  
values-based control concepts applied within the management control system 
(MCS) literature, including the concepts of clan control, cultural control, belief 
system and value-based control. The analysis yields a summary of similarities 
and differences between these concepts, and identifies key values-based control 
approaches suggested by them. After discussing the limitations of these 
approaches, the paper proposes a new, broader conceptualisation of values-
based control.  This conceptualisation highlights that organisational members 
can  engage  in  desirable  values-related  behaviour  not  only  by  relying  on  their  
intrinsic motivation, but also by relying a on their perceptions of the benefits 
relating to such behaviour. This new conceptualisation portrays values-based 
control as comprising of an array of complementary values-based control 
approaches.  These  differ  in  the  extent  to  which  they  seek  to  exert  direct  
influence  on  organisational  members’  behaviour.  An in-depth  case  study  of  a  
large global organisation with a strong administrative heritage in values-based 
control is then used to illustrate how the identified values-based control 
approaches - selection, acculturation, communication and incentivisation - can 
be applied in practice. The paper concludes by discussing its theoretical 
implications, and by suggesting avenues for further research.  
 
Keywords: value, values-based control, cultural control, clan control, belief 
system, management control system 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  notion  that  managers  utilize  organisational  values  as  a  means  of  
influencing organisational members’ behaviour is well established within the 
management control system MCS (e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995; Malmi and 
Brown, 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007, Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995a) 
and  organisational  behaviour  literatures  (e.g.  Harris  and  Ogbonna,  2011;  
Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Wiener, 1982). Such a control approach – discussed 
as values-based control in  this  paper  –  is  often  contrasted  with  formal,  
bureaucratic forms of control (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Langfield-Smith, 1997; 
Norris and O’Dwyer, 2004; Ouchi, 1979).64 Early contributions on values-based 
control tend to position values-based control as an alternative control 
approach, suitable for complex and uncertain situations in which formal, 
bureaucratic forms of control may not enable effective control (e.g. Eisenhardt, 
1985;  Jaeger,  1983;  Ouchi,  1979).  More  recent  contributions  have  tended  to  
refrain from such mutually exclusive positions, highlighting the 
complementary nature of values-based and other controls. Contemporary 
literature on MCSs widely acknowledges that values-based control systems 
constitute an essential part of a control package (e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Mundy, 2010; Simons, 1995a; Widener, 
2007).  They  exert  powerful  influence  over  other  MCSs  (Mundy,  2010;  
Sandelin, 2008; Widener, 2007), and act as complements (Bruining et al., 
2004; Mundy, 2010; Simons, 1995a; Widener, 2007) or substitutes to other 
MCSs in the control package (Sandelin, 2008). 
 Despite widespread recognition of the significance of values-based control, 
the concept of values-based control remains ambiguous. MCS researchers have 
addressed values-based control through a variety of concepts including clan 
control (Ouchi, 1979, 1980; see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995, 1997), cultural 
control (e.g. Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Sandelin, 2008), belief system 
(Simons, 1995a, 1995b; see e.g. Marginson, 2002; Mundy, 2010; Widener, 
2007) and value-based control (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Although these 
concepts share the assumption that managers can seek to utilize organisational 
values as a means of influencing organisational members’ behaviour, these 
concepts  are  only  partially  overlapping.  They  are  based  on  different  
interpretations  of  the  key  mechanisms  and  approaches  through  which  this  
                                                  
64 The term ‘bureaucratic control’ refers here to a control approach that is based on the 
definition of formal rules and procedures, mechanisms for monitoring compliance, and 
explicit standardised systems of reward and sanction to ensure conformity (based on 
Ferner, 2000).   
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influence is mobilised. Hitherto, the MCS literature has made little progress in 
specifying the concept of values-based control, or in identifying linkages 
between the applied values-based control concepts. The MCS literature has 
also been relatively silent in terms of discussing the potential limitations of 
influencing organisational members’ behaviour through values-based control 
approaches. 
 This paper elaborates on the concept of values-based control. It seeks to 
specify the key approaches through which values-based control is mobilised, 
and to illustrate how these approaches can be applied in practice. It also sheds 
light on the challenges that surface when organisational members’ behaviour is 
influenced through these approaches, and highlights similarities and 
differences between the key values-based control concepts applied within the 
MCS literature. The examination is based on two pillars: first, it relies on a 
review of extant literature. Second, it draws from an empirical examination of 
values-based control practices in a large, global organisation with a strong 
administrative heritage in values-based control. Such an examination - 
developing a more elaborate understanding of the concept of values-based 
control - works to the benefit of the literature in values-based control, as well 
as  to  the  literature  on  MCSs  in  general.  It  helps  us  to  develop  a  more  
comprehensive understanding of the nature and implementation of values-
based control. It is also beneficial to the development of a more fine-grained 
understanding of the contextual nature of values-based control. Future studies 
can build on this elaboration - to gather evidence of what types of values-based 
control approaches are effective in particular organisational settings. It also 
provides a basis against which the findings of studies using different values-
based control concepts can become positioned and analysed. Finally, a more 
elaborate understanding of the multiplicity of ways through which values-
based control is mobilised can also offer us a better appreciation of how values-
based control systems function as part of broader control packages.  
 This paper contributes to the literatures on values-based control and MCS 
in  two  ways.  First,  it  contributes  conceptually by  proposing  a  new  
conceptualisation of values-based control. This proposed framework is broader 
than  the  traditional  values-based  control  concepts  -  clan  control,  cultural  
control,  belief  system  and  value-based  control  -  applied  within  the  MCS  
literature. This new conceptualisation acknowledges that organisational 
members can engage in desirable values-related behaviour by not only relying 
on their intrinsic motivation (e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ouchi, 1979), but 
by  also  relying  on  their  perceptions  of  the  benefits  related  to  assuming  such  
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behaviour (e.g. Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). It 
portrays values-based control as comprising an array of complementary values-
based control approaches - selection, acculturation, communication and 
incentivisation. These differ in the extent to which they seek to exert direct 
influence on organisational members’ behaviour. It argues that the 
conventional conception of values-based control as socio-ideological control - 
operating through organisational members’ internal beliefs about what types of 
behaviour  are  desirable  -  may  provide  only  a  partial  view  of  the  nature  of  
values-based  control  (e.g.  Langfield-Smith,  1995;  Norris  and  O’Dwyer,  2004;  
Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995a). Furthermore, the proposed framework suggests 
that values-based control may take more formal and bureaucratic forms than 
generally acknowledged. Second, the paper contributes also empirically by 
illustrating how values-based control can be mobilised through the formal 
incentivisation of organisational members’ values-related behaviour. Although 
some recent studies have reported observations of attempts to incentivize 
desirable values-related behaviour (Doz and Kosonen, 2007, p. 110; Lenzioni, 
2002, Mundy, 2010), these studies have provided very little visibility into how 
such formal incentivisation can be implemented in practice.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following three 
sections focus on a discussion about the nature and implementation of values-
based control. The discussion starts by addressing the nature of values, paying 
attention to the distinctive features of individual and organisational level 
values. The subsequent section analyses similarities and differences between 
key values-based control concepts, and identifies the key approaches that these 
concepts suggest for mobilising values-based control. The next section 
addresses challenges relating to these approaches, and proposes a new, broader 
conceptualisation of values-based control. The paper then proceeds to illustrate 
how the identified values-based control approaches can be applied in practice. 
In the final section, the paper’s theoretical implications are discussed and its 
implications for future research on values-based control, and MCS in general, 
will be laid out.  
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2. The nature of values: individual and organisational level 
perspectives 
 
The concept of ‘value’ occupies a prominent place in scientific discourse, across 
various social science disciplines. The nature of values has been examined at 
societal, organisational and individual levels - and across a diversity of 
disciplines including anthropology, political science, psychology and 
management science. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there is no 
consensus about how to conceptualise and measure values across levels of 
analysis, ranging from the individual to the organisational, social and cultural 
levels.  (Meglino  and  Ravlin,  1998;  Murphy  and  Davey,  2002;  Rokeach  and  
Bald-Rokeach, 1989) Despite inconsistencies in the definition of values, certain 
conceptualisations have gained a fair degree of acceptance, in particular within 
the organisational behaviour research. Rokeach’ (1973, p.5) definition of value 
as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence 
is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct 
or end-state of existence’ has been particularly influential. (See e.g. Kirkhaug, 
2009; Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ravlin, 1995; Wiener, 1988) Rokeach’s (1973) 
conceptualisation encompasses two types of values that can be used to describe 
a person: terminal values are self-sufficient end-states that a person strives to 
achieve – such as comfortable life and wisdom. By contrast, instrumental 
values are the modes of behaviour – such as honesty, loyalty and helpfulness – 
that facilitate the attainment of terminal values.  
 Within the MCS and organisational behaviour literatures, values have 
generally been conceptualised in terms of instrumental values (see Meglino 
and Ravlin,  1998; Merchant and Van der Stede,  2007; Simons, 1995a, 1995b).  
This more limited conceptualisation – portraying values as desirable modes of 
behaviour -  has  been  argued  to  be  more  pertinent  for  research  in  
organisations, as organisational values tend to relate to modes of behaviour 
which are perceived to be relevant for the effective functioning of an 
organisation (Meglino and Ravlin, 1998). This narrower conceptualisation is 
adopted also in this study: ‘values’ refer to the “enduring beliefs about how an 
individual  should  or  ought  to  behave  within  a  broad  range  of  situations” 
(Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ravlin, 1995). This conceptualisation is general in 
the  sense  that  it  applies  to  the  examination  of  values  both  at  individual  and  
organisational levels.65   
                                                  
65 Whether organisations like individuals have the competency to possess values has 
been under some scholarly debate within the organisational behaviour literature (see 
e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998 cf. Meglino, 1997; Pruzan, 2002). I adopt the widely 
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 Two features in this conceptualisation deserve further consideration. First, 
values are conceived as having an enduring character. At the individual level, 
the  enduring  nature  of  values  arises  mainly  from  the  fact  that  each  value  is  
initially learned in isolation from other values in an absolute fashion. As an 
individual matures, he/she integrates his/her values into an organised system 
of values wherein each value is ordered in priority with respect to other values. 
The specific values an individual holds tend to stay stable over time: a change 
in an individual’s values typically entails a reordering of priorities among 
existing values. As values are learned early in life, and occupy a central position 
in an individual’s cognitive structure, they are difficult to change during 
adulthood.  (Ravlin,  1995;  Rokeach,  1973)  At  an  organisational  level,  the  
enduring nature of values arises from organisational values becoming 
embedded in - and being reinforced by - corporate rites, rituals, artefacts and 
practices (Pratt and Beaulieu, 1992; Schein, 1985).  
 A second feature that deserves further attention is the normative nature of 
values.  At  an  individual  level,  values  specify  an  individual’s  personal  beliefs:  
how  he  or  she  “should”  or  “ought”  to  behave.  An  individual’s  values  do  not  
necessarily reflect how he or she desires to behave. Rather, they describe his or 
her internalised interpretations about socially desirable ways to fulfil his or her 
needs.  (Meglino  and  Ravlin,  1998,  p.  345;  Rokeach,  1973)  These  
interpretations have been shaped by institutional forces – such as family, 
school, religious society and work organisation – which have acted upon him or 
her  (Ravlin,  1995;  Rokeach,  1973).  Thus,  at  an  organisational  level,  
organisational values create bounds and limits on individual behaviour. 
Organisational values are often explicitly articulated because they serve the 
normative function of guiding organisational members in how to behave over a 
range  of  situations.  (Schein,  1985)  These  two  features  –  the  enduring  and  
normative nature of values – have implications for the feasibility of values-
based control. This will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
acknowledged position within the MCS and organisational culture literatures according 
to which values are considered to also reside at an organisational level (e.g. Langfield-
Smith, 1995; Schein, 1985; Simons, 1995a). I also adopt the widely acknowledged 
position within the MCS literature, and do not seek to make a clear distinction between 
management-espoused organisational values, and those enacted by organisational 
members  (see  e.g.  Malmi  and  Brown,  2008;  Merchant  and  Van  der  Stede,  2007;  
Simons, 1995a, 1995b). In this paper, the term ‘organisational values’ refers primarily 
to the explicitly articulated values that guide organisational members in how to behave 
over a range of situations (see e.g. Schein, 1985; Simons, 1995a, 1995b). I acknowledge, 
however, that organisations vary in the extent and intensity to which these officially 
articulated organisational values are shared by organisational members (see e.g. 
Wiener, 1988; Sørensen, 2002).  
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3. Values-based control: analysis of key concepts 
 
The normative nature of values (Ravlin, 1995; Rokeach, 1973) implies that 
managers may seek to utilize organisational values as a means of influencing 
organisational members’ behaviour. Managers may seek to achieve value 
congruence between the organisation and organisational members. 
Internalised organisational values can serve as normative guidelines for 
guiding organisational members’ behaviour (see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995; 
Malmi and Brown, 2008; Norris and O’Dwyer,  2004, Ouchi,  1979).  Managers 
may also seek to explicate organisational values in such terms that they guide 
organisational members’ behaviour also when organisational members do not 
strongly subscribe to these values (see e.g. Malmi and Brown, 2008; Simons, 
1995a; Welch and Welch, 2006).  As noted earlier in the introduction section, 
we use a generic term values-based control to  refer  to  any  attempts  by  
managers  to  utilize  organisational  values  as  a  means  of  influencing  
organisational members’ behaviour. This enables us to examine the concept of 
values-based control broadly, acknowledging that values-based control may 
not always take a purely socio-ideological form whereby managers would seek 
to influence organisational members’ behaviour through influencing their 
mind-sets.  It  can  also  take  a  more  technocratic  form,  and seek  to  exert  more  
direct influence on organisational members’ behaviour.66 This broad definition 
also acknowledges that organisational members can be motivated to engage in 
values-related behaviour through different mechanisms. Some organisational 
members may engage in values-related behaviour based on their intrinsic 
motivation to do so (see e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Some 
other  organisational  members  may,  on  the  other  hand,  engage  in  such  
behaviour based on their perceptions of the benefits relating to such behaviour 
(Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993).  
 The  literature  on  values-based  control  generally  portrays  values-based  
control as socio-ideological. It claims that values influence organisational 
members’ behaviour through their grip on internal beliefs concerning what 
types of behaviour are desirable (see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995; Ouchi, 1979; 
Simons, 1995a). Key values-based control concepts differ, however, 
considerably in the extent to which they pay attention to the mechanisms 
                                                  
66 I draw on Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) to distinguish between ‘socio-ideological 
control’ that seeks to influence organisational members’ behaviour through influencing 
their mind-sets, and ‘technocratic control’ that seeks to exert direct influence over 
organisational members’ behaviour.  
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through which such influence on organisational members’ mind-sets can be 
exerted. They also differ in their interpretations of the key approaches through 
which values-based control is mobilised, as well as the key organisational 
actors involved in mobilising it. Therefore, the following discussion seeks to 
highlight key similarities and differences between these concepts.  It goes out 
to identify the key values-based control approaches that these concepts suggest 
for mobilising values-based control. The key values-based control concepts 
addressed in the following include clan control (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), cultural 
control (e.g. Harris and Ogbonna, 2011; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; 
Sandelin, 2008), belief system (Simons, 1995a, 1995b) and value-based control 
(Malmi and Brown, 2008).  
 The notion that organisational values may constitute an essential control 
mechanism was initially introduced by Ouchi (1977, 1979, 1980). He claimed 
that a values-based control approach referred to as clan control could provide 
an effective, alternative control mechanism – especially in situations in which 
effective control through the monitoring of behaviour, or the outputs of that 
behaviour, could not be feasible due to excessive complexity and uncertainty. 
In such situations effective control could be achieved by creating strong 
commitment to an organisation’s values and goals. Ouchi’s (ibid.) conception 
of values-based control is essentially socio-ideological: it focuses on the 
processes through which organisational members’ values could become aligned 
with those of the organisation. According to Ouchi (ibid.), the selection of 
individuals with congruent values, and their acculturation into an 
organisation’s values through training,  ceremonies and rituals,  could serve as 
key approaches for developing such value congruence. Although Ouchi (1979, 
p. 854) himself portrayed clan control as a subtle, almost invisible control 
mechanism, many of the key organisational processes through which he 
claimed clan control to be mobilised are, in actuality, quite formal processes 
(see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; Snell, 1992).  
 Despite  the  fact  that  Ouchi  (1979,  1980)  portrayed  clan  control  as  one  of  
three alternative control mechanisms67, his description of clan control suggests 
only partial control: clan control’s effectiveness is heavily dependent on 
                                                  
67 Malmi and Brown’s (2008) recent MCS conceptualisation posits clan control as a 
subgroup level control construct, highlighting that clan control would typically emerge 
within professions, or bounded organisational parts, such as specific organisational 
units. We would refrain from limiting the concept of clan control to a subgroup level. 
Although Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) comment on that clan control is more likely to 
emerge and function at a subgroup level, Ouchi’s (1977, 1979, 1980) general discussion 
about clan control suggests that he considered it to be essentially an organisational 
level concept. The fact that he refers to clan type of control as ‘one of the organisational 
ideals’ also supports this argument (Ouchi and Jaeger, 1978). 
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organisational members’ individual commitment to an organisation’s goals and 
values, as well as on mutual, social reinforcement by organisational members. 
The  way  Ouchi  (1979,  1980)  portrays  clan  control  suggests  further  that  he  
himself considered organisational values to be beyond managers’ control: 
organisational  values  evolve  over  time  and  become  embedded  in  an  
organisation’s traditions. Some other researchers have interpreted clan control 
as  involving  also  attempts  to  promote  top  managers’  definitions  of  key  
organisational values (see e.g. Sullivan, 1983).   
 The term cultural control is  sometimes  applied  as  almost  a  synonym  to  
clan control. It suggests managers’ attempts to promote individual 
commitment to an organisation’s values and goals among organisational 
members (see e.g. Jaeger and Baliga, 1985; Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983). A more 
generally acknowledged conceptualisation is to use the term cultural control to 
refer to managers’ attempts to shape organisational culture, i.e. to influence the 
values  and  beliefs  shared  by  organisational  members  (see  e.g.  Harris  and  
Ogbonna, 2011; Murphy and Davey, 2002; Sandelin, 2008).68,69 Hence, the 
concept of cultural control is similar to the concept of clan control. It also refers 
to managers’ attempts to get organisational members to subscribe to an 
organisation’s values and objectives – the main difference being that it pays 
more attention to influencing the values and beliefs of an organisation as a 
whole. An implicit assumption behind the concept of cultural control is that a 
strong organisational culture – i.e. to a large extent shared organisational 
values (Sørensen, 2002; Wiener, 1988) – is beneficial to an organisation (see 
e.g. Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Flamholtz, 2001; Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
Although  the  emphasis  is  on  influencing  shared values, top managers are 
generally  considered  to  have  the  legitimacy  and  the  capacity  to  produce  
definitions of organisational values (e.g. Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Harris and 
                                                  
68 Researchers on organisational culture generally agree that shared values and beliefs 
constitute an essential element of the concept of organisational culture: culture is, 
indeed, often defined as shared  values  and  beliefs  (see  e.g.  Henri,  2006;  Pratt  and  
Beaulieu, 1992; Van de Steen, 2010; Wiener, 1988). Many prominent writers comment, 
however, on that the concept of culture comprises of a family of concepts, including, for 
example, symbol, language, ideology, belief, ritual and myth (Pettigrew, 1979); and that 
it involves several levels including underlying assumptions, values, and physical 
artefacts (Schein, 1985).   
69 Some  MCS  researchers  have  interpreted  cultural  control  as  referring  to  managers’  
attempts to use organisational culture as control  (see  Berry  et  al.,  2009;  Langfield-
Smith, 1995). Although seemingly different from the conceptualisation which views 
cultural control as an attempt to control culture, we argue that the difference between 
these two interpretations is not as significant as it would seem at first. For example, 
Malmi and Brown’s (2008) recent discussion of the term cultural control as control is 
clearly based on the assumption that managers seek to shape organisational culture in 
order to make it more compatible with their organisation’s objectives. 
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Ogbonna,  2011).  As  a  consequence,  the  communication  of  official  values  
through formal documents such as values statements and corporate credos is 
considered  to  be  essential  for  mobilising  cultural  control  -  beside  such  
approaches as employee selection and acculturation that are also highlighted 
by the concept of clan control (see e.g. Harris and Ogbonna, 2011; Murphy and 
Davey, 2002).  
 Within the MCS literature, Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) have 
proposed a slightly different conceptualisation of cultural control. They also 
consider the shaping organisational culture as a central objective of cultural 
control, but for them cultural control is essentially about triggering mutual 
monitoring among organisational members (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007, p. 85). This is reflected in the processes and systems which they see as 
being significant for the mobilisation of cultural  control  -  attempts to develop 
individual commitment to an organisation’s values and goals through selection 
and training are excluded from their concept of cultural control.70 Within the 
more generic literature on cultural control, the development of individual 
commitment, mutual reinforcement by organisational members and top 
management direction are all considered essential for an effective mobilisation 
of cultural control (see e.g. Ogbonna and Harris, 1998, 2002; Ogbonna and 
Wilkinson, 2003). 
 The concept of belief system (Simons, 1995a, 1995b) represents a different 
interpretation of the nature and implementation of values-based control. 
Although  Simons’  (ibid.)  term  ‘belief  system’  would  seem  to  imply  that  he  
considers these systems as influencing organisational members’ individual 
beliefs, his discussion about the concept suggests that he considers belief 
systems as capable of exerting also more direct influence on organisational 
members’ behaviour. For him, belief systems are essentially about defining and 
communicating top managers’ definitions of organisational values – as well as 
about informing organisational members about “what constitutes acceptable 
behaviour”, over a broad range of different circumstances (Simons, 1995b, p. 
83). As the emphasis is on the formal communication of organisational values, 
formal documents, such as values statements and organisational credos are 
considered to be the key systems for mobilising values-based control through a 
belief system (Simons, 1995a, 1995b; Widener, 2007). Less formal means, such 
                                                  
70 Attempts to develop individual commitment to an organisation’s values and goals 
through,  for  example,  selection  and  training,  are  included  in  Merchant  and  Van  der  
Stede’s (2007) ‘personnel control’ concept. Their concept of ‘personnel control’ is, 
however, not limited to developing individual commitment to values and goals. It 
includes also attempts to develop personnel’s capabilities and resources through, for 
example, job design. 
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as  internal  business  magazines  and  posters,  are  also  considered  to  be  of  
significance in informing organisational members (Bruining et al., 2004; 
Mundy, 2010). The concept of belief system is hence less socio-ideological than 
the concepts of clan control and cultural control. It emphasises formal 
communication of official organisational values. It pays less attention to the 
processes through which organisational members’ values can be aligned with 
those  of  the  organisation.  It  differs  from  the  concepts  of  clan  control  and  
cultural control also in its very hierarchical orientation:  a belief system pays 
little attention to creating individual commitment to the officially defined 
organisational values, or to triggering mutual reinforcement by organisational 
members. 
 Malmi and Brown’s (2008) value-based control concept seeks to integrate 
these perspectives.71 It identifies the selection and acculturation of employees, 
and the communication of organisational values as the key approaches for 
mobilising values-based control. It also acknowledges that values-based 
control does not influence organisational members’ behaviour solely through 
the creation of value congruence between the organisation and organisational 
members. The mere explication of organisational values can suffice to generate 
desired values-related behaviour among some organisational members. Malmi 
and Brown’s (ibid.) discussion of the concept of value-based control is too 
concise to make too extensive interpretations of their view in regard to the key 
organisational actors involved in mobilising value-based control. Their 
discussion  seems  to  indicate,  however,  that  they  place  less  emphasis  to  
triggering mutual reinforcement by organisational members as compared to 
the concepts of clan control and cultural control. 
 Table 1 summarizes the discussion about the similarities and differences 
between the key values-based control concepts. It highlights the similarities 
between the concepts of clan control and cultural control. Both concepts 
emphasise the approaches through which managers seek to align 
organisational members’ individual values with those of the organisation. As 
                                                  
71 Malmi  and  Brown’s  (2008)  term  ’value-based  control’  is  very  similar  to  the  term  
‘values-based control’ applied in this paper. Our decision to use the latter term is based 
on that it better enables us to distinguish the control approach discussed in this paper 
from  the  term  ‘value-based  management’  that  is  commonly  used  within  the  
management accounting literature to refer to a management approach  that 
emphasizes maximizing shareholder value creation (See e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 2001; 
Malmi and Ikäheimo, 2003). Within the general management literature the terms 
‘value-based management’ (see e.g. Brytting and Trollestad, 2000) and ‘values-based 
management” (see e.g. Andersson, 1997) and ‘values-driven management” (see e.g. 
Driscoll  and  Hoffman,  1999)  have  all  been  used  to  refer  to  a  management  approach  
whereby organisational values are mobilised to influence organisational members’ 
mind-sets and/or behaviour. 
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the concept of cultural control also focuses on shaping organisational culture – 
i.e. influencing the organisational values that are shared by organisational 
members – it pays also attention to the communication of officially defined 
organisational values. Both these concepts consider the development of 
individual commitment and the mutual reinforcement by organisational 
members as being essential for the effective mobilisation of values-based 
control. Top management direction is more explicit and highlighted within the 
concept of cultural control. The concept of a belief system represents a 
different interpretation of the nature and implementation of values-based 
control. It emphasises the formal communication of officially defined 
organisational values. Although it also seeks to develop subscription to specific 
organisational values, it exerts also more direct influence on organisational 
members’  behaviour  by  informing  organisational  members  about  the  types  of  
values-related behaviour that are acceptable within the organisation. It differs 
from the concepts of clan control and cultural control also in its very 
hierarchical orientation; placing strong emphasis on top management direction 
in the mobilisation of values-based control. Finally, the concept of value-based 
control seeks to integrate these perspectives. It acknowledges that values-based 
control may operate either through creating value congruence, or through 
exerting more direct influence on organisational members’ behaviour. It 
identifies  the  selection  and  acculturation  of  individuals,  as  well  as  the  
communication of official organisational values as the key processes for 
mobilising values-based control. Finally, it considers top management 
direction, and the development of individual level commitment as essential for 
the effective mobilisation of values-based control, and pays less attention to the 
generation of mutual reinforcement by organisational members. 
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Clan control 
(Ouchi, 1979, 
1980) 
 
Cultural 
control 
(e.g. Harris and 
Ogbonna, 2011; 
Merchant and Van 
der Stede, 2007; 
Sandelin, 2008)72 
 
Belief system 
(Simons, 1995a, 
1995b) 
 
Value-based 
control 
(Malmi and 
Brown, 2008) 
 
Key 
approaches  
 
 selection 
 acculturation 
 
 selection 
 acculturation 
 communication 
 
 
 communication 
 
 selection 
 acculturation 
 communication 
 
Primary 
objectives 
 
 value 
congruence 
 
 value 
congruence/ 
intended 
organisational 
culture 
 
 value 
congruence/  
values-related 
behaviour 
 
 value 
congruence/ 
values-related 
behaviour 
 
Actors 
involved 
 
 (top 
management 
direction) 
 individual 
level 
commitment 
 mutual 
enforcement 
 
 top 
management 
direction 
 individual level 
commitment 
 mutual 
enforcement 
 
 top 
management 
direction 
 
 top 
management 
direction 
 individual level 
commitment 
 
Table 1. Comparison of key values-based control concepts applied within the MCS literature 
 
Table 1 also highlights the key approaches that these concepts suggest for 
mobilising values-based control: these include the selection of individuals with 
congruent values, the acculturation of individuals into an organisation’s values, 
and the communication of official organisational values. The following section 
addresses the limitations of these approaches, and adds a fourth, more 
instrumental values-based control approach, which managers can use to 
                                                  
72 Within the MCS literature the term ‘cultural control’ has been applied, inter alia, by 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) and Sandelin (2008). The interpretation of the 
concept of ‘cultural control’ presented in Table 1 draws also on the more generic 
literature on ‘cultural control’ (e.g. Harris and Ogbonna, 2011). As a consequence, it is 
not identical to Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2007) or Sandelin’s (2008) 
interpretation of the term. 
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motivate values-related behaviour also when organisational members do not 
strongly subscribe to the organisational values. 
 
 
4. Conceptualizing values-based control as comprising of an array 
of complementary values-based control approaches 
 
The identified values-based control approaches differ in the extent to which 
they seek to exert direct influence on organisational members’ behaviour. The 
first  two approaches – the selection of individuals with congruent values and 
the acculturation of individuals into an organisation’s values - operate through 
creating value congruence between the organisation and organisational 
members. The aim is to align organisational members’ values with those of the 
organisation,  whereby  the  internalised  organisational  values  can  serve  as  
normative guidelines for guiding organisational members’ behaviour. 
(Langfield-Smith, 1995; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Ouchi, 1979; Ravlin, 1995) 
The third approach – the communication of official organisational values – 
seeks, however, to exert also more direct influence on organisational members’ 
behaviour by informing organisational members about the kinds of behaviour 
which are acceptable within that organisation (Malmi and Brown, 2008; 
Simons, 1995a, 1995b).  
 None of these approaches for mobilising values-based control is, however, 
unproblematic. Mobilising values-based control through the selection of 
individuals with congruent values is problematic because individual values are 
only partially visible to the outside. The analysis is likely to focus on the most 
visible  part  of  individual  values  –  namely,  individuals’  values-related  
behaviour. This provides only partial visibility to an individual’s deeply-held 
values. (Rokeach, 1973; Schein, 1985; Welch and Welch, 2006) Mobilizing 
values-based control through the acculturation of individuals into an 
organisation’s values is, on the other hand, problematic due to the enduring 
nature  of  individual  values.  As  values  are  learned  early  in  life,  and  occupy  a  
central position in an individual’s cognitive structure, they are difficult to 
change during adulthood (Ravlin, 1995; Rokeach, 1973). This limits managers’ 
ability to align organisational members’ values with those of the organisation. 
Individuals are also typically under the simultaneous influence of several 
societal institutions – such as family, work organisation and religious society – 
which  further  limits  the  efficacy  of  such  managerial  efforts  (Ravlin,  1995;  
Rokeach, 1973). Finally, managers’ attempt to achieve value congruence or to 
motivate  organisational  members  to  engage  in  desirable  values-related  
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behaviour through the communication of official organisational values is also 
problematic. It is unlikely to generate strong commitment to the official values, 
nor to provide organisational members with adequate motivation to engage in 
values-related behaviour unless organisational members perceive there to be 
sufficient incentives related to engaging in such behaviour (Ogbonna and 
Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). Official organisational values are 
also typically defined in such general terms that they are unable to provide 
specific guidance to organisational members (Simons, 1995a, 1995b).  
 Hence, the identified three values-based control approaches may not 
suffice to generate desirable values-related behaviour in organisations. 
Managers’  attempts  to  select  individuals  with  congruent  values,  or  to  
acculturate them into an organisation’s values, may not be enough to generate 
value congruence between the organisation and organisational members (see 
e.g. Meglino and Ravlin, 1998). The communication of official organisational 
values may, on the other hand, not suffice for motivating organisational 
members to engage in desirable values-related behaviour unless organisational 
members perceive sufficient incentives relating to such behaviour (Ogbonna 
and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). To provide such clear 
incentives, managers may need to formally incentivize desirable values-related 
behaviour (Lenzioni, 2002).  
 Recent observations within the MCS and strategic management literatures 
indicate that some companies are moving to formally incentivizing 
organisational members’ values-related behaviour (Doz and Kosonen, 2007, p. 
110; Lenzioni, 2002, Mundy, 2010). They are integrating the evaluation of 
organisational members’ values-related behaviour into their formal appraisal 
and  performance  measurement  process  (Doz  and  Kosonen,  2007,  p.  110;  
Lenzioni, 2002; Mundy, 2010). They are linking the outcome of this evaluation 
to formal incentives - such as bonuses, stock options, pay rises and career 
promotions (Doz and Kosonen, 2007, p. 110; Lenzioni, 2002). This enables top 
management  to  signal  that  it  considers  organisational  values  to  genuinely  
constitute an essential part of the way it desires the organisation - and 
individual  organisational  members  -  to  operate  (Lenzioni,  2002;  Mundy,  
2010). With the formal incentivisation of values-related behaviour top 
management seeks to reinforce the influence of other values-based control 
approaches. It provides organisational members with additional motivation to 
engage  in  desirable  values-related  behaviour  also  when  they  do  not  strongly  
subscribe to the organisational values (Lenzioni, 2002).  
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 The  mobilisation  of  values-based  control  through  the  formal  
incentivisation of values-related behaviour is, however, not unproblematic 
either.  It  requires,  first  of  all,  that  desirable  values-related  behaviour  can  be  
specified in such concrete terms that organisational members’ behaviour can 
be evaluated against some pre-defined ideals or standards. This is, however, 
problematic.  Such specifications will need to be applicable over a broad range 
of situations (Simons, 1995b). These specifications are, hence, likely to be 
generic in nature – forcing organisational members to make local 
interpretations of their meaning. The actual evaluation of values-related 
behaviour is also challenging. Diverging from a performance evaluation against 
some objective, quantifiable targets, the evaluation of organisational members’ 
values-related behaviour is inherently subjective and sensitive in character. 
This sets  additional demands for the procedural features of the evaluation 
process (see e.g. Ittner et al., 2003; Prendergast and Topel, 1996), as well as for 
managers’ capability to interpret what types of values-related behaviour are 
desirable in specific situations. Formal incentivisation of values-related 
behaviour can also result in unintended consequences  - such as impression 
management, i.e. organisational members’ attempts to influence the image 
others have of them (Bolino, 1999; Bolino et al., 2004); as well as a decrease in 
an intrinsic motivation to engage in such behaviour (Beckton et al., 2008).  
 Emerging from this analysis, values-based control appears as an array of 
values-based control approaches that differ in the extent to which they seek to 
exert direct influence on organisational members’ behaviour. Since all these 
approaches have inherent limitations, an effective mobilisation of values-based 
control may require a complementary use of these approaches. The selection of 
individuals with congruent values, and their further acculturation into an 
organisation’s values can be used to align organisational members’ values with 
those of the organisation. Since these approaches are unlikely to result in 
complete value congruence, the communication of official values and the 
formal incentivisation of  values-related  behaviour  can  be  used  to  inform  
organisational  members  about  desirable  values-related  behaviour,  and  to  
generate motivation to engage in such behaviour also when organisational 
members do not strongly subscribe to the organisational values. Without some 
degree of value alignment generated through the other values-based control 
approaches, a formal evaluation and incentivisation of values-related 
behaviour is, on the other hand, likely to be ineffective and artificial. Table 2 
summarizes this discussion, and presents a conceptualisation of values-based 
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control as comprising of an array of complementary values-based control 
approaches. 
 Next, I draw on an in-depth case study of a large global organisation with a 
strong administrative heritage in values-based control to illustrate how the four 
values-based control approaches constituting the concept of values-based 
control proposed in this paper can be applied in practice. A particular emphasis 
will  be  on  the  fourth  values-based  control  approach  -  that  of  formally  
incentivizing values-related behaviour - which has received much less attention 
within the values-based control  and MCS literatures.73 Before proceeding into 
the case analysis, I will briefly address the research approach of the study in the 
following. 
  
                                                  
73 Although some recent studies have reported observations of attempts to incentive desirable 
values-related behaviour (Doz and Kosonen, 2007; Lenzioni, 2002; Mundy, 2010), these 
studies have provided very limited visibility into how organisational members’ values-related 
behaviour can in practice be incentivised. For example, in regard to the formal evaluation of 
values-related behaviour, the available evidence is limited to a notion that values statements 
(Lenzioni, 2002), or “a list of behaviour and value-driven attributes” (Doz and Kosonen, 2007, 
p. 110) can be used as a basis for the evaluation.  
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Values-based control 
 
 Selection Acculturation Communication Incentivisation 
Properties  analysis of 
individuals’ 
internal 
values 
during the 
selection 
process 
 organisational 
members’ 
intentional 
acculturation into 
an organisation’s 
values through 
induction, training 
and informal 
socialisation 
 communication of 
official 
organisational 
values through 
formal documents 
and more informal 
media 
 formal 
incentivisation of 
desirable values-
related behaviour; 
 entails formal 
specification and 
evaluation 
Intended 
outcome 
 individuals 
with 
congruent 
values 
selected 
 
 organisational 
members’ 
individual values 
aligned with 
organisational 
values 
 official 
organisational 
values clarified 
and promoted 
 clear incentives 
for desirable 
values-related 
behaviour 
established 
Primary 
objective 
 value 
congruence 
 value congruence  value congruence/ 
desirable values-
related behaviour 
 desirable values-
related behaviour 
Challenges  individual 
values only 
partially 
visible to 
the outside 
 
 individual values 
difficult to change 
 individuals under 
the simultaneous 
influence of 
several societal 
institutions 
 the mere 
communication of 
official 
organisational 
values unlikely to 
be sufficient for 
generating value 
congruence nor 
motivating 
desirable values-
related behaviour 
 organisational 
values provide 
only very general 
guidance; requires 
local 
interpretation of 
their meaning 
 desirable values-
related behaviour 
difficult to specify 
in concrete, but 
“universal” ways; 
requires local 
interpretation of 
their meaning 
 evaluation 
subjective and 
sensitive in 
character 
 may result in 
unintended 
consequences 
such as 
impression 
management and 
decrease of 
intrinsic 
motivation 
 
Table 2. Conceptualizing values-based control as comprising of an array of complementary 
values-based control approaches  
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5. Research approach  
 
The empirical data that this paper builds upon is based on a broader case study 
on the strategy formation and implementation related the use of MCSs in a 
large, global organisation. This broader research project covered a variety of 
MCS.  They  included  MCSs  used  for  informing  managers  in  their  strategy  
formulation efforts, as well as MCSs - such as strategic performance 
measurement systems and values-based control systems - used to contribute to 
that organisational activities and individual organisational members’ 
behaviours would be aligned with the organisation’s strategic priorities. The 
overall research approach was open-ended and empirically sensitive in 
character. As the research project proceeded, increasing attention was paid to 
the company’s values-based control practices. Initial interviews with company 
representatives indicated that the company provided a particularly suitable 
organisational setting for examining the nature and implementation of values-
based control. It had a strong administrative heritage in values-based control. 
And it implemented a wide variety of values-based control approaches - some 
of  which  were  quite  novel,  and  capable  of  providing  some  new  theoretical  
insights.  
 The case evidence was collected over a period of three years, from June 
2006  to  June  2009.   Theme  interviews  with  corporate  and  business-level  
managers formed the basis of the case analysis. Interviewed corporate-level 
managers represented key corporate functions, such as corporate strategy, HR, 
and  finance  and  control.  This  enabled  us  to  develop  a  comprehensive  
understanding of top managers’ attempts to use values-based control systems, 
and  MCSs  in  general.  Interviews  with  business  managers  from  several  
hierarchical levels provided, on the other hand, indication of the extent to 
which corporate managers’ intentions with regard to using values-based 
control systems, and the MCSs in general, were effective in practice. It also 
provided insight into how managers at lower levels in the hierarchy reacted to 
the  values-based  control  approaches  imposed  on  them.  Altogether,  22  
interviews  with  an  average  length  of  over  70  minutes  were  conducted  (see  
Appendix A). Of the 22 interviews, 18 were tape recorded and transcribed.74 
When tape recording was not possible, notes were taken. These notes were 
                                                  
74 Two interviews could not be recorded because the interviewees did not provide 
permission for recording and two telephone interviews with overseas executives could 
not be recorded due to technical limitations. 
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immediately transcribed after the interviews and were sent for validation to the 
interviewees.  
 Interviews were open-ended and empirically sensitive in character. 
Interviewees were first approached with fairly open questions relating to the 
use of values-based control systems, and MCSs in general. As the project and 
data collection progressed, I was able to pose more specific questions, probing 
deeper into initial ideas (Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006; 
McKinnon,  1988;  Vaivio,  2008).  I  was  also  able  to  draw  on  numerous  public  
and internal documents. Public documents, such as broker presentations, press 
releases and material presented at the company website provided general 
information about the company, its environment, strategy and management 
practices.  They  also  enabled  us  to  examine  how  the  company  communicated  
publically about its strategy, values, and values-based control practices. 
Internal documents, such as values statements, planning process descriptions 
and detailed guidance given to managers related to the evaluation of values-
related behaviour, provided a more detailed account about the company’s 
organisational values, and their mobilisation in practice. Finally, continual 
informal discussions with key informants enabled us to engage in more general 
discussions regarding the case companies’ management approach and their use 
of MCS. This provided a platform for more detailed questions (See Appendix A 
for a list of informal discussions).  
 Consistent with the open-ended, empirically sensitive character of the 
study,  the  data  analysis  commenced  during  the  data  gathering  phase,  and  it  
involved several iterative rounds of reflection between data and theory (Ahrens 
and  Dent,  1998;  Ahrens  and  Chapman,  2006).  The  data  analysis  involved  
searching for emerging themes of significance, reorganising data according to 
the themes, and using these themes as input to further interviews (Ahrens and 
Dent, 1998). Internal and public documents were used to elaborate on and 
confirm issues that arouse in the interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).  
 
 
6. Mobilising values-based control through an array of 
complementary values-based control approaches:  the Case of 
ValueComp 
 
This empirical section is divided into three subsections. The first one outlines 
the organisational context within which values-based control was mobilised at 
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the case company ValueComp.75 The second subsection describes how the 
managers at ValueComp sought to create value congruence between the 
organisation and organisational members through the approaches of selection, 
acculturation and communication. The third subsection illustrates how the 
fourth values-based control approach - that of formally incentivizing values-
related  behaviour  -  was  used  to  motivate  such  behaviour  also  when  
organisational members’ did not strongly subscribe to the organisational 
values. 
 
6.1. Organisational context: global organisation with a strong 
administrative heritage in values-based control 
 
The case company ValueComp operated a truly global organisation, with 
significant business operations in all five continents. Its production and R&D 
activities were spread across more than ten locations throughout the world.  It 
had sales in over hundred countries. Like most large multinational companies 
(MNC), ValueComp operated a complex matrix organisation. Its business 
operations were structured along three global business areas, which were all 
responsible for distinct sets of products and customer segments. These 
business  areas  were  supported  by  two  global  horizontal  organisations  which  
had group-wide responsibility for sales, marketing, purchasing, logistics and 
technological development. Some of the horizontal organisational were further 
divided into regional entities. The complex nature of the global organisation 
contributed to business reporting being often multidimensional in nature: 
business managers often found themselves in a situation where they had to 
report to several superiors, some of which could be placed in geographically 
distant locations. The global and complex nature of the operations was also 
reflected  in  general  day-to-day  work:  it  was  often  organised  along  global  
project organisations, whereby organisational members from different parts of 
the  world  were  connected  to  work  towards  common  project  goals  on  a  
temporary basis.  
 To enhance cooperation in such a demanding organisational context, 
organisational values were used for defining guidelines and boundaries of 
desirable behaviour. They were constituted a significant part of the overall 
management approach: for over a decade, a management approach referred to 
as ‘value-based management’ had been strongly and consistently promoted by 
top management. This management approach was based on the premise that 
                                                  
75 A  pseudonym  ValueComp  is  used  throughout  the  paper  in  order  to  secure  the  
anonymity of the case company. 
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the decisions and behaviour of  managers and employees should be guided by 
organisational values. Organisational members were, in general, expected to 
adopt behaviour consistent with the organisation’s values. The comment by the 
Business Development and Strategy Projects Director for one of the business 
areas crystallizes this broadly shared conception: 
 
“We are very much a values-driven company. This helps people to think what is 
important, and how they can contribute to the company. We, in a way, expect that 
people are of the ‘company man’ type.”  
 
The  Corporate  Strategy  Director  commented,  for  his  part,  on  the  role  of  
organisational values as follows:  
 
“I think that [organisational] values create a kind of boundary mechanism for 
individuals who are average or low performers. If you are a high performer, you 
take other people into account anyway.... These values are commensurable to all 
individuals. They make this organisation a tolerable place to work.” 
 
The interviewed managers did not seem to object to top managers’ attempts to 
apply  ‘value-based  management’.  On  the  contrary,  they  tended  to  consider  
such attempts as positive. The promotion of organisational values was 
generally considered to be an essential mechanism for enhancing cooperation. 
This  was  considered  to  be  particularly  important  because  the  company  
operated across a variety of national cultures. The Senior Development 
Manager for Business Improvement Services commented this:   
 
“In my view, it is good that our values are promoted. That you cannot adopt a 
mentality that you can develop a career in our company through treading on other 
people’s toes; through utilizing some iffy business practices, not sharing 
information with others or not utilising your full potential. These are important 
messages. If you want to prosper, and help the company to prosper, then you need 
to pay attention to the way results  are made.  This  is  important,  because we are a 
global company; people come from very different national cultures. It is important 
that  we  have  something  in  common  –  this  is  what  we  refer  to  as  organisational  
values, and value-based management.” 
 
The Strategy and Portfolio Manager for one of the sales categories within the 
largest business area noted for her part:  
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“The fact that organisational values are strongly promoted in our company makes 
cooperation easier. You can, on a general level, expect other people to behave in a 
certain way.”  
 
The actual organisational values were quite typical of contemporary 
organisations:  the  company  had  four  core  values,  which  related  to  
commitment, cooperation, respect and innovation. The company had recently 
gone through an extensive process in which the definition and meaning of the 
organisational  values  had  been  re-evaluated.  The  process  had  involved  a  
substantial number of organisational members from different parts of the 
global  organisation  -  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  that  the  officially  defined  
organisational  values  would  represent  those  actually  enacted  within  the  
organisation. 
 
 “Our organisational values were recently re-evaluated. We had these value 
workshops where we involved a significant part of our global organisation in a 
discussion  about  the  essence  of  our  values.  Our  present  value  definitions  are,  of  
course, not that different from the previous ones: they were kind of updated to be 
compatible with the present situation.” (The Business Development and Strategy 
Projects Director) 
 
 “When we seek to re-define our values then everyone, the whole organisation is 
strongly involved...It [organisational values] is not something that is created by the 
board of directors. Our personnel are strongly involved in the process; that way it 
is  also  more  natural  for  the  people  to  subscribe  to  these  values.”  (The Corporate 
Planning and Analysis Director) 
 
Mobilising ‘value-based management’ entailed, in practice, applying a variety 
of complementary values-based control approaches. The selection process paid 
attention to potential candidates’ value profiles. Organisational members were 
further acculturated into the organisational values. Official organisational 
values were communicated. Finally, the formal incentivisation of values-related 
behaviour was carried out.  
 
6.2. Developing value congruence through selection, acculturation and 
communication 
 
Value congruence between the organisation and organisational members was 
developed  through  several  values-based  control  approaches.  First,  the  
recruitment process paid particular emphasis to selecting individuals whose 
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value  profiles  would  be  congruent  with  the  ‘ValueComp  values’.   As  the  
evaluation of individuals’ deeply held values would have been very challenging 
- and was only partially feasible - the evaluation focused on assessing potential 
candidates’  values-related  behavioural  modes.  The  evaluation  sought  to  
determine whether the potential candidates would be likely to engage in 
desirable values-related behaviour within the organisation. The Corporate 
Planning and Analysis Director commented on this briefly: 
 
“Values  are  quite  a  lot  emphasised  in  our  management  approach.  First  in  
recruitment:  when  people  are  recruited,  their  match  to  ValueComp  values  is  
evaluated quite specifically…”  
 
The Business Development and Strategy Projects Director explained this 
further: 
 
 “We promote values in several ways… it starts even from recruitment. We seek to 
select individuals with a particular value profile…We expect to see that our 
organisational values are visible in the person we are recruiting; that she or he has 
sincere  interest  in  those  issues  that  are  relevant  to  our  values.  Because  
organisational  values  are  always,  at  the  end,  individual  values.  Or  at  least  they  
should be reflected in his or her modes of behaviour....When a group of individuals 
then work in a project, they will all share the same kind of behavioural modes.”  
 
Once individuals entered the organisation, further efforts were made to 
acculturate  them  to  the  organisational  values.  Organisational  values  
constituted, first of all, an essential part of organisational members’ 
introduction training. Many of the subsequent training programs did also pay 
attention to the organisational values. The purpose was not only to strengthen 
organisational members’ awareness of organisational values: the 
internalisation of these values was also enhanced. Many training programs 
included practical examples of how a particular organisational value could be 
“realised” in practice. Instead of a mere communication of official values, the 
aim was to develop deeper commitment to the organisational values. These 
values-related trainings were not of minor significance: some of the values-
related trainings were obligatory. And they were linked to monetary bonuses. 
The Strategy and Portfolio Manager observed this: 
 
”Our values are also reflected in the training programs. Not necessarily in every 
training, but in general…I happened to take part in an e-learning course yesterday, 
and our values were reflected also in that training. Not in a way that there would 
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have been explicit linkages to a particular ValueComp value, such as ‘this issue 
relates to this value, and means this’ ...In some other training programs the link is 
more explicit. For example our code of conduct training included several examples 
of how a ValueComp employee could operate according to the company values – 
across several different situations. The training provided also examples of what 
types of behaviour would not be acceptable…When I was working in my previous 
organisation, this was an obligatory training – it was a general requirement for 
that you could, at all, be eligible for a bonus. This requirement came down from the 
top level.”  
 
Organisational  values  were  also  kept  present  and  visible  in  everyday  
organisational life. There was extensive, on-going communication and 
discussion of their meaning. The purpose was, again, to strengthen 
organisational members’ subscription to the values. Moreover, it would 
develop their capability to interpret how the ValueComp values could be 
“realised” in specific situations. Of course, keeping organisational values 
strongly visible in everyday organisational life also enabled top management to 
signal that it considered organisational values to be a significant part of the 
way the organisation, and organisational members, should operate. The 
Business Development and Strategy Projects Director continued: 
 
“…We have also a lot of discussion and communication about the values, values are 
present in several ways…for example in our screensavers…We do lot of small things 
to promote values… We may also have some posters in the main halls…all these 
contribute  to  the  awareness  and  internalisation  of  our  values…And  of  course  we  
have  a  lot  of  material  in  our  intranet  and  internet  site…You  may  search  there  for  
more information.”  
 
The Corporate Planning and Analysis Director added for her part: 
 
“…Then there is also a lot of internal communication and discussion about values 
overall…I mean they are quite regularly out there, in the intranet and specific 
places… so the awareness of the values is kind of maintained all the time…” 
 
The communication of organisational values took several forms. In addition to 
the posters and screensavers that provided everyday visibility to the 
ValueComp values, values were also communicated through formal documents, 
such as the ‘Operational Mode Document’. This sought to explicate many of the 
company’s most significant objectives and principles. The communication of 
organisational values was not, however, limited to defining what the 
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organisational values were. It also included a description of what types of 
values-related behaviour were considered to be desirable and appropriate. This 
enabled top management to exert direct influence on organisational members’ 
behaviour. It also contributed to organisational members’ values-related 
behaviour being formally incentivised, as will be described in the following 
subsection. This was considered to be essential in order to generate values-
related behaviour within the organisation: despite all the efforts to develop 
value congruence between the organisation and organisational members, not 
all organisational members subscribed to the ValueComp values. Some of the 
organisational  members  could  not  even  name all  the  four  ValueComp values.  
The  comment  by  the  Strategy  and  Portfolio  Manager  illustrates  well  her  
dissatisfaction with the extent to which the ValueComp values had been 
internalised by many of her fellow colleagues: 
 
”I think that values should really influence your inner self, and the way you behave 
in general… You do not really need any posters for that… To me values are a mode 
of behaviour…. But, I know quite a lot of people who wouldn’t necessarily be able to 
even name our values from the top of their minds...” 
 
6.3. Motivating values-related behaviour through formal incentivisation 
 
The fourth values-based control approach – that of formally incentivizing 
values-related behaviour - was used to provide organisational members with 
additional motivation to engage in these types of behaviour. The purpose was 
to encourage desirable values-related behaviour also among such 
organisational members, who did not strongly subscribe to the ValueComp 
values. Of course, the formal incentivisation of values-related behaviour also 
served to inform organisational members about ‘value-based management’ 
being genuinely an essential part of the company’s management approach. Its 
influence extended beyond the mere rhetoric’s of promoting organisational 
values. The Corporate Planning and Analysis Director explained why they had 
decided to establish formal incentives for engaging in values-related behaviour: 
 
 “When the evaluation of values-related behaviour is firmly integrated to the formal 
performance evaluation,  then also those individuals,  who wouldn’t  otherwise care 
that much about organisational values, become interested in values-related 
behaviour. Those individuals, who don’t care about values, are generally interested 
in financial matters. When the evaluation of values-related behaviour is clearly 
linked  to  the  incentives,  also  these  individuals  develop  an  interest  in  the  
organisational values.” 
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Business  Development  and Strategy  Projects  Director  remarked,  on  the  other  
hand: 
 
”It [formal evaluation and incentivisation of values-related behaviour] motivates 
people to engage in behaviour that is consistent with the company’s objectives and 
values…That all little arrows would point to the same direction...and that they 
would build a bigger arrow together. I think that it is in that sense very similar to 
other incentive systems that we have.”  
 
How  the  formal  incentivisation  was  applied  in  practice  suggested  that  the  
evaluation of organisational members’ values-related behaviour had become an 
integral part of the annual performance evaluation process. This process 
encompassed two dimensions: to what extent an individual had been able to 
reach  his  or  her  business  targets,  and  to  what  extent  he  or  she  had  
demonstrated values-related behaviour, when striving for these targets. 
Performance in relation to the business targets was evaluated on a bi-annual 
basis. For individuals in line management positions, the majority of the 
business targets tended to be derived from their unit’s balanced scorecard 
targets. For other organisational members, the business targets tended to 
comprise of a mix of locally defined strategic, financial and more immediate, 
operative targets. On an annual basis, organisational members’ performance 
was then put under a broader examination. Attention was paid both to what he 
or she had been able to reach, as well as to how he or she had reached these 
targets. The evaluation of values-related behaviour was taken seriously: it had 
significant consequences. Where the bi-annual business target-related 
evaluation was linked to monetary bonuses, the annual performance evaluation 
process had broader implications. It was related to merit increases, rises in 
base salary and opportunities to attend equity programmes and expensive 
training. The Corporate Planning and Analysis Director explained again: 
 
“Values are specifically used in this performance evaluation...Your overall 
performance is evaluated once a year on two aspects:  the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. The 
‘what’ part is obviously a very important input to that evaluation: it relates to how 
well you have performed in relation to your individual business targets. The ‘how’ 
part is then more the kind of compliance with ValueComp values, and how you 
work….It influences, for example, your equity grants and salary rises.”  
 
The Strategy and Portfolio Manager commented for her part: 
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”We evaluate both what you reach and how you reach that. The ‘how’ part is also 
important  there.  If  you  try  relentlessly  to  push  your  own  issues  through,  without  
paying attention to others, it is not in accordance with company values. And it will 
be taken into account in the evaluation. It [evaluating the how] is an essential part 
of the overall evaluation…. If you on a longer term receive good evaluations – if you 
perform well and demonstrate behaving in accordance with the company values – 
then it will help you to move forward in your job grades and base salary.”  
 
The formal evaluation and incentivisation of values-related behaviour entailed 
that organisational members were given descriptions of the types of behaviour 
that were considered desirable and appropriate. These descriptions were 
presented separately for each of the four core ValueComp values. There were 
also slightly modified versions of the descriptions available for managers, in 
order to take into account their leadership role.76 These descriptions were, 
inevitably,  presented  in  rather  general  terms.  They  required  managers  and  
employees to make local interpretations of their specific meanings. The Cost 
Management and Business Control Manager explained how he had utilised 
these descriptions:  
 
“We are given clear documentation for that [desirable and appropriate values-
related behaviour]…the PowerPoint presentation provides clear examples of what 
is “exceptional”, “on target” and “improvement required” level behaviour in relation 
to each value. I have found the guidance helpful when discussing this with my team 
members. It enables them to clearly see what is generally expected and it helps me 
to explain what exceptional behaviour, for example, could be in that particular 
situation.“  
 
The Finance Director B commented for her part: 
 
”We have very specific guidelines for evaluating individuals’ values-related 
behaviour. We focus on how that person has performed in his or her working 
environment – in his or her team, and as an individual.“  
 
Managers were, however, not obliged to use these descriptions, resulting in 
that they were not always followed in practice. Some managers considered 
these specifications to be oversimplifying. They preferred to base the 
evaluations on their own judgement. Some managers were, on the other hand, 
                                                  
76 Although we were able to review these documents in practice, we were unfortunately 
not given permission to disclose any detailed examples of these descriptions. 
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even unaware of their existence. The Finance and Control Director for one of 
the business units within the largest business area commented this rather 
bluntly:  
 
“How the evaluation is conducted in practice depends very much on the manager. 
We have,  of  course,  supporting material,  which you can read in order to prepare 
yourself for these discussions. All these issues are specified there. But then everyone 
interprets this material, and uses it as they like… It is impossible to simplify all this 
into  a  single  format.  It  is  really  part  of  leadership.  My  opinion  is  that  if  you  try  
scrutinizing all this to a single format, it goes down the tube….”  
 
The Strategy and Portfolio Manager commented for her part:  
 
“I think that we should be given more specific guidance, so that we could make sure 
that  values get  realised at  the operational  level.  That you could say that  ok,  these 
are our values, and this is what I can do to realise each value…During the last 
evaluation round I accidentally happened to open a document, which provided 
more specific guidance to evaluating values-related performance.”  
 
The evaluation of individuals’ values-related behaviour was, hence, inherently 
subjective. It entailed making local interpretations of desirable values-related 
behaviour. Although some issues could be evaluated more objectively, the 
evaluation involved much subjective judgement. The Business Development 
and Strategy Projects Director observed: 
 
“Evaluation of individuals’ values-related behaviour does include subjectivity. It 
requires  in  a  way  an  interpretation  of  how  that  person  can  contribute  to  that  
value.... Some issues you can judge more objectively. If we think, for example, of our 
innovation value... if she or he has been able to demonstrate that she or he has 
brought  forward  a  new  innovation,  which  can  be  concretely  applied  to  our  
products, then she or he has concretely operated according to our innovation value. 
On the subjective side you can gather feedback from people who have worked with 
that person – from people who have worked in common projects; from his or her 
colleagues, subordinates and other superiors. You seek to evaluate how that person 
operates in practice; what operation modes she or he applies.” 
 
The Strategy and Portfolio Manager, on the other hand, commented for her 
part: 
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”Yes,  in my own performance evaluation we have always addressed also the how 
part. But it is vaguer, as it is based on qualitative assessment….For example, in my 
written assessment we have used terms such as ‘promotes team spirit’, ‘takes other 
people into account’ and ‘shares information…You need to be somewhat creative to 
be able to evaluate the how part.”  
 
Some managers even conducted the evaluation without much explicit linkage 
to the defined organisational values. In these cases the evaluation was based 
more on the managers’ individual values.  The Finance and Control Director 
commented again:  
 
“Yes, I do take values into consideration in performance evaluation. But it is 
subjective…everyone has his/her own values and they are more or less in line with 
organisational values….I guess I evaluate it more based on how I would behave in 
such a situation...what I view to be desirable and appropriate. We know that we 
have targets that we need to reach, and that we can reach those targets in several 
ways  -  some  of  those  ways  are  simply  more  desirable  than  others.  Then  I  try  to  
evaluate whether my subordinates have used the more desirable ways, or whether 
they  have  used  more  negative  ways  that  may  not  in  fact  confirm  to  anybody’s  
values... In my opinion, it does not really matter that much what the corporate 
values are.”  
 
In addition to being subjective, the evaluation was also sensitive in nature. It 
entered into rather personal matters. Categorising someone as not 
demonstrating values-related behaviour could have had an almost negative 
connotation, as organisational values were considered to be an essential part of 
organisational life at ValueComp. Finance Director B observed again:  
 
“If I think of my own managerial work, we have gone through this point by point. 
But this is often a rather sensitive topic. At the end it would be very hard for anyone 
to work here unless he had internalised our company values. So these values are 
quite difficult to evaluate. In principal, if a manager wanted, he could categorise 
individuals either as that they have behaved in accordance with the company 
values, or that they have not. So it depends very much on the discussion between a 
manager and his subordinate.”   
 
The Cost Management and Business Control Manager commented for his part: 
 
“When  you  have  known  these  guys  for  a  long  time,  it  is  not  always  that  easy  to  
draw the line… In some cases it is easy to say that your behaviour is exceptional - if 
the feedback you have received from the people who have worked with that person 
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has been overflowing…But, in some other cases the evaluation is more challenging. 
If  the  guy  has  worked  very  hard  and  got  quite  good  feedback,  then  it  can  be  de-
motivating to evaluate him as ‘on target’... What can also be challenging is if 
somebody has been evaluated as ‘exceptional’ for several years and you lower his 
grade to ‘on target’. Then you need to have pretty good arguments; otherwise the 
guy may get very mad and leave the company.”  
 
Because the evaluation was subjective and sensitive in nature, it was essential 
to contribute to the evaluation being perceived as fair by organisational 
members (Ittner et al., 2003; Prendergast and Topel, 1996). Several features of 
the process pointed towards this. First, managers sought to gather information 
about their subordinates’ values-related behaviour from different sources - 
from colleagues, subordinates, and superiors, who had worked with that 
person during the evaluation period. Some of the interviewed managers also 
suggested that they paid attention to developing trust in the superior-
subordinate relationship by simply “trying to be as righteous and fair” in the 
evaluation as possible. Emphasis was also paid to increasing the transparency 
of the evaluation process. Managers were expected to present written feedback 
about what their subordinates had achieved, what had been good in their work, 
and where  they  could  still  improve.  This  written  feedback  was  provided  both  
with regard to the business targets, as well as with consideration of the extent 
to which that person had operated in accordance with the organisational 
values.  
 Finally,  the  fact  that  the  performance  evaluation  and  reward  process  was  
oriented more towards enhancing personal development than toward enforcing 
strict accountability contributed to organisational members not having to feel 
threatened by the process.  They could better accept the fact that their 
evaluations were to a large extent subjective.77 As a consequence, the 
interviewed  managers  did  not  seem  to  feel  offended  or  threatened  by  their  
performance being evaluated also with regard to their values-related 
behaviour. The general attitude seemed to be that evaluating organisational 
members’ performance with regard to their values-related behaviour was 
essential for the effective functioning of the organisation: it enhanced 
cooperation, and gave organisational members an incentive to contribute 
beyond their individual business targets, which were generally determined with 
                                                  
77 If an individual failed to reach his/her targets, it did not, in general, result in severe 
consequences. It meant in practice that a personal ‘development plan’, specifying 
personal development objectives for the upcoming 30, 60, or 90-day-period, was 
outlined. 
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a six-month perspective. The Senior Development Manager for Business 
Improvement Services commented again: 
 
”Well, the reason for that we evaluate both the ’what’ and the ’how’ is that you need 
to  have  both  sides…  If  we  measured  only  very  concrete  targets,  and  paid  no  
attention to how they were achieved, it would be a very short-sighted approach. 
You could perhaps squeeze out results, but in our company it is the organisational 
values  that  should  guide  the  way  you  seek  your  targets….  This  is  a  much  more  
sustainable and enduring approach. This approach enhances cooperation and the 
achievement of targets in practice.”  
 
The Cost Management and Business Control Manager noted for his part: 
 
“I  think  that  the  main  reason  for  that  we  evaluate  also  the  how  part  is  that  the  
company wants to operate and perform on a long-term perspective; not focus on 
only short-term performance.”  
 
The formal evaluation and incentivisation of values-related behaviour could, 
however, have been ineffective and artificial, unless there would have been at 
least some degree of value congruence between the organisation and 
organisational  members  generated  through  the  other  values-based  control  
approaches. The fact that the other approaches strengthened organisational 
members’ awareness and internalisation of organisational values contributed 
to that managers were better prepared to evaluate their subordinates’ values-
related behaviour. The Finance Director A concluded:  
 
“I have found this evaluation to be very easy - I have not perceived it as challenging. 
This  is  probably because our values are easy to subscribe to – then they are also 
easy to use in the evaluation. If they were somehow alien to you, then the evaluation 
would be more artificial. Our organisational values are visible and present all the 
time. They provide clear guidelines for us.”  
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper has sought to elaborate on  the concept of values-based control - a 
concept which has remained ambiguous, despite contemporary literature on 
MCSs regarding such systems as constituting an essential part of the overall 
MCS package  (Malmi  and Brown,  2008;  Merchant  and Van der  Stede,  2007;  
Mundy, 2010; Sandelin, 2008; Simons, 1995a; Widener, 2007). It has sought 
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to  specify  the  key  approaches  in  mobilizing  values-based  control.  And  it  has  
tried to illustrate how these approaches can be applied in practice. The 
examination has been based on a review of extant literature - and on an 
empirical illustration of values-based control practices in a large, global 
organisation.  
 This  paper  seeks  to  add  a  conceptual  argument  and  an  empirical  
illustration  to  the  literatures  on  values-based  control  and  MCS.  First,  it  
proposes a new conceptualisation of values-based control which portrays 
values-based control as comprising of an array of complementary values-based 
control approaches. These differ in the extent to which they seek to exert direct 
influence on organisational members’ behaviour. This new conceptualisation is 
broader than the values-based control concepts generally applied within the 
MCS  literature.  It  suggests  that  organisational  members  can  engage  in  
desirable values-related behaviour not only on the basis of their intrinsic 
motivation  (e.g.  Meglino  and  Ravlin,  1998;  Ouchi,  1979),  but  on  the  basis  of   
their  perceptions  of  the  benefits  related  to  assuming  such  behaviour  (e.g.  
Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; Wiener, 1982; Willmott, 1993). It complements the 
three  values-based  control  approaches  -  selection, acculturation and 
communication -  generally  highlighted  by  the  literature  on  values-based  
control with a fourth approach - that of formally incentivizing organisational 
members’ values-related behaviour. Second, the paper also provides an 
empirical  illustration  to  the  values-based  control  and  MCS  literatures  by  
describing in some empirical detail how values-based control can be mobilised 
through the means of formal incentivisation. Prior studies reporting managers’ 
attempts to incentivize organisational members’ values-related behaviour (Doz 
and Kosonen, 2007, p. 110; Lenzioni, 2002, Mundy, 2010) have provided very 
little visibility into how the formal incentivisation of values-related behaviour 
can be implemented in practice. 
 The new conceptualisation put forward in this paper has implications for 
the research on values-based control. First, it argues that the general 
conception to view values-based control as socio-ideological control that 
operates through influencing organisational members’ internal beliefs about 
what types of behaviour are desirable (e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1995; Norris and 
O’Dwyer, 2004; Ouchi, 1979; Simons, 1995a)  may represent only a partial view 
of the nature of values-based control. This is because individual values are 
enduring, and difficult to change during adulthood (Ravlin, 1995; Rokeach, 
1973). Managers’ attempts to align organisational members’ values with those 
of the organisation are unlikely to result in complete value congruence between 
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the organisation and organisational members (Ogbonna and Harris, 1998; 
Willmott,  1993).  As  a  consequence,  managers  cannot  presume  that  
organisational  members  would  internalize  these  values,  whereby  the  
organisational values would serve as internalised, normative guidelines for 
guiding organisational members’ behaviour. They may need to exert also more 
direct influence organisational members’ behaviour in order to generate 
desirable values-related behaviour within the organisation.  
 Second, it suggests that a common juxtaposition between values-based 
control and formal, bureaucratic forms of control (see e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Langfield-Smith,  1997;  Norris  and  O’Dwyer,  2005;  Ouchi,  1979)  may  not  be  
justifiable. The MCS and values-based control literatures often portray values-
based control as an informal and subtle control form, which operates largely 
outside formal control processes (see e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1997; Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2007; Norris and O’Dwyer, 2004; Ouchi, 1979; cf. Alvesson and 
Kärreman, 2004; Simons, 1995a). The conceptualisation put forward in this 
paper highlights that many of the processes through which values-based 
control is mobilised - such as employee selection, training, evaluation and 
incentivisation - are in fact quite formal organisational processes. It argues 
further that values-based control can exhibit many of the characteristics of 
conventional bureaucratic control systems following cybernetic logic: when 
values-based control is mobilised through the formal incentivisation of values-
related behaviour, it entails that some standards or ideals for desirable values-
related behaviour are specified; and that organisational members’ values-
related behaviour is monitored, evaluated and rewarded based on these 
specifications. Finally, the conceptualisation put forward in this paper also 
highlights the complementary nature of values-based control approaches. It 
contends that all the identified values-based control approaches have inherent 
limitations. It argues that an effective mobilisation of values-based control can 
necessitate a complementary use of these approaches. 
 Further empirical investigations are needed to assess whether the 
conceptualisation proposed in this paper is helpful in explaining the nature and 
implementation of values-based control in organisations. All the four identified 
values-based control approaches are not likely to be pertinent, or even 
necessary, in all organisational contexts. Small and geographically confined 
organisations may be able to mobilize values-based control solely through such 
values-based control approaches that operate through creating value 
congruence between the organisation and organisational members. Large, 
global organisations that operate across a multiplicity of national cultures may, 
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on  the  other  hand,  not  be  able  to  base  their  values-based  control  solely  on  
creating value congruence. They may need to exert also more direct influence 
on organisational members’ behaviour, through specifying - and potentially 
incentivizing - desirable values-related behaviour within their organisations. 
Future studies could provide insight into the contextual nature of these 
practices, as well as into their relationships with other MCSs in a control 
package.  
 Further empirical examinations could also seek to shed more light on how 
organisational members react to managers’ attempts to monitor and evaluate 
their values-related behaviours. Such a control approach intrudes into very 
personal and sensitive domains. It can trigger resistance and anxiety among 
organisational members. This study suggests that certain procedural features - 
such as an attempt to strengthen the transparency of the evaluation process -   
can enhance organisational members’ approval for such evaluation. Further 
studies could tell us more about the procedural features of acting managers 
seeking to strengthen their capability to impose such personal, almost intimate 
control.  
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Appendix A: Interviews and informal discussions 
 
INTERVIEWS    
With Whom Level Date Duration  
(min) 
    
Corporate planning & analysis director,  
former strategic planning director for the 
largest business area 
corporate 21 June 2006 120 
Corporate planning & analysis director,  
former strategic planning director for the 
largest business area 
corporate 10 July 2006  90 
Marketing  planning  director  for  the
largest business area 
business 
area 
10 August 2006 90 
Corporate planning & analysis director 
with finance & control background 
corporate 14 August 2006 90 
Vice president, rewards & benefits and 
competence & performance management 
director (joint telephone interview 
through conference call) 
corporate 23 August 2006 90 
Corporate planning & analysis director,  
former strategic planning director for the 
largest business area 
corporate 13 September 2006 90 
Head of finance & control corporate 21 September 2006 60 
Vice president, business improvement 
services and senior development 
manager, business improvement services 
corporate 13 October 2006 90 
Corporate strategy director corporate 23 October 2006 90 
Senior development manager, business 
improvement services 
corporate 27 October 2006 60 
Vice president, business improvement 
services 
corporate 3 November 2006 60 
Corporate strategy director corporate 29 November 2006 60 
Competence & performance 
management director 
corporate 30 November 2006 90 
director, business development & 
strategy  projects,  R&D  for  the  largest  
business area 
business 
area 
7 January 2008 90 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 14 January 2008 30 
Director, F&C, business unit x within the 
second largest business area 
business 
unit 
14 January 2008 90 
Director HR, executive development, 
talent and performance management, HR 
development 
corporate 22 January 2008 90 
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Strategy  &  portfolio  manager  for  one  of  
the sales categories 
business 
unit 
14 March 2008 60 
Cost management and business control 
director for purchasing at the largest 
business area 
business 
unit 
15 March 2008 30 
Former senior manager, third largest 
business area 
business 
area 
11 June 2009 30 
Finance director I for a major horizontal 
organisation (telephone interview) 
business 
area 
15 June 2009 30 
Finance director II for a major horizontal 
organisation 
business 
area 
17 June 2009 40 
 
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS    
With Whom Level Date Duration  
(min) 
    
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 23 May 2006   60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 9 June 2006 60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 27 October 2006 60 
Corporate planning & analysis director corporate 19 January 2007 30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business area  
business 
area 
2 April 2006  30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business area 
business 
area 
20 April 2006 30 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business area 
business 
area 
28 September 2007 60 
Senior manager, strategy & business 
development for the largest business area 
business 
area 
22 June 2009 30 
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